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The trend in Information Technology is that distributed systems and networks
are becoming increasingly important, as most of the services and opportunities
that characterise the modern society are based on these technologies. Com-
munication among agents over networks has therefore acquired a great deal of
research interest. In order to provide effective and reliable means of communi-
cation, more and more communication protocols are invented, and for most of
them, security is a significant goal.
It has long been a challenge to determine conclusively whether a given protocol is
secure or not. The development of formal techniques, e.g. control flow analyses,
that can check various security properties, is an important tool to meet this
challenge. This dissertation contributes to the development of such techniques.
In this dissertation, security protocols are modelled in the process calculus LYSA.
A variety of interesting security properties that protocols are often expected to
have are formalised: authentication, confidentiality, freshness, absence of simple
and complex type flaws. Those security properties are explicitly specified as
annotations embedded in the LYSA syntax. Finally, a number of automatic
techniques for the analysis of system behaviour are developed. These techniques
are specified as control flow analyses and are, therefore, guaranteed to terminate.
The perspectives for the analysis techniques are discussed. Thus the dissertation
marks a step forward both for scientists, who gain a general framework for
the study of several interesting security properties, and developers, who get a




Tidens informationsteknologiske trend er at distribuerede systemer og netværk
bliver mere og mere vigtige, idet de fleste af de services og muligheder, der
tegner det moderne samfund, er baseret p˚a disse teknologier. Netværksbaseret
kommunikation mellem autonome agenter har derfor f˚aet stor forskningsmæssig
interesse. For at tilvejebringe effektive, p˚alidelige og sikre kommunikations-
former bliver der til stadighed udviklet et væld af protokoller. I de fleste af
disse protokoller er sikkerhed et væsentligt ma˚l.
Det har længe været en udfordring at give garantier for om en given pro-
tokol er sikker. Udviklingen af formelle analyser, der kan verificere forskellige
ønskværdige sikkerhedsegenskaber, er derfor et vigtigt redskab n˚ar denne ud-
fordring skal imødeg˚as. Denne afhandling bidrager til udviklingen af s˚adanne
teknikker.
I afhandlingen modelleres sikkerhedsprotokoller i proces kalkulen LYSA. Dernæst
formaliseres et antal vigtige sikkerhedsegenskaber, som protokoller normalt for-
ventes at have: autenticitet (authentication), fortrolighed (confidentiality), friskhed
(freshness) og fraværet af b˚ade simple og komplekse typefejl (type flaws). Disse
egenskaber specificeres eksplicit i form af annoteringer der indføjes i protokollernes
specifikationer ved brug af udvidelser af LYSA kalkulens syntaks. Det sidste
skridt best˚ar i udviklingen af automatiske teknikker til analyse af systemers
opførsel. Disse teknikker er specificeret som statiske kontrol flow analyser og er
derfor fuldt automatiske og terminerer altid.
De brugsmæssige s˚avel som videnskabelige perspektiver for disse teknikker be-
handles. Dermed bidrager afhandlingen med et skridt fremad b˚ade for forskere,
som f˚ar en mere generel ramme, indenfor hvilken interessante sikkerhedsegen-
iv
skaber kan studeres, og for udviklere, som f˚ar en samling af værktøjer, der kan
validere kryptografiske protokoller i forhold til forskellige sikkerhedsaspekter.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In modern times, distributed systems and networks are becoming increasingly
important, upon which most technologies that shape today’s society are built.
Communication among agents over networks is then drawing a lot of attention.
In order to build efficient and reliable means of communication, more and more
protocols have been invented. In most of the protocols, security plays a sig-
nificant role and is normally a goal to achieve. For example, when shopping
online the credit card information of customers has to be kept secret, and when
doing e-banking, a money transfer request has to be recognized as coming from
a person who has the right to do it. In these two examples, security involves
confidentiality and authenticity, respectively. However there are more aspects
of security, e.g. integrity, availability and non-repudiation, depending on the
application in question.
Generally speaking, in distributed systems and networks, security problems are
undecidable [30] for their dynamic behaviour due to, say, mis-behaved agents
and unbounded sessions of protocol executions [35, 42, 26, 76]. Therefore, ver-
ification of security properties is an important research problem. This leads to
the researches in searching for a way to verify whether a system is secure or not.
Formal methods offer a promising approach for automated security analysis of
protocols: the intuitive notions are translated into formal specifications, which
is essential for a careful design and analysis, and protocol executions can be
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simulated, making it easier to verify certain security properties.
This thesis relies on the use of formal methods and investigates one way to
soundly validate protocols. The aim of this thesis is to illustrate that:
The intended behaviour of cryptographic protocols can be made
more explicit using annotations. Such annotations will facilitate
static program analysis to validate a number of important security
properties the protocols are supposed to adhere to.
1.1 Background
The central topic of this thesis is composed of the following elements.
1.1.1 Security Protocols
The most frequently used way of protecting communication is by means of
cryptography, i.e. data from one party is encrypted using a key before sending
it out onto the network and the other party who receives the encryption has to
use a corresponding key to decrypt the message before being able to read the
data. Obviously it requires that these two parties have to agree on the keys
used to encrypt and decrypt prior to performing any action. The sequence of
message exchanges in order to generate and distribute cryptographic keys to
the intended users is the so called security protocol (or communication protocol,
cryptographic protocol).
Designing security protocols is complex and often error prone: various attacks
are reported in the literature to protocols thought to be “correct” for many
years. This is due to the nature of protocols: they are executed in an uncertain
environment, where some of the participants are not fully trusted or even maybe
malicious. Sometimes, the attackers do not need to break cryptography. Indeed,
these are the cases considered in this thesis, i.e. the underlying cryptography of
protocols is assumed to be perfect, which means that security issues regarding
cryptographic primitives and specific cryptographic algorithms are abstracted
away, and protocols are broken merely because of attackers exploiting flaws
in the protocols. The attacker is powerful enough to perform a number of
potentially dangerous actions: he is able to intercept messages flowing over the
network, or replace them by new ones using the knowledge he has previously
gained; he is able to perform encryption and decryption using the keys within
1.1 Background 3
his knowledge. Consequently, albeit carefully designed, security protocols may
have various flaws , allowing the attackers to break it.
Each security protocol is designed to achieve certain goals after the execution.
Those goals are called security properties. There are various security properties,
for example, to ensure that secret data is not revealed to irrelevant parties,
to make two parities share a same fresh key, or to make sure they are the
intended senders/receivers. Due to the presence of an attacker, protocols are
easily subject to some flaws and thus not able to preserve the expected security
properties. Therefore it is very important to find a formal way to prove their
correctness with respect to security properties. Indeed, this is the essential goal
of this thesis.
Security protocols are widely used. Example protocol applications include the
following,
e-shopping Shopping on the Internet becomes more and more popular now
because of its convenience. It offers lots of benefits that cannot be found
when shopping in a store or by mail: the Internet is always open – seven
days a week, 24 hours a day and bargains can be numerous. Buying an
airline ticket, booking a hotel, sending flowers to a friend can be done
within a few seconds: just select what you want and send out your credit
card number. However, one crucial concern of e-shopping is the secrecy of
the credit card number such that it won’t be known and abused by a third
party. To this aim, most of the online shops adopt the Secure Sockets
Layer (SSL V3.0) protocol, a security protocol that provides communica-
tion privacy over the Internet. The protocol is used to establish a secure
connection between two parities and hence allows client/server applica-
tions to communicate in a way that is designed to prevent eavesdropping,
tampering, or message forgery.
e-voting Voting is one of the foundational aspects of any democratic society. It
is much more complicated than simply counting votes. In fact, most of the
work in an election occurs long before/after the voter ever steps into the
booth, e.g. ballot preparation is a long process that is complicated by mil-
lions of rules and regulations, and a huge number of volunteer workforce
is involved. For the United States of America, the total country election
expenditures, in 2002, were estimated at over 1 billion dollars, or about
10 dollars per voter. Due to the large amount of votes, the traditional,
i.e. paper-based, voting system is very vulnerable and may have some
disadvantages compared to electronic voting systems, e.g. Charles Stew-
art of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology estimates that 1 million
more ballots were counted in 2004 than in 2000 because electronic voting
machines detected votes that paper-based machines would have missed.
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Naturally, an electronic voting system is embedded with voting protocols,
which try to use advanced cryptography to make electronic voting secure
and meanwhile guarantee e-voting requirements, e.g. democracy (the vot-
ers can vote only once and only the voters can vote), accuracy (a voter’s
vote cannot be altered, duplicate, or removed without being detected) and
privacy (votes remain anonymous).
1.1.2 Process Calculi
Process calculi (or process algebras) are programming-like languages for describ-
ing concurrent and distributed systems. There are a number of different, but
somehow related, process calculi, e.g. CSP [50], CCS [67] as well as some re-
cent members of this family, pi−calculus [66], spi-calculus [3] and the ambient
calculus [25].
While the variety of existing process calculi is very large, e.g. some incorporate
stochastic behaviour and some include timing information, they do share several
common features: they consist of active components, also known as processes;
each process can perform its own actions independently or interact with other
processes by communication (message passing); processes can be combined by
some basic operators, e.g. sequentialisation, parallel compositions and some-
times non-deterministic choice; and processes can declare scopes of terms using
restriction operators.
Parallel composition is a key primitive to distinguish process calculi from se-
quential computation. Assuming we have two processes P and Q, parallel com-
position of these two processes is normally represented by P | Q, which allows
computation in P and Q to proceed simultaneously and independently, and also
allows interaction between P and Q.
Interaction (or communication) can be viewed as a directed flow of information
from an outputting process (e.g. 〈t〉) to an inputting processes (e.g. (;x)).
The outputting process has to specify the data to be sent, which is t in 〈t〉.
Similarly, if an input expects to receive data, one or more bound variables will
act as place-holders to be substituted by data, when it arrives. In (;x), x plays
that role.
Sequential composition can be used to regulate the orders in which interactions
are executed. For example, it might be desirable to specify that: first to receive
data on x and then send that data out. In process calculi, the sequentialisation
operator, normally represented by ., is usually integrated with input or output,
or both. For example a process (;x).P will wait for an input, only when this
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input has been received will the process P be activated, with the received data
substituted for x.
One advantage of using process calculi to model concurrent systems is that they
are always equipped with formal semantics specifying how the system evolves.
As far as process calculi are concerned, they are often given a structural opera-
tional semantics (also called small step semantics). The semantics is regarded as
“syntax-directed” such that each compositional construct is defined in terms of
individual components, following various syntactic possibilities. The behaviour
and evolution of a process are described by means of a transition system and
each computational step is defined as a path in the transition system. Transi-
tions are defined using axioms and inference rules of the form,
Premise1 ∧ . . . ∧ Premisek
Conclusion
which can be read as “the conclusion holds when all the k premises are satisfied”.
Example 1.1 Assume there is a simple semantics rule:
〈t〉.P | (;x).Q→ P | Q[t/x]
The interpretation of this rule is:
1. The process 〈t〉.P sends out a message, t. Dually, the process (;x).Q
receives that message. Once the message has been sent, 〈t〉.P becomes
the process P , while (;x).Q becomes the process Q[t/x], which is Q with
the place-holder x substituted by the received data t.
Note that there is no premise in this case.
Process calculi can be used to model various concurrent systems, e.g. biological
systems, mobile ambients and security protocols. Executions of cryptographic
protocols can be described as a sequence of internal operations performed by
each principal and synchronised by their communications. Naturally this can
be modelled in a process calculus at a very abstract level. The desired security
properties are then studied by checking their specification along all the possible
computational steps. A large amount of research has been done in recent years
using various process calculi, e.g. to establish properties about the information
flow and to detect flaws in cryptographic protocols. It is also the approach
adopted in this thesis, i.e. using a process calculus to formally model security
protocols and specify security properties.
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1.1.3 Program Analysis
A program is any formal notation used to communicate ideas precisely between
people or between a person and a machine. Program analysis provides a static
way of deriving behavioural information of programs arising dynamically at
run-time without actually executing it. The goal of program analysis is thus to
produce descriptions of certain program properties applicable to all possible ex-
ecutions of the program for arbitrary input values. Example program properties
include: (a) which program points are reachable by variable x, and (b) which
are the possible values of variable y at run time. However, according to Rice’s
Theorem [75], some properties of programs are undecidable, including the above
examples. In order to keep analysis results computable, program analysis can
only provide safe approximate answers and therefore efforts have to be made
to keep the approximation as close to the precise result as possible. However,
in general, program analysis is very efficient in the sense that it is focusing
on the fully automatic processing of large programs and the computations are
guaranteed to terminate by lattice and fix-point theory [82].
Figure 1.1: Nature of Program Analysis
There are two kinds of approximations,
• under-approximation, which estimates the program behaviour, that must
happen along all the execution paths; and
• over-approximation, which estimates the program behaviour that may
happen along at least one execution path.
Choosing the right approximation depends on which property of a program
needs to be checked.
Example 1.2 The program fragment,
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read(x);
if x > 0
then y := 2
else y := 0;
z := 5/y
will firstly read a user input x, then check whether x is a positive number or
not before assigning different values to y and finally compute the value of z.
Assume one wants to ensure that all the divide by zero errors are found before
actually executing the program. Obviously it is of interest to estimate which
value y holds after the last statement. An over-approximation of the value of y
may be {0, 2}, which is the most precise result for this program, or {0, 2, 45},
which is a safe but less precise one. On the other hand, {2}, for example, is
not a safe over-approximation, because it does not contain all the values that y
may possibly hold. Furthermore, ∅ is a safe under-approximation of y’s value,
because none of the values is guaranteed to be held by y after the last statement.
The results of program analysis can be used to, for example, optimise compilers
for generating small, faster, less memory consuming code, or debug programs for
finding dead code or type-mismatched function calls. A more recent application
of program analysis is to capture malicious or unintended behaviours of software
and systems. In this thesis, we shall use program analysis techniques to validate
security protocols with respect to different security properties.
There are several approaches to program analysis, including Data Flow Analysis,
Control Flow Analysis, Abstract Interpretation and Type and Effect Systems.
These approaches are divided into different classes depending on whether they
compute the flow of data or the flow of control in a program.
However, there is a large amount of commonality among these approaches. A
comparison between them may help with choosing the right one for checking
the property in question and exploiting insights gained from one approach may
enhance the power of other approaches.
In this thesis, we restrict ourselves to Control Flow Analysis, a specific static
technique, based on Flow Logic for studying various security properties of com-
munication protocols.
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1.1.4 Flow Logic for Control Flow Analysis
Flow Logic [74] is a relatively new program analysis technique. It is actually
based on existing technologies and insights, especially from the classical areas of
data flow analysis, constraint based analysis and abstract interpretation. Flow
logic is concerned about specifying which criteria an analysis estimate should
satisfy in order to be acceptable for a program.
A very important feature of flow logic is that it separates the specification of an
acceptable estimate from the actual computation of the analysis information.
This abstraction enables it to be applied to a variety of programming paradigms,
including imperative, functional, object-oriented and concurrent constructs, and
even a combination of different paradigms. From flow logic’s point of view, an
analysis is split into two phases:
1. define a judgement, usually in clausal form, expressing the acceptability
of an analysis estimate for a program.
2. compute the clauses to get a solution.
One advantage of such a division is that the second phase is independent of
the kind of analyses as well as programming languages, therefore many state-of-
the-art technologies may be employed for computing the analysis information,
including the analysis of mobile ambients [25], Java cards [46] and security
protocols [15]. Furthermore, it also makes specification and implementation be-
come independent. Thus one can concentrate on specifying the analysis without
considering the implementation.
In this thesis, we will continue to exploit flow logic by applying it to specify
control flow analysis for communication protocols.
A control flow analysis of a program P works by collecting information about
some aspects of the behaviour of the program P . This behavioural information
is stored in a data structure, also called analysis component, say A. An analysis
in flow logic style is syntax-directed: it is defined structurally on the syntax of
the program P by giving rules of the form
A |= P iff a logic formula holds
meaning that A is a description of the behaviour of the program P when the
logic formula holds. The logic formula can be any arbitrary one and may even
be recursive, e.g. containing A |= P ′ for an arbitrary program P ′.
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Example 1.4 Assume one wants to analyse which data may be sent over the
network by a process. The analysis in flow logic style can be defined as:
κ |= 〈t〉.P iff 〈t〉 ∈ κ ∧ κ |= P
...
where κ is an analysis component containing all the messages sent over the
network. It can be read as “in order for κ to be a valid analysis estimations of
the process 〈t〉.P , it has to be the case that 1) 〈t〉 is contained in κ, and 2) κ is
also a valid estimation of the continuation process P”.
1.2 Contribution Outline
In this context this dissertation contributes a number of static analyses in sup-
port of the main thesis. Each of the static analyses focuses on one of the secu-
rity properties of communication protocols, which are confidentiality, freshness,
simple type flaw free, and complex type flaw free. There are also a number of
publications present these works; they are confidentiality [38], freshness [37, 36],
simple type flaw free [17, 14], and complex type flaw free [79]. These analyses
constitute a nice toolbox for the analysis of communication protocols, which
may provide useful information about security properties.
1.3 Overview of the Thesis
Chapter 2 gives an introduction to some basic concepts related to cryptographic
protocols as well as a list of protocol narrations, which are analysed in this thesis.
Chapter 3 introduces the process calculus LYSA, which is a calculus that models
systems using secure network communication protected by means of cryptogra-
phy. Both the syntax and semantics are presented. It also shows how to encode
in LYSA protocols executed in different scenarios.
Chapter 4 introduces the basic concepts of the analysis technique and shows how
analyses are formulated in the Flow Logic framework. Next, a fairly standard
control flow analysis of LYSA is given that captures the entire behaviour of any
LYSA process. It is illustrated how to prove within the Flow Logic framework
that the analysis is indeed able to capture the behaviour of a process with respect
to the formal semantics given in Chapter 3.
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Chapter 5 concerns the authentication property of protocols. Both the LYSA
calculus, presented in Chapter 3, and the standard Control Flow Analysis, pre-
sented in Chapter 4, are extended to include orig and dest annotations in order
to facilitate capturing authentication violations.
Chapter 6 analyses the confidentiality properties and extends standard LYSA
and it’s Control Flow Analysis with within and from annotations to detect any
confidentiality violations.
This work was previously presented in [38].
Chapter 7 describes how to detect replay attacks. It is done by distinguish-
ing terms from different sessions. To this aim, the standard LYSA calculus is
decorated with session identifiers and the Control Flow Analysis is extended to
capture message replays by inspecting the session identifiers.
This work was previously presented in [37, 36].
Chapter 8 deals with the simple type flaw attacks, which happen when a field in
a message is interpreted as of an unexpected type. The standard LYSA calculus
is extended to include types, terms are associated with their types. The Control
Flow Analysis is then extended to compare whether the received term is of the
expected type and hence captures any type mismatching.
This work was previously presented in [17, 14].
Chapter 9 discusses complex type flaw attacks, the central idea of which is to fool
a principal by misinterpreting the fields and accepting a concatenation of fields
as single field. The notion of one-to-one variable binding in the standard LYSA
calculus is relaxed in order to capture multi-to-one bindings. It is guaranteed
that a protocol is free of complex type flaw attacks if there are no possible
multi-to-one bindings.
This work was previously presented in [79].
Chapter 10 concludes the thesis and discusses perspectives of future work.
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Protocols
Cryptographic protocol, as suggested by the name, employs cryptographic algo-
rithms to protect sensitive data. It normally consists of a sequence of message
exchanging and is to achieve some security-related goals after a complete exe-
cution.
Before going into the details, we shall describe in words a very simple crypto-
graphic protocol as an example.
Figure 2.1: A Simple Protocol
Example 2.1 In our scenario, as shown in Figure 2.1, there are two users,
say Alice and Bob, where Alice wants to send to Bob a secret data, credit card
information for instance, over an insecure network. Assuming both Alice and
Bob pre-share a key in advance, one way to achieve the goal is that Alice uses
the key to encrypt the secret data and sends the encryption to Bob along the
network. When receiving the encryption, Bob then decrypts it using the key and
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gets hold of the secret data. After successfully completed the protocol, Alice and
Bob, and nobody else, should know the secret data.
In the above example, cryptography is used to protect the security of data. The
sender encrypts the sensitive data using the key and the receiver at the other
end of the network decrypts the message using the corresponding key to extract
the data. However, as pinpointed by [41],
cryptography is rarely ever the solution to a security problem. Cryp-
tography is a translation mechanism, usually converting a commu-
nication security problem into a key management problem and ulti-
mately into a computer security problem. Hopefully, the resulting
problem is easier to solve than the original problem. In summary,
cryptography can enhance computer security; it is not a substitute
for computer security.
The reason is that there are various kinds of attacks, which can prevent crypto-
graphic protocols from achieving the expected security goals without breaking
the underlying cryptographic algorithms.
2.1 Security Attacks
What kind of attacks do there exist against security protocols? This question
cannot be answered before having defined what we expect from a given security
protocol. As an example, assume that the purpose of a certain protocol is to
distribute credit card information safely between, say, Alice and Bob (as in
Example 2.1). Then we expect that after the protocol has been successfully
terminated, the credit card information is known to Alice and Bob, only. If the
protocol can terminate successfully so that an outsider knows the information
then our expectations have not been realized. There is an attack against the
protocol.
Let us now enumerate some typical attacks. In general, the communication over
network is viewed as a flow of information from a source, such as a file or a user,
to a destination, such as another file or a user. The attacks on the security of
network can be categorised into the following [55].
Interruption The communication flow is destroyed or becomes unavailable or
unusable. Examples include destruction of a piece of hardware, i.e. a hard
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disk, or the cutting of a physical communication line, i.e. a cable.
Eavesdropping An unauthorised party gains access to the communication.
The unauthorised party could be a person, a program, or a computer. Ex-
amples include wiretapping to capture data in a network, and the illegally
copying of files or programs.
Fabrication An unauthorised party inserts counterfeit data into the commu-
nication flow. Examples include the inserting of spurious message in a
network or the addition of records to a file.
Modification An unauthorised party not only gains access to but tampers
with the communication flow. Examples include changing values in a
data file, altering a program so that it performs differently, and modifying
the content of messages being transmitted in a network.
Traffic analysis An unauthorised party intercepts and examines the messages
flowing over the network in order to deduce information from the message
patterns. It can be performed even when the messages are encrypted and
can not be decrypted.
Figure 2.2: Graphical Representation of the attacks
These attacks can be represented as in Figure 2.2.
Attacks can be divided into active and passive attacks. Passive attacks are at-
tacks that can be carried out by eavesdropping on the communications between
the participants, without modifying or redirecting them. All other attacks are
active attacks. Typically, passive attacks are somehow trivial and almost all
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attacks that are mentioned in the literature are the active ones, which is also
the case in this thesis.
A protocol execution is considered as involving honest principals and active
attackers. The abilities of the attackers and relationship between honest prin-
cipals and attackers together constitute a threat model. The almost exclusively
used threat model is the one proposed by Dolev and Yao [33], which is there-
fore often referred to as Dolev-Yao threat model. The Dolev-Yao threat model
is a worst-case model in the sense that the network, over which the principals
communicate, is thought as being totally controlled by an omnipotent attacker
with all the capabilities listed above. Therefore, there is no need to assume the
existence of multiple attackers, because they together do not have more abilities
than the single omnipotent one. Dishonest principals do not need to be consid-
ered either: they can be viewed as attackers. Furthermore, obviously, it is not
interesting to consider an attacker with less abilities than the omnipotent one.
Example 2.2 In Example 2.1, the attacker can eavesdrop on the encryption
sent over the network. In case he is in possession of the pre-shared key between
Alice and Bob, he is able to attack the protocol in, at least, the following two
ways:
1. eavesdrop the communication and perform decryption and therefore knows
the credit card information.
2. intercept the communication and encrypt something else and send to Bob,
who will then be cheated in accepting a faked credit card information.
2.2 Security Properties
Each cryptographic protocol is designed to achieve one or more security-related
goals after a successful execution, in other words, the principals involved may
reason about certain properties; for example, only certain principals have access
to particular secret information. They may then use this information to verify
claims about subsequent communication, e.g. an encrypted message can only
be decrypted by the principals who have access to the corresponding encryption
key.
The most commonly considered security properties include,
Authentication Authentication is concerned with assuring that a communi-
cation is authentic. In the case of an ongoing interaction, such as the
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connection of a host to another host, two aspects are involved. First, at
the time of connection initiation, the two entities have to be authentic,
i.e. each is the entity that he claims to be. Second, during the connec-
tion, there is no third party who interferes in such a way that he can
masquerade as one of the two legitimate parties for the purposes of unau-
thorized transmission or reception. For example, fabrication is an attack
on authenticity.
Confidentiality Confidentiality is the protection of transmitted data from at-
tacks. With respect to the release of message contents, several levels of
protection can be identified, including the protection of a single message
or even specific fields within a message. For example, interception is an
attack on confidentiality.
Integrity Integrity assures that messages are received as sent, with no dupli-
cation, insertion, modification, reordering, or replays. As with confiden-
tiality, integrity can apply to a stream of messages, a single message, or
selected fields within a message. Modification is an attack on integrity.
Availability Availability assures that a service or a piece of information is
accessible to legitimate users or receivers upon request. There are two
common ways to specify availability. The first approach is to quantify
system reliability using measurable criteria, such as the failure probability
or the MTTF/MTTR (mean time to fail/ mean time to recover) ratio
[78]. The second approach is to specify failure factors (factors that could
cause the system or the communication to fail) [77], for example, the
minimum number of host failures needed to bring down the system or the
communication. Interruption is, for example, an attack on availability.
Non-repudiation Non-repudiation prevents either sender or receiver from deny-
ing a transmitted message. Thus, when a message is sent, the receiver can
prove that the message was in fact sent by the alleged sender. Similarly,
when a message is received, the sender can prove that the message was in
fact received by the alleged receiver.
Example 2.3 Consider the two attacks on the protocol in Example 2.2. The
first attack breaks the confidentiality of the credit card information, because it
is known to the attacker. The second attack breaks the authentication of Alice
to Bob: after completing the protocol, Bob believes that what he received is from
Alice but actually it is from the attacker instead.
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2.3 Security Mechanisms
Cryptographic mechanisms are fundamental to cryptographic protocols. Sup-
pose that we have a message text M that we wish to transmit over the network.
The process of converting M to a form that is not understandable to anyone
monitoring the network is called encryption. This conversion depends on an
additional parameter K known as the key.
The intended receiver of an encrypted message may wish to recover the original
text M . To do this, a second key (K or K−1) is used to reverse the process.
This reverse process is known as decryption.
It is very obvious that by restricting appropriately who has access to the keys
involved, we can limit the ability to encrypt or decrypt messages.
2.3.1 Cryptographic Primitives
Symmetric Key Cryptography In symmetric key cryptography, the en-
cryption key and decryption key are identical. Of course, anyone who holds
the key can create encryption and read the contents of encrypted messages. To
ensure security of communication this key is kept secret between the communi-
cating principals.
In this thesis, we shall represent the encryption of M using key K by {M}K
and adopt the notation of perfect encryption, where we do not consider the
attacker to be all powerful in terms of solving computational problems. This
means that there are certain things that the attacker can not do, e.g. without the
correct key, the attacker cannot decrypt an encryption or generate an encryption
without using the proper key.
Asymmetric Key Cryptography In asymmetric key cryptography (or pub-
lic key cryptography) there is no shared secret between communicating princi-
pals. In this scenario, each principal is associated with a key pair (K,K−1).
The public key K is made publicly available but the private K−1 is kept secret
from anybody else. Any principal can encrypt a message M using K and only
the key-holder can then decrypt it using K−1. Thus, the secrecy of messages to
the principal can be ensured.
Some public key algorithms allow the private key to be used to encrypt messages
with the public key being used to decrypt the corresponding encryption. If an
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encryption decrypts (using K) to a meaningful message M then it is assumed
that the encryption must have been created by the key-holder using the key
K−1. This can be used to guarantee the authenticity of the message. Such
algorithms are often said to provide a digital signature capability.
One-way Hash Function We shall often require evidence that a message
that has been sent has not been subject to modification in any way. Typically
this is carried out by using a hash function. A hash function H when applied to
a messageM yields a value H(M) known as the hash value of that message. The
mapping of message to its hash result is one-way; given M and H(M) it should
be computationally infeasible to find M ′ such that H(M ′) = H(M). Therefore
a receiver of a message can check whether a message and a corresponding hash
result agree. Hash functions are largely intended for use in conjunction with
cryptography to provide signatures.
2.3.2 Session Key vs. Master Key
In general, the cryptographic protocol architecture consists of two principals,
who are willing to engage in a secure communication using an insecure network,
and a trusted server, which generates the session key used for exchanging data
securely between the principals. The session key is abandoned after data ex-
changing is over. In fact, it is not possible to establish an authenticated session
key without existing secure channels already being available [19]. Therefore it is
essential that some keys are already shared between different principals, which
are often referred to as master keys. Different from session keys, which expire
after each session, master keys are changed less frequently, and consequently
leaking master keys always causes cryptographic protocols to be broken.
2.4 Protocol Narrations
Protocols are normally expressed as narrations, where some finer details are
abstracted away. A protocol narration is a simple sequence of message exchanges
between the different participating principals and can be interpreted as the
intended trace of the ideal execution of the protocols. Consider the following
example.
Example 2.4 The protocol narration of Example 2.1 can be written as
1. A→ B : {CCI}K
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where A is Alice for short, B is Bob and CCI stands for the credit card infor-
mation. The protocol narration specifies that the protocol has only one step that
A sends to B the credit card information encrypted using the key K.
2.4.1 Some Example Protocol Narrations
We collect in this section all the protocols being mentioned or analysed in the
thesis.
2.4.1.1 Wide Mouthed Frog protocol
WMF is a symmetric key management protocol aiming at establishing a secret
session key Kab between the two principals A and B sharing secret master keys
KA and KB , respectively, with a trusted server S. The protocol is specified by
the informal narration below.
In the first message A sends to S its name, and then a fresh key Kab and the
name of the intended receiver B, encrypted under the key KA. In the second
one, S forwards the key and the sender name A to B, encrypted under the key
KB . Finally, B sends A the message Msg encrypted under the session key Kab
(Note that usually A sends the last message).
1. A→ S : {K}Ka
2. S → B : {K}Kb
3. B → A : {Msg}K
2.4.1.2 Andrew Secure RPC protocol
The goal of the Andrew Secure RPC protocol is to exchange a fresh, authen-
ticated, secret key between two principals sharing a symmetric key K. It has
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four steps. In the first message the initiator A sends a nonce NA, the respon-
der B increments and returns it as the second message together with his nonce
NB . A accepts the value and returns the NB + 1, B receives and checks the
third message and if it contains the nonce incremented, then he sends a new
session key, K ′ to A together with a new value N ′B to be used in subsequent
communications. The protocol narration is the following,
1. A→ B : A, {NA}K
2. B → A : {NA + 1, NB}K
3. A→ B : {NB + 1}K
4. B → A : {K ′, N ′B}K
The Andrew Secure RPC protocol is subject to a simple type flaw attack as
shown below: by replaying the message from step 2 to B in step 4, the attacker
can successfully force A to accept NA + 1 as the new session key. The protocol
makes use of an operation to increment NA, in step 2, and NB , in the third
step 1. The attack is shown below,
1. A→ B : A, {NA}K
2. B → A : {NA + 1, NB}K
3. A→M(B) : {NB + 1}K
4. M(B)→ A : {NA + 1, NB}K
An improved version of Andrew Secure RPC protocol is suggested in [23], the so
called BAN version, in order to prevent the above mentioned type flaw attack.
The fixing amounts to inserting another component NA into the encryption in
the fourth message, as shown below,
4′. B → A : {K ′, N ′B , NA}K
and leave the other steps untouched.
1The increment operation in LySa can be modelled as an encryption with key SUCC,
where SUCC is known to the attacker.
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2.4.1.3 Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key protocol
1. A→ S : A,B,Na
2. S → A : {Na, B,K, {K,A}Kb}Ka
3. A→ B : {K,A}Kb
4. B → A : {Nb}K
5. A→ B : {Nb − 1}K
6. A→ B : {Msg}K
This protocol involves two principals A and B and a server S, with whom A
and B share the master keys ka and kb, respectively. The protocol has 6 steps
to accomplish the goal that a session key K is generated by S and distributed
to both A and B. The protocol makes use of nonce, typically a random number
only used once and Na and Nb in this example, to ensure the freshness of the
messages. In step 1, A tells S that she wants to talk to B and uses the nonce Na
to ensure that this request is not a replayed one. Upon receiving the request, S,
in step 2, generates a new session key K and sends it back to A, as encrypted
together some other information using the master key Ka. In step 3, A decrypts
the messages and forwards the field, {K,A}Kb to B. In step 4 and 5, B identifies
A by challenging her using the nonce Nb. If A answers the challenge correctly,
they then communicate with each other using K as the session key.
However, three years after invented, the Needham-Schroeder protocol was found
to be flawed; it subjects to a replay attack in case an old session key, K ′, is
revealed to the attacker.
1. A→ S : A,B,Na
2. S → A : {Na, B,K, {K,A}Kb}Ka
3. M(A)→ B : {K ′, A}Kb
4. B →M(A) : {Nb}K′
5. M(A)→ B : {Nb − 1}K′
6. M(A)→ B : {Msg}K′
In the above example, M(A) represents the attacker, who pretends to be the
principal A and comes into play from message 3. By knowing the old session
key K ′, he is able to replay the message {K ′, A}Kb from a previous session and
therefore later on force B to accept K ′ as a fresh session key.
Amended Needham-Schroeder protocol:
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1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : {A,NB}KB
3. A→ S : A,B,NA, {A,NB}KB
4. S → A : {NA, B,K, {K,NB , A}KB}KA
5. A→ B : {K,NB , A}KB
6. B → A : {N}K
7. A→ B : {N − 1}K
A initiates the protocol by sending his identity to B. Once B receives the
message, he replies with an encryption of whatever he received and a newly
generated nonce NB . A then forwards this encryption together with the iden-
tities and a new nonce NA to the server S. S receives this message, decrypts
the messages using the shared key KB and responds by sending the new session
key K encrypted for A with KA in step 4 including a segment encrypted for
B containing the key also. On receipt of the message in step 4, A decrypts it
and checks the value of NA to ensure that the key K is fresh. He then forwards
the encrypted segment to B in step 5. B does a similar thing that decrypts the
message and checks the freshness of the key K. In step 6 B challenge A with
another nonce N . If A responds by sending the value decremented by one in
step 7, the protocol is complete.
However, the protocol is vulnerable to a complex type flaw attack, discovered
by B. W. Long [59]:
1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : {A,NB}KB
3. A→ S : A,B,NA, {A,NB}KB
1′. M → A : NA, B,K ′
2′. A→M : {NA, B,K ′, N ′A}KA
4. M → A : {NA, B,K ′, N ′A}KA
5. A→ B : N ′A
6. M → A : {N}K′
7. A→M : {N − 1}K′
The attack requires two instances of the protocol, in which A plays the roles
of initiator and responder, respectively. In the first instance, A initiates the
protocol with B. Meanwhile, the attacker, M , initiates the second instance
with A and sends NA, B,K ′, in step 1′, to A, where NA is a copy from step
3 in the first instance and K ′ is a faked key generated by the attacker. A will
generate and send out the encryption of whatever he received, NA, B,K ′ in fact,
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and a nonce N ′A. The attacker impersonates S and replays this message to A
in the first instance. A decrypts this message, checks the nonce NA and the
identity B, and accepts K ′ as the session key, which is actually generated by
the attacker. After completing the challenge and response in step 6 and 7, A
will communicate with the attacker with the faked key K ′.
2.4.1.4 Otway-Rees Protocol
The Otway-Rees protocol aims at establishing a fresh shared key, K, and dis-
tribute it between two principals A and B. The key establishment and distri-
bution are done with the help of a server S. It is assumed that initially A and
B share long term keys KA and KB with the server, respectively. The protocol
is listed below:
1. A→ B : M,A,B, {M,A,B,NA}KA
2. B → S : M,A,B, {M,A,B,NA}KA , {M,A,B,NB}KB
3. S → B : M, {NA,K}KA , {NB ,K}KB
4. B → A : M, {NA,K}KA
5. B → A : {msg}K
The value M is used as a serial number and provides no security intention,
therefore we can safely assume that it is known to all the principals and even
the attacker. The nonces NA and NB , on the other hand, is freshly generated
in each session and thus should not be known to the attacker in advance. Note
that we rearrange the orders of some elements, compared to the original protocol
narration, just to enable pattern matching to work when encoding it in LYSA.
1. Principal A generates a fresh nonce NA, encrypts it along with the serial
number M and the names of the principals and sends the encryption as
well as the other information to the principal B.
2. Principal B generates another fresh nonce NB , encrypts it with the value
M and the names of the principals using the shared key and sends it
together with what he received to the server S.
3. Server S generates a fresh session key, K, encrypts it with the nonces
that is known to him after decrypting what he receives, using the long
term keys, KA and KB , respectively. Along with the value M , the two
encryptions are sent to B.
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4. Principal B decrypts the last part of the message he receives using his
long term key KB and checks whether the nonce NB is indeed the one he
newly generated and sent out. If this is the case, he then accepts K as
the new session key and forwards the rest of the message to principal A.
Principal A also checks the nonce NA and decides whether he accepts K
as the session key.
5. Principal B and A now are communicating with each other using the key
K to encrypt the messages.
2.4.1.5 Woo and Lam Protocol pi1
Woo and Lam [83] introduced a protocol that ensures one-way authentication of
the initiator of the protocol, A, to a responder, B. The protocol uses symmetric-
key cryptography and a trusted third-party server, S, with whom A and B share
long-term symmetric keys. The protocol uses a fresh and unpredictable nonce
NB produced by B. The protocol narration is listed in the left part of the figure
below, where the keys KAS and KBS represent the long-term keys that A and
B share with the trusted server S. The protocol narration is the following,
1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : NB
3. A→ B : {A,B,NB}KAS
4. B → S : {A,B, {A,B,NB}KAS}KBS
5. S → B : {A,B,NB}KBS
The Woo-Lam protocol is prone to a type flaw attack, which is shown below.
The attacker replays the nonce NB to B in step 3, which B accepts as being
of the form {A,B,NB}KAS . B then encrypts whatever he received and then
sends it out in step 4. The attacker intercepts it and replays it to B in step 5
and therefore fools B to believe that he has authenticated A, whereas A has not
even participated in the run, as shown below,
1. M(A)→ B : A
2. B →M(A) : NB
3. M(A)→ B : NB
4. B →M(S) : {A,B,NB}KBS
5. M(S)→ B : {A,B,NB}KBS
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2.5 Why Cryptographic Protocols Go Wrong
Nowadays a considerable number of cryptographic protocols have been specified
and implemented. Consequently analysing cryptographic protocols in order to
find various kinds of flaws and to prevent them has received a lot of attention.
The area is, however, remarkably subtle and a very large portion of proposed
protocols have been shown to be flawed a long time after they were published.
This has naturally encouraged research in this area. To give some examples, the
Needham Schroeder Conventional Key Protocol was published in 1978 [70] and
became the basis for many similar protocols in later years. In 1981, Denning and
Sacco demonstrated that the protocol was flawed and subject to replay attack
[29]. This sets the general trend for the field. In 1994, 13 years after the public
protocol of Denning and Sacco has been published, Martin Abadi demonstrated
that it was flawed [4]. 17 years after the publication, the public key protocol
of Needham and Schroeder, in 1995, was proved to be flawed by Lowe. In the
intervening years a whole host of protocols have been specified and found to be
flawed.
One reason for cryptographic protocols easily going wrong is the existence of
the attacker. As mentioned before, cryptographic protocols are deployed over
an open network such that everyone can join it and start sending and receiving
messages to and from the principals across it without the need of authorization
or permission. In such an open environment, we mush anticipate that there are
bad guys out there who will do all sorts of bad things, not just passively eaves-
dropping, but also actively altering, forging, duplicating, re-directing, deleting
or injecting messages. These fault messages can be malicious and cause a de-
structive effect to the principals in the receiving end.
Thus, in the Dolev-Yao threat model, any message sent to the network is con-
sidered to be sent to the attacker for his disposal. Consequently, any message
received from the network is treated to have been received from the attacker af-
ter his disposal. In other words, the attacker is considered to have the complete
control of the entire network.
Another reason for the cryptographic protocols easily go wrong is that, in the
cryptographic protocol literature, protocols are usually expressed as narrations
and most of the details of the actual deployment are ignored. Encryption,
decryption and other operations are modelled using only the natural algebraic
laws they always obey. All data that is exchanged in a cryptographic protocol
is presented in symbolic form.
Despite being rather intuitive, the description technique of protocol narrations
contains lots of implicit concepts. Abadi [2] pointed out that “informal protocol
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narrations” need to be complemented with explanations of some either implicitly
assumed facts or additional information to remove ambiguities. For example:
(1) one should make explicit what is known (publicly and privately) before a
protocol run, and what is to be generated freshly during a protocol run, (2) one
should make explicit what security goals the protocol is assumed to provide.
In case of authentication, both principals involved should be convinced that
the session key is known by both of them only but nobody else (except for the
trusted server). In case of key freshness, both principals should be convinced
that the session key is a newly generated one. These are exactly the cases for
the Needham-Schroeder symmetric key protocol in Example 2.5.
All the above points seem to be suggesting further work to make protocol nar-
rations more explicitly and formally. However, instead of pursuing a formal
semantics for protocol narrations, we shall introduce, in next chapter, some
other ways of describing protocols, namely process calculi, which have complete




The LYSA Calculus for
Security Protocols
In the literature, process calculus has the central position as a framework of
modelling and reasoning about concurrent systems. In the last two decades
several variants of process calculus have come into existence, the most important
ones of which include Communicating Sequential Processes (CSP) by Hoare [50,
51], the Calculus of Communicating Systems (CCS) by Milner [67, 68], and the
Algebra of Communicating Processes (ACP) by Bergstra and Klop [8, 10, 11].
Initially, the main idea of process calculi is to have a simple language and is
focused on studying the communications in a fixed network of parallel processes.
Later on, the use of processes calculi was evolved into describing dynamically
reconfigurable system, e.g. the pi calculus [66] and Mobile Ambients [25], or
focusing on a particular aspect of a system, such as real-time [27, 49, 69, 85],
probabilistic [39, 40, 47] or security features [3, 15].
Process calculi offer a pure framework to study concurrent and distributed sys-
tems and, in turn, the security issues connected to them. Systems are specified
as expressions of the calculus, called processes. Processes are obtained by com-
bining via a few operators (sequential and parallel composition, nondetermin-
istic choice, declarations), and can perform actions like sending and receiving
messages along channels. Furthermore there are some scope operators, such as
restrictions and hiding.
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Every process calculus is supplied with an operational semantics, which is based
on transition systems in most of the cases. The operational semantics concerns
the process behaviour. It describes which activities and operational steps a
process can perform.
3.1 LYSA Calculus
In this section we shall briefly recall the LYSA [15, 16, 20] calculus. The pro-
cess calculus LYSA is designed specially for modelling security protocols. It is
in the pi-calculus tradition and develops the idea from the Spi-calculus for in-
corporation of cryptographic operations. However different from both pi− and
Spi-calculus, it has the following two features, which greatly facilitate developing
the static analysis (see next chapter).
Firstly, LYSA has no communication channels and instead all the communication
takes place on a global network, ether. This corresponds to the real scenario
where typically security protocols are operated.
Secondly, opposing to have a separate matching construct, e.g. if-then construct
in some other process calculi, LYSA directly incorporates pattern matching into
the language constructs where values can become bound to variables. This not
only makes modelling of protocols more succinct but also makes the analysis
simpler, because one does not have to deal with values that have become bound
in a early place and will be filtered by matching in a later place.
3.1.1 Syntax
In LYSA, the basic building block is values, i.e. V al, which are used to rep-
resent keys, nonces, encrypted messages, etc. Syntactically, they are described
by expressions E ∈ Expr that may either be variables, names, or encryptions.
Variables and names come from two disjoint sets V ar, ranged over by x, and
Name, respectively. The set Name can be further partitioned into two sets: or-
dinary names, representing principal names, nonces and symmetric keys, which
are ranged over by n, and key pairs, m+ and m−, representing public and pri-
vate key pairs for asymmetric key cryptography. Finally, expressions may be
encryptions of a k-tuple of other expressions. Both symmetric key encryption
{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 , and asymmetric key encryption {|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 can be mod-
elled in LYSA. In both cases, E0 is the key used to perform the encryption.
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LYSA expressions are, in turn, used to construct LYSA processes P ∈ Proc as






{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 symmetric encryption
{|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 asymmetric encryption
P ::= processes
〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P output
(E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P input
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E0 in P symmetric decryption
decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}E0 in P asymmetric decryption
(ν n)P restriction
(ν± m)P pair restriction
P1 | P2 parallel composition
!P replication
0 nil
Table 3.1: Syntax of LYSA calculus
The process 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P sends a k−tuple of values onto the global network
and, if it succeeds, continues as P .
The process (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P reads a k−tuple of values from the
global network. Input incorporates pattern matching and only successfully con-
tinues as P when the matching succeeds, namely, the first j values of the received
k-tuple are pair-wise equal to E1, . . . , Ej . In this case, the rest k−j values of the
received tuple are pair-wise bound to the variables xj+1, . . . , xk. Syntactically,
the expressions used for matching and the variables to be bound are separated
by a semi-colon.
The process decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E0 in P denotes the sym-
metric decryption. Similar to the input construct, it incorporates a form of
pattern matching, too. The decryption succeeds only when the value of term E
is an encryption of k−tuple, where the first j values are pair-wise identical to
E1, . . . , Ej and furthermore the encryption key has to be identical to E0. If this
is the case, the rest k−j values are pair-wise bound to the variables xj+1, . . . , xk
and the process continues as P .
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The process decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}E0 in P denotes the asym-
metric decryption. It is the same as symmetric decryption except that the
encryption key and E0 must from a key pair, i.e. m+ and m−. It does not
matter which is the public one and which is the private one. In this way LYSA
is able to model both public key encryption and private key signatures.
The process (ν n)P generates a fresh name n, of which the scope is restricted
to be the process P .
The process (ν± m)P , similar to (ν n)P , generates a pair of fresh names m+
and m−. Their scopes are restricted to be P , too.
The process P1 | P2 denotes two processes P1 and P2 running in parallel. They
may synchronise through communication over the global network or perform
internal actions independently.
!P generates an arbitrary number of process P composed in parallel.
0 is the nil process and does nothing.





(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0)
The process shows a communication between two principals, namely A and B.
The topmost and bottommost processes in the parallel composition represent
their actions, respectively. Initially, the principals A and B are assumed to
share a symmetric key K.
In LYSA, the prefix (ν K) in the process (ν K)P is called a binder of the name
K, which has the scope of the process P . Also the process (ν CCI)P ′ is a
binder of name CCI, restricting its scope to the process P ′. A name is said to
be free, whenever its occurrence is not bound by any binder. In LYSA, a standard
function fn(P ) is defined, which collects all the free names in the process P .
This function is straightforward and standard but for completeness it is listed
in Table 3.2.
In the protocols, first, the principal A generates a fresh value CCI, for example
his credit card information, and then out puts the message 〈A,B, {CCI}K〉,
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consisting the names of the sender A and the intended receiver B and finally
the credit card information encrypted under the shared symmetric key, {CCI}K ,
onto the network.
The principal B is willing to receive a triple sent to himself. He uses pattern
matching to ensure that the first two values are indeed A,B. On successfully
receiving the triple sent by A, the variable y is bound to the value {CCI}K .
In order to get the credit card information, the principal B has to decrypt the
value using the key K. If succeeds, the variable yCCI will be then bound to
the value CCI.
The two parallel processes are terminated by the inactive process.
Example 3.2 The process below represents a protocol between two principals A




!(ν± K)〈B,A,K+〉.(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K− in 0
First, principal B generates a fresh key pair K+ and K−. It sends K+ to the
principal A while K− is kept private to the principal A due to the scoping rule
of the pair restriction operator.
On reception, the principal A encrypts his credit card information CCI using the
public key received in the variable x. This message is sent to B that decrypts
it using the private key K−. On successful decryption B has the credit card
information stored in the variable yCCI.
3.1.2 Semantics
Following the pi-calculus tradition, LYSA has a reduction semantics. The reduc-
tion relation holds between a pair of processes, written as P → P ′, meaning
that P can evolve into P ′. The definition of reduction relation is described by
axioms and inference rules that form an inductive definition of the relation. Be-
fore moving to the definition of the reduction relation itself in Table 3.5, some
auxiliary mechanisms will be explained.







fn({E1, . . . , Ek}E0) def= fn(E0) ∪ . . . ∪ fn(Ek)
fn({|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 def= fn(E0) ∪ . . . ∪ fn(Ek)
fn(〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P ) def= fn(E1) ∪ . . . ∪ fn(Ek) ∪ fn(P )
fn((E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P )
def
= fn(E1) ∪ . . . ∪ fn(Ej) ∪ fn(P )
fn(decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E0 in P )
def
= fn(E) ∪ fn(E0) ∪ . . . ∪ fn(Ej) ∪ fn(P )
fn(decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}E0 in P )
def
= fn(E) ∪ fn(E0) ∪ . . . ∪ fn(Ej) ∪ fn(P )
fn((ν n)P )
def
= fn(P ) \ {n}
fn((ν± m)P )
def
= fn(P ) \ {m+,m−}







Table 3.2: Free names; fn(P )
3.1.2.1 Structural Congruence
The structural congruence ≡ is defined as the least congruence satisfying the
following conditions. The idea is that two processes are considered to be equal
when they are identical up to structure and only differ in their syntax.
The last rule in Table 3.3 says that two processes P1 and P2 are structurally
equivalent whenever they are α−equivalent, namely P1 α≡ P2. The α−equivalence
relation is used to express the idea that the names of the bound variables are
unimportant and can be substituted by another one (under certain conditions).
The rules defining α−equivalence are listed in Table 3.4.
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P ≡ P
P1 ≡ P2 implies P2 ≡ P1
P1 ≡ P2 and P2 ≡ P3 implies P1 ≡ P3
P1 ≡ P2 implies

〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P1 ≡ 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P2
(E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P1 ≡
(E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P2
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E0 in P1 ≡
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E0 in P2
decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}E0 in P1 ≡
decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}E0 in P2
(ν n)P1 ≡ (ν n)P2
(ν± m)P1 ≡ (ν± m)P2
P1 | P3 ≡ P2 | P3
!P1 ≡!P2
P1 | P2 ≡ P2 | P1
(P1 | P2) | P3 ≡ P1 | (P2 | P3)
P | 0 ≡ P
!P ≡ P | !P
(ν n)0 ≡ 0
(ν n1)(ν n2)P ≡ (ν n2)(ν n1)P
(ν n)(P1 | P2) ≡ P1 | (ν n)P2 if n /∈ fn(P1)
(ν± m)0 ≡ 0
(ν± m1)(ν± m2)P ≡ (ν± m2)(ν± m1)P
(ν± m)(P1 | P2) ≡ P1 | (ν± m)P2 if m+,m− /∈ fn(P1)
(ν± m)(ν n)P ≡ (ν n)(ν± m)P
P1
α≡ P2 implies P1 ≡ P2
Table 3.3: Structural congruence; P ≡ P ′
3.1.2.2 The Reduction Relation
The reduction relation, describing how a process evolves into another, is defined
inductively as the smallest relation on two processes such that the rules in Table
3.5 are satisfied.
One auxiliary ingredient in the definition of the reduction relation is substitution
of variables for values. The values V ∈ V al are simply the closed expressions, i.e.




α≡ P2 implies P2 α≡ P1
P1
α≡ P2 and P2 α≡ P3 implies P1 α≡ P3
(ν n1)P
α≡ (ν n2)(P [n1 7→ n2]) if n2 /∈ fn(P )
(ν± m1)P
α≡ (ν± m2)(P [m+1 7→ m+2 ,m−1 7→ m−2 ]) if m+2 ,m−2 /∈ fn(P )
Table 3.4: α−equivalence




| {V1, . . . , Vk}V0
| {|V1, . . . , Vk|}V0
The semantics of the calculus specifies how a process may evolve. Because of
the parallelism construct, a process may evolve in various ways. One may be
interested in whether it is the expected one. To this end, the semantics of LYSA
makes use of a reference monitor to check each computational steps against
certain additional requirements before allowing it to be executed. The reference
monitor can be either turned on or off, thus gives two variants, parameterised
on R.
1. the standard semantics, written as P → P ′, takes R to be universally true
and thus ignores it. This can be viewed as that the reference monitor has
been turned off, i.e. no additional requirement has to be meet.
2. the reference monitor semantics, written as P →RM P ′, is an extension
of the standard semantics. In this case, the reference monitor is turned
on and checks properties of a process at run time. If the requirements,
defined by RM, are not meet, the process execution will be aborted by
the reference monitor. Note that RM is currently undefined, because no
security properties have been taken into account yet. In later chapters,
we shall show that how the reference monitor works dynamically to check
various security properties.
In some of the reduction rules, a substitution function has been used, written as
P [V/x], which substitutes a variable x for a value V in the process P whenever
x becomes bound to V .
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(Com)
∧ki=1Vi = V ′i
〈V1, . . . , Vk〉.P | (V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P ′ →R
P | P ′[V ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , V ′k/xk]
(Dec)
∧ki=0Vi = V ′i
decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as {V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk}V ′0 in P →R




∧ki=1Vi = V ′i
decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ as {|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}m− in P →R




∧ki=1Vi = V ′i
decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− as {|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}m+ in P →R




P →R P ′
(ν n)P →R (ν n)P ′ (ANew)
P →R P ′
(ν± m)P →R (ν± m)P ′
(Par)
P1 →R P ′1
P1 | P2 →R P ′1 | P2
(Congr)
P ≡ P ′ ∧ P ′ →R P ′′ ∧ P ′′ ≡ P ′′′
P →R P ′′′
Table 3.5: Operational Semantics; P →R P ′.
The reduction relation itself is defined inductively as the smallest relation on
pairs of processes that satisfies the rules in Table 3.5. These rules are explained
below.
The rule (Com) expresses that a communication happens between two processes
only when there is an output 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉.P and an input (V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P ′,
where the first j values V1, . . . , Vj and V ′1 , . . . , V
′
j are pairwise identical. In this
case, the variables after the semicolon in the input construct are substituted for
the corresponding values in the output construct.
The rules (Dec), (ADec) and (ASig) concern about decryptions and perform pat-
tern matching in a similar way: it is required that the expression being decrypted
is an encryption value of the right form, i.e. the first j values are V1, . . . , Vj ,
and the keys are the right ones with respect to symmetric or asymmetric key
cryptography. If these requirements are met, variables are substituted for the
corresponding values.
The rule (New) and (ANew) let a process to evolve inside a restriction, however
the restriction operator itself does never disappear.
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The rule (Par) expresses that parallel composition is interleaved such that one
of its branches may evolve while the other one remains unchanged.
Finally, the rule (Congr) ensures that the reduction relation may be applied to
any process that is structurally congruent to the processes found in the other
rules.
Example 3.3 Consider the process from Example 3.1. According to the reduc-
tion relation rules in Table 3.5, it may evolve following the steps:
(ν K)((ν CCI)〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0 | (A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0)
→ (ν CCI)〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0 | (A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0
→ 〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0 | (A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0
→ 0 | decrypt {CCI}K as {; yCCI}K in 0
→ 0 | 0
Note that in the line 3, since the output of the principal A, 〈A,B, {CCI}K〉
and the input of the principal B, (A,B; y), match each other, the variable y is
then substituted for the value {CCI}K in the rest of the process and hence gives
decrypt {CCI}K as {; yCCI}K in 0 in the line 4. In the line 5, we write 0 | 0
as a shorthand for 0 | 0[CCI/yCCI], which, indeed, are equivalent.
Example 3.4 In pattern matching, values to be matched and variables to be
bound are separated by semicolon. Thus the location of the semicolon is impor-
tant and affects how a process may evolve. Consider the following two cases:
1) 〈n〉.P | (;m).Q→ P |Q[n/m]
m is a variable and the process progresses.
2) 〈n〉.P | (m; ).Q
m is a value and the process is stuck.
3.2 The Meta Level Calculus
Each protocol can be used in a variety of scenarios to meet different needs, which
are not necessarily known in the design stage. When it comes to the deployment
stage, very often, one may need to make a number of assumptions, e.g. how
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many principals will be executing the protocol simultaneously and whether a
principal is allowed to play different roles at the same time. However, the LYSA
calculus presented in the previous section is abstracted to a higher level such
that it is not capable of describing those assumptions clearly. To this aim, a
meta level is introduced as an extension of LYSA presented before, which, from
now on, is referred to as object level for distinguishment.
Basically, the meta level is developed for describing different scenarios when
many principals execute a protocol at the same time, i.e. from the protocol’s
point of view, there are many initiators and responders. To identify those prin-
cipals, a protocol can be modelled as several copies of processes representing
each principal and renaming each individual principal names and keys to be
unique. This amounts to syntactically unfolding a process, e.g. using the rule
!P ≡ P | !P , and attaching indices to each copy.
The meta level is an extension of the object level with adding sequence of indices,
i1 . . . ik, to names and variables. Usually we write i¯ as a shorthand of i1 . . . ik.
The syntax of meta level terms ME ∈MTerm and meta level processes MP ∈
MProc are defined by the grammar in Table 3.6:
The meta level processes have three new constructs. They all incorporate count-
able indexing sets S, which includes set variables X.
• |i∈SMP is the parallel composition of instances of processMP , where the
index i throughout each instance is substituted by a element in the set S.
• let X ⊆ S in MP declares a set identifier X to be used in the process M ,
where X ∈ SetId refers to a subset of the values of the index set S in the
process MP . For the reason of consistence, whenever X is instantiated to
a subset of S, the same instantiation will be applied to all the X occurring
throughout the process M .
• (νi¯∈S¯ na¯i¯)MP is a restriction of all names na¯i¯, where the possible empty
prefix of indices a¯ have already been defined and the index sequence i¯ =
i1 . . . ik is instantiated pairwisely from the set S¯ = S1 × . . .× Sk.






Example 3.5 Consider the process from Example 3.1. It can be deployed in a
scenario where there are many principals Ai for i in some set S1 and many Bj
for j in some set S2. This scenario can be modelled by a meta level process as:






i¯| {ME1, . . . ,MEk}ME0
| {|ME1, . . . ,MEk|}ME0
MP ::= |i∈SMP
| let X ⊆ S in MP
| (νi¯∈S¯ na¯i¯)MP
| (ν±i¯∈S¯ ma¯i¯)MP
| 〈ME1, . . . ,MEk〉.MP
| (ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk).MP
| decrypt ME as {ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk}ME0 in MP
| decrypt ME as {|ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk|}ME0 in MP
| (ν ni¯)MP
| (ν± mi¯)MP
| MP1 | MP2
| !MP
| 0
Table 3.6: Syntax of meta level LYSA calculus
let X ⊆ S1 in
let Y ⊆ S2 in
(ν K)(
|i∈X |j∈Y (ν CCIij)〈Ai, Bj , {CCIij}K〉.0
|
|i∈X |j∈Y (Ai, Bj ; yij).decrypt yij as {; yCCIij}K in 0)
In this scenario, each principal Ai initiates a session with each principal Bj and
all the principals share the same key K.
The meta level is an extension of the object level by attaching indies to variables
and names. By instantiating the indies, it generates a number of object level
processes, each of which represents a instance of the deployment scenario. This
instantiation relation is formally defined as MP V P , describing that an object
level process P is an instance of a meta level process MP . The instantiation
relation is defined in Table 3.7.
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(ILet)
MP [X 7→ S′]V P
let X ⊆ S in MP V P if S
′ ⊆fin S
(IIPar)
MP [i 7→ a1]V P1 . . . MP [i 7→ ak]V Pk
|i∈{a1,...,ak}MP V P1| . . . |Pk
(IINew)
MP V P
(νi¯∈{a1,...,ak} na¯i¯)MP V (ν naa1) . . . (ν naak)P
(IIANew)
MP V P
(ν±i¯∈{a1,...,ak} ma¯i¯)MP V (ν± maa1) . . . (ν± maak)P
(IOut)
MP V P
〈ME1, . . . ,MEk〉.MP V 〈ME1, . . . ,MEk〉.P
(IInp)
MP V P
(ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk).MP V
(ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk).P
(IDec)
MP V P
decrypt ME as {ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk}ME0 in MP V
decrypt ME as {ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk}ME0 in P
(IADec)
MP V P
decrypt ME as {|ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk|}ME0 in MP V
decrypt ME as {|ME1, . . . ,MEj ;mxj+1, . . . ,mxk|}ME0 in P
(INew)
MP V P
(ν na¯)MP V (ν na¯)P
(IANew)
MP V P





MP1 V P1 MP2 V P2
MP1 | MP2 V P1 | P2
(INil) 0V 0
Table 3.7: The instantiation relation; MP V P
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The rule (ILet) instantiates a meta level processM to all the object level process
P , which can be found by taking some finite subset of the set S declared in the
let construct. The operator ⊆fin ensures that the subset taken is a finite one.
The rule (IIPar) instantiates an indexed parallel |i∈S M to be the parallel com-
position of processes for each of the indices in the set S.
The rules (IINew) and (IIANew) instantiate both of the indexed restrictions to
the restrictions of the names for all values in the set {a1, . . . , ak}.
Instantiation of all the other meta level constructs is performed simply by in-
stantiating their subprocess. This is the case for the rest of the rules, i.e. (IOut),
(IInp), (IDec), (IADec), (INew), (IANew), (IRep), (IPar) and (INil).
Example 3.6 The meta level process from Example 3.4 can be instantiated to
various different object level processes, when S1 = {1, 2} and S1 = {1}.
Taking X = {1, 2} and Y = {1}, we have:
(ν K)(
(ν CCI11)〈A1, B1, {CCI11}K〉.0
| (ν CCI21)〈A2, B1, {CCI21}K〉.0
| (A1, B1; y11).decrypt y11 as {; yCCI11}K in 0
| (A2, B1; y21).decrypt y21 as {; yCCI21}K in 0)
Taking X = {1} and Y = {1}, we have:
(ν K)(
(ν CCI11)〈A1, B1, {CCI11}K〉.0
| (A1, B1; y11).decrypt y11 as {; yCCI11}K in 0)
Taking X = ∅ and Y = ∅, we have: 0.
The (ILet) rule in Table 3.7 decides that the meta level process instantiates to
all the combinations of subsets of S1 and S2, which describes the scenario that
at most two principals playing the role of initiator, A1 and A2, send a message
to the responder B1.
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3.3 A Worked Example: the Otway-Rees Pro-
tocol
When modelling a protocol in the meta level, there are a number of assumptions
to make. The assumptions amounts to different scenarios, in which the protocol
is deployed. In this section, we shall show some of the considerations when
encoding a protocol by applying them to an example protocol, the Otway-Rees
protocol, which has a narration as below and is explained in Chapter 2. We will
show in the later chapters that the different assumptions made are crucial to
the control flow analysis and may result in completely different analysis results.
1. A→ B : M,A,B, {M,A,B,NA}KA
2. B → S : M,A,B, {M,A,B,NA}KA , {M,A,B,NB}KB
3. S → B : M, {NA,K}KA , {NB ,K}KB
4. B → A : M, {NA,K}KA
5. B → A : {msg}K
A very simple scenario of deploying the protocol is that only one principal A
initiates a session with one principal B. These two principals and the server can
be modelled as the three parallel processes listed in Table 3.8.
(ν KA)(ν KB)(
!(ν NA)〈M,A,B, {M,A,B,NA}KA〉.
(M ;xEnc).decrypt xEnc as {NA;xk}KA in
(;xmEnc).decrypt xmEnc as {;xMsg}xk in 0
| !(M,A,B; yEnc).
(ν NB)〈M,A,B, yEnc, {M,A,B,NB}KB 〉.
(M ; yxEnc, yzEnc).decrypt yzEnc as {NB ; yk}KB in
〈M,yxEnc〉.(ν Msg)〈{Msg}yk〉.0
| !(M,A,B; zxEnc, zyEnc).
decrypt zxEnc as {M,A,B; zna}KA in
decrypt zyEnc as {M,A,B; znb}KB in
(ν K)〈M, {zna,K}KA , {znb,K}KB 〉.0)
Table 3.8: A LYSA process of the Otway-Rees protocol with only one initiator
A and one responder B.
In the first line the keys KA and KB shared between A and the server S, and
B and the server, respectively, are restricted. These restrictions model that the
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keys are unknown to the outsiders. Technically, the scopes of KA and KB cover
both A and B, which means, for example, KA is available for B to use and KB
is available for A to use. This fact, although sounds confusing, actually does not
matter: by inspecting the processes modelling both principals, it is easy to tell
that A does not use the key KB at all and similar for B. So this LYSA process
perfectly models that only A and S share the key KA and only B and S share
the key KB .
The three lines after the restrictions model the action of the principal A, which
1) generates a new nonce NA, 2) encrypts it together with the serial value M
and the names of itself and the intended receiver using the shared key KA, and
3) sends the value M , the source and destination address and the encryption
onto the network. Note that the operator ! indicates that the principal A may
execute these steps for any number of times.
The next four lines model the principal B, which 1) generates a nonce of it own
NB , 2) encrypts the nonce with other information using the shared key KB , and
3) sends the encryptions and whatever it received from the network, i.e. ideally
the encryption generated by A, onto the network.
The last four lines model the server S. The server 1) reads from network the
encryptions generated by A and B, respectively, 2) decrypts them to get the
nonces, NA and NB , 3) generates a fresh new session key K, 4) encrypts the
new session key with the nonces, and 5) sends back to B.
3.3.1 Multiple Principals
Many protocols become vulnerable when more than one copies or sessions of
the protocol are running simultaneously. This may give chances to an attack,
i.e. messages from one session are used in another session running after it or in
parallel.
Consider a scenario that there is a server for helping establish secure commu-
nications and a set of principals that each of them may act as either a initiator
or a responder, as shown in Figure 3.1.
As far as the keys shared between principals and the server are concerned, this
scenario can be further classified into two cases:
• each principal shares a pair of keys with the server, one is for the initiator’s
role and the other is for the responder’s role. For example, a principal I
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Figure 3.1: Multiple Principals Scenario
uses KA to encrypt and decrypt when he acts as a initiator A, and uses
KB when acting as a responder.
• each principal share only one key with the server and use it for both
initiating and responding purposes.
Consider the first case, where arbitrarily many principals Ai initiates sessions
with arbitrarily many distinct responders Bj and each Ai uses the key KAi and
each Bj uses the key KBj . The scenario may be modelled as in Table 3.9.
The meta level process is identical to the one listed in Table 3.8 except that
indices have been added. The indexed parallel compositions and the indices have
been added consistently such that names, variables used in a session between
Ai and Bj are indexed ij.
We may also assume that although each principal may play the role of either
the initiator or the responder, he uses the same key for the two roles. With
this assumption about the key and others remaining the same, we can model
the protocol as in Table 3.10. Note that, in the first line, the shared key KSi is
restricted for each principal, Ai and Bi, which is different from the restriction
of KAi and KBi as in Table 3.9.
To summarize, in the section, we consider the scenario that a protocol is executed
between two sets of distinct principals and each of them may choose to use
different or the same key for the initiator or the responder roles. However there
is a significant limitation of this scenario: the protocol establishment can only
work in one direction in the sense that only principals Ai is allowed to initiate
a session. In the next section, we shall consider a more general scenario.
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let X ⊆ S in (νi∈X KAi)(νj∈X KBj)(
|i∈X |j∈X !(ν NAij)〈Mij , Ai, Bj , {Mij , Ai, Bj , NAij}KAi〉.
(Mij ;xEncij).decrypt xEncij as {NAij ;xkij}KAi in
(;xmEncij).decrypt xmEncij as {;xMsgij}xkij in 0
||i∈X |j∈X !(Mij , Ai, Bj ; yEncij).
(ν NBij)〈Mij , Ai, Bj , yEncij , {Mij , Ai, Bj , NBij}KBj 〉.
(Mij ; yxEncij , yzEncij).decrypt yzEncij as {NBij ; ykij}KBj in
〈Mij , yxEncij〉.(ν Msgij)〈{Msgij}ykij 〉.0
||i∈X |j∈X !(Mij , Ai, Bj ; zxEncij , zyEncij).
decrypt zxEncij as {Mij , Ai, Bj ; znaij}KAi in
decrypt zyEncij as {Mij , Ai, Bj ; znbij}KBj in
(ν Kij)〈Mij , {znaij ,Kij}KAi , {znbij ,Kij}KBj 〉.0)
Table 3.9: A LYSA process of the Otway-Rees protocol where there are multiple
principals and each of them uses different keys for initiator and responder roles
3.3.2 Bi-directional Key Establishment
The multiple principals scenario consists of two distinct sets of principals. An-
other, or more general, scenario is that it only consists of principals Ii such that
each principal can act both as initiator and as responder of the protocols, e.g.
each principal Ii initiates a session with every other principals Ij and meanwhile
responds to the sessions initiated by each Ij , as shown in Figure 3.2. In such a
scenario, the key establishment will be used in two directions.
Figure 3.2: Bi-directional Key Establishment Scenario
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let X ⊆ S in (νi∈X KSi)(
|i∈X |j∈X !(ν NAij)〈Mij , Ai, Bj , {Mij , Ai, Bj , NAij}KSi〉.
(Mij ;xEncij).decrypt xEncij as {NAij ;xkij}KSi in
(;xmEncij).decrypt xmEncij as {;xMsgij}xkij in 0
||i∈X |j∈X !(Mij , Ai, Bj ; yEncij).
(ν NBij)〈Mij , Ai, Bj , yEncij , {Mij , Ai, Bj , NBij}KSj 〉.
(Mij ; yxEncij , yzEncij).decrypt yzEncij as {NBij ; ykij}KSj in
〈Mij , yxEncij〉.(ν Msgij)〈{Msgij}ykij 〉.0
||i∈X |j∈X !(Mij , Ai, Bj ; zxEncij , zyEncij).
decrypt zxEncij as {Mij , Ai, Bj ; znaij}KSi in
decrypt zyEncij as {Mij , Ai, Bj ; znbij}KSj in
(ν Kij)〈Mij , {znaij ,Kij}KSi , {znbij ,Kij}KSj 〉.0)
Table 3.10: A LYSA process of the Otway-Rees protocol where there are multiple
principals and each of them uses the same key for initiator and responder roles
Similar to the multiple principals scenario, this scenario can be further classified
into two cases concerning the keys used for each role.
• each principal Ii uses different keys to initiate and respond a session with
each other principal Ij .
• each principal Ii uses the same key to initiate and respond a session with
each other principal Ij
In the scenario that each principal Ii uses different keys to both initiate and
respond a session, the Otway-Rees protocol can be modelled as a meta level
process shown in Table 3.11. Shared keys KAi and KBi are restricted to each
principal Ii. The principal Ii uses the key KAi to initiate a session and use the
key KBi to respond a session. The server meditates communication between
two arbitrary principals Ii and Ij . All the names and variables used in a session
initiated by Ii to Ij have the index ij.
We may also choose to model the protocol running in a scenario that each
principal Ii uses the same key KSi to initiate and respond to a session with the
principal Ij , as shown in Table 3.12.
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let X ⊆ S in (νi∈X KAi)(νj∈X KBj)(
|i∈X |j∈X !(ν NAij)〈Mij , Ii, Ij , {Mij , Ii, Ij , NAij}KAi〉.
(Mij ;xEncij).decrypt xEncij as {NAij ;xkij}KAi in
(;xmEncij).decrypt xmEncij as {;xMsgij}xkij in 0
||i∈X |j∈X !(Mij , Ii, Ij ; yEncij).
(ν NBij)〈Mij , Ii, Ij , yEncij , {Mij , Ii, Ij , NBij}KBj 〉.
(Mij ; yxEncij , yzEncij).decrypt yzEncij as {NBij ; ykij}KBj in
〈Mij , yxEncij〉.(ν Msgij)〈{Msgij}ykij 〉.0
||i∈X |j∈X !(Mij , Ii, Ij ; zxEncij , zyEncij).
decrypt zxEncij as {Mij , Ii, Ij ; znaij}KAi in
decrypt zyEncij as {Mij , Ii, Ij ; znbij}KBj in
(ν Kij)〈Mij , {znaij ,Kij}KAi , {znbij ,Kij}KBj 〉.0)
Table 3.11: A LYSA process of the Otway-Rees protocol where aribitrarily many
principals Ii simultaneously act both as initiator and as responder and use
different keys for the two roles
3.3.3 Insider Attacks
In modern distributed systems, it is normally the case that a group of principals
is granted with some sorts of credentials in order to access a provided service.
For example, in a university students use their student numbers and passwords
to register/cancel courses, and in a large company employees access to the cen-
tral server to retrieve clients information. However it is not plausible that all
the users are trusted with all the sensitive information and there is no guarantee
that all the principals with credentials always behave as expected. For example
they may reveal their credentials, intentionally or accidently, to the attacker,
who may then be able to launch an attack, or they may themselves use the
credentials to compromise a secure communication between other honest prin-
cipals, in this sense, these principals can be viewed as attackers. So in order
to discuss insider attacks it is convenient to partition principals into legitimate
ones, whose credentials are kept confidential and who will not launch attacks,
and illegitimate ones, whose credential are revealed to the attacker or who may
launch attacks.
In all the previous examples, we only model the legitimate principals, who only
behave as they are suppose to do and we use the restriction operator to declare
the scopes of the credentials of the legitimate principals, such as keys and nonces,
i.e. they are initially protected from the attackers.
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let X ⊆ S in (νi∈X KSi)(
|i∈X |j∈X !(ν NAij)〈Mij , Ii, Ij , {Mij , Ii, Ij , NAij}KSi〉.
(Mij ;xEncij).decrypt xEncij as {NAij ;xkij}KSi in
(;xmEncij).decrypt xmEncij as {;xMsgij}xkij in 0
||i∈X |j∈X !(Mij , Ii, Ij ; yEncij).
(ν NBij)〈Mij , Ii, Ij , yEncij , {Mij , Ii, Ij , NBij}KSj 〉.
(Mij ; yxEncij , yzEncij).decrypt yzEncij as {NBj ; ykij}KSj in
〈Mij , yxEncij〉.(ν Msgij)〈{Msgij}ykij 〉.0
||i∈X |j∈X !(Mij , Ii, Ij ; zxEncij , zyEncij).
decrypt zxEncij as {Mij , Ii, Ij ; znaij}KSi in
decrypt zyEncij as {Mij , Ii, Ij ; znbij}KSj in
(ν Kij)〈Mij , {znaij ,Kij}KSi , {znbij ,Kij}KSj 〉.0)
Table 3.12: A LYSA process of the Otway-Rees protocl where aribitraryly many
principals Ii simultaneously act both as initiator and as responder and use the
same key for the two roles
In this section, we shall consider the scenario where both legitimate principals
and illegitimate principals exist and they are all allowed to initiate and respond
to a session with another principals, either legitimate or illegitimate. Further-
more, the server is allowed to meditate communications between both legitimate
and illegitimate principals.
Consider the process in Table 3.12. To take the illegitimate principals into
account, the Otway-Rees protocol can be modelled as in Table 3.13.
To model both legitimate and illegitimate principals, the set of principals Ii is
partitioned into two sets: the legitimate principals have an index i ∈ X ⊆ S and
the illegitimate principals take the index i ∈ {0}. In the first line, the keys of
illegitimate principals, e.g. KS0, are not restricted and therefore are known to
the attacker. This enables the attacker to act as illegitimate principals that may
attack the legitimate part of the protocol. The parallel composition |j∈Y in the
initiator’s process models that each Ii may initiate a session with an illegitimate
principal. Similarly, |i∈Y in the responder’s process allows each principal to
response to a session initiated by an illegitimate principal, and |i∈Y |j∈Y allows
the server to communicate with either legitimate or illegitimate principals.
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let X ⊆ S in (νi∈X KSi)(
let Y ⊆ X ∪ {0} in
|i∈X |j∈Y !(ν NAij)〈Mij , Ii, Ij , {Mij , Ii, Ij , NAij}KSi〉.
(Mij ;xEncij).decrypt xEncij as {NAij ;xkij}KSi in
(;xmEncij).decrypt xmEncij as {;xMsgij}xkij in 0
||i∈Y |j∈X !(Mij , Ii, Ij ; yEncij).
(ν NBij)〈Mij , Ii, Ij , yEncij , {Mij , Ii, Ij , NBij}KSj 〉.
(Mij ; yxEncij , yzEncij).decrypt yzEncij as {NBij ; ykij}KSj in
〈Mij , yxEncij〉.(ν Msgij)〈{Msgij}ykij 〉.0
||i∈Y |j∈Y !(Mij , Ii, Ij ; zxEncij , zyEncij).
decrypt zxEncij as {Mij , Ii, Ij ; znaij}KSi in
decrypt zyEncij as {Mij , Ii, Ij ; znbij}KSj in
(ν Kij)〈Mij , {znaij ,Kij}KSi , {znbij ,Kij}KSj 〉.0)
Table 3.13: A LYSA process of the Otway-Rees protocol with both legitimate
and illegitimate principals
3.4 Why Process Calculus
In the protocol analysis literature, there has long been many formalisms for for-
mally describing security protocols. The main reason to use formal description
techniques is that they give rise to both analyses at the specification level and
the tools at the implementation level. Perhaps a very difficult part of analysing
protocols is in finding a proper formalism to use, as there are many of them to
choose from.
One of them is Petri nets, which is a graphical and mathematical modelling tool
that is applicable for describing and studying security protocols. Petri nets and
its extensions, e.g. colored petri nets [53] and numerical petri nets [80], have
been proved to be successful in modelling protocols. Some of the research and
applications include [12, 13, 32, 31, 54, 60]. However, careful attention must
be paid to tradeoff between the level of abstraction and the capability of the
analyses. In fact, a major weak point of petri net is the complexity problem,
i.e. petri net based models may become very large for the analysis of even a
modest-size protocol.
Another approach that seems promising for modelling security protocols is
modal logic. Within this approach, the protocol, and necessary assumptions
and the goals of the protocols are formulated in formal logic, which consists of
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primitive propositions, represented by propositional letters, and propositional
connectives, e.g. or, and, not and implication. The best known one of the logics
was developed by Burrows, Abadi and Needham [23], which is usually called
BAN logic. Although it is very useful, its relation to implementation may be
quite tenuous and subtle [3].
Process calculus is yet another way to model security protocols. It is a model
based on modelling processes and events. Process calculus is a small, programming-
like language. It is directly executable and it has a precise semantics to describe
how processes are evolved.
In this section, we reviewed a process calculus, LYSA, which incorporates crypto-
graphic primitives, and was designed especially for modelling security protocols.
We showed how to encode in LYSA various scenarios in which a protocol is de-
ployed. Encoding protocols in LYSA gives a formal and precise way of describing
protocol executions and therefore facilitates analysing. In the next chapter, we
shall present a control flow analysis which precisely collects the possible be-
haviour of a given protocol.
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Chapter 4
Control Flow Analysis
Control flow analysis comes from the field known as static analysis. Static
analysis examines a piece of code of a program statically, without attempting
to execute it. However, not all the non-trivial questions one may ask about a
program are computable given finite amount of resources, e.g. time and memory,
as stated by Rice’s theorem [75]. In other words, static analysis problems are
undecidable in the worse case. A tradeoff one has to make between preciseness
and decidability is then to force static analysis to give approximate answers
about a property of a piece of code. It means that the answer may include false
positives, e.g. a bug that the program doesn’t contain. However, this is the
price one has to pay for gaining the decidability.
Originally, static analysis was developed for generating codes and optimising
compilers [62, 24]. Nevertheless, many static analysis approaches have recently
been directed to apply to security. Encouraging results have been obtained
by the use of those approaches, such as type systems [48, 56] and control flow
analysis. These techniques predict safe and computable approximations to the
set of values or behaviours arising dynamically during run-time. For example,
the control flow analysis for LYSA process given in [15, 16, 20] computes an
approximation of the run-time behaviour of a process. The analysis has been
applied to prove the authentication property of protocols.
Example 4.1 Consider the simple protocol from Example 2.1, which has a
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(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0)
In this protocol, it is of interest to investigate that whether the credit card in-
formation CCI is received by B correctly. To do this, the control flow analysis
should be able to determine which value may be bound to the variable yCCI.
However, the value is not bound to yCCI until the decryption of y is successful.
To trace back the value being bound to y, the analysis also has to collect the
messages which flow over the network.
In this case, we are expecting the analysis to figure out that:
• the value CCI is bound to the variable yCCI, and
• the message 〈A,B, {CCI}K〉 is sent over the network
Before going into the detail of the control flow analysis, we shall briefly introduce
the concept of flow logic, in which the control flow analysis is formalised.
4.1 Flow Logic
Flow Logic is relatively new concept in the program analysis field. It was intro-
duced in the late 90’s by Nielson, Nielson [74, 72, 73] and Hankin [71], and has
been used for analysis of a wide variety of languages and process calculi, e.g.
the pi−calculus [66], Spi-calculus [3], λ−calculus [9], the ambient calculus [25],
imperative objects, Concurrent ML, object-oriented constructs, and protocol
narrations.
Flow logic is a formalism based on logical systems for specifying static analysis.
It separates the specification of an analysis and the actual computation of an
analysis result. It therefore, on one hand, allows one to focus the effort on
designing and specifying what it means for an analysis estimate to be acceptable
for a program without being bothered by implementation considerations, and,
on the other hand, benefits the implementation of the analysis by allowing one
to freely chooses existing suitable tools to do the computations. In this sense,
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the Flow Logic framework can be seen as a “specification approach” to static
analysis, rather than an “implementation approach”.
A control flow analysis of a process P works by collecting information about
some aspects of the behaviour of P . This information is stored in some data
structures, say A1, . . . ,Ak, which are called analysis components, and each anal-
ysis component holds one aspect of the process behaviour. As mentioned before,
flow logic specification focuses on the relationship between an analysis estimate
and the process to be analysed. Formally, this relationship is captured by an
acceptability judgement, written as
A1, . . . ,Ak |= P
which holds precisely when A1, . . . ,Ak are descriptions of the behaviour of the
process P .
4.1.1 Verbose and Succinct Flow Logics
A flow logic specification can be classified by the criteria
• succinct versus verbose
depending on the scopes of the analysis components.
The most common format of a flow logic specification is the verbose one, which
has a form as,
A1, . . . ,Ak |= P iff a logic formula F holds
and means that in order for A1, . . . ,Ak to be an estimate of the process P ,
the logic formula F has to hold. In this format, an analysis is specified by
structurally defining a logic formula F for each syntactic construct of the process
P . In general, the formula F can be an arbitrary formula in logical form and
may even be recursive, i.e. it may contain A1, . . . ,Ak |= P ′ for an arbitrary
process P ′.
Example 4.2 The rule
A1, . . . ,Ak |= P1 | P2 iff A1, . . . ,Ak |= P1 ∧ A1, . . . ,Ak |= P2
is a verbose flow logic specification for analysing parallel composition of pro-
cesses. It defines that in order for A1, . . . ,Ak to be an estimate of the process
P1 | P2, it has to be estimates for both P1 and P2.
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In the verbose form, all the analysis components, i.e. A1, . . . ,Ak are implicitly
assumed to be global, i.e. their scopes are up to all the analysis rules.
A succinct flow logic specification, on the contrary, records information about
a process locally, by the rules of the form
A1, . . . ,Ak |= P : A′ iff a logic formula F holds
where A′ is another analysis component holding the information only about the
process P . This succinct component is implicitly assumed to be local to this
formula and therefore is not known anywhere else in the entire analysis.
Example 4.3 The rules
A1, . . . ,Ak |= n1 : A′ iff n1 ∈ A′ and
A1, . . . ,Ak |= n2 : A′ iff n2 ∈ A′
are succinct flow logic specifications. The analysis component A′ in the two
rules may not have the same content because of the different scopes.
The next section will present a control flow analysis of LYSA in the style of flow
logic.
4.2 A Control Flow Analysis of LYSA
The LYSA calculus is especially designed to model security protocols involving
a number of principals, where each of them executes a sequence of actions,
synchronised by communications. Because of the inter-actions, in most of the
cases, it is impossible to predict the exact behaviour of each principal. In this
section, we present a control flow analysis aiming at collecting the central aspect
of the information of a protocol of interest. This is done by over-approximating
the protocol behaviour along all the execution paths, as shown in Figure 4.1.
4.2.1 Domain of the Analysis
The control flow analysis describes a protocol behaviour by collecting all the
communications that a process may participate in. This information, i.e. the
tuples of values that may be communicated over the network, is recorded in
an analysis component κ. As said before, successful communications involve
pattern matching and variable binding, i.e. binding values to variables. It
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Figure 4.1: The relationship between the protocol behaviour and analysis
is handy and convenient for the analysis to collect this information. For this
purpose, another analysis component ρ is introduced to record the values that
each variable may be bound to. Thus the analysis components in the control
flow analysis of LYSA are κ and ρ, corresponding to the abstract representations
A1 and A2 in Section 4.1.
4.2.1.1 Name Space
Both the analysis components κ and ρ have to do with recording values V ∈ V al
in some format. However, a LYSA process may generate infinitely many values
during an execution because of the restriction and replication constructs, which
means that the analysis components have to be able to record infinitely many
names.
For keeping the analysis component finite, a solution is to partition all the names
used by a process into finitely many equivalence classes and use the names of the
equivalence classes instead of the actual names. This partition works in a way
that names from the same equivalence class are assigned a common canonical
name and consequently there are only finitely many canonical names in any
execution of a given process. This is enforced by assigning the same canonical
name to every name generated by the same restriction. The canonical name
for a name n is written as bnc and for a value V written as bV c. The analysis
component will then use canonical values taken from the set bV alc ranged over
by U .
Example 4.4 An example process, that may generate infinitely many names,
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is !(ν n)P , which has one of the computational sequences as
!(ν n)P → (ν n′)P ′ | !(ν n)P → (ν n′)P ′ | (ν n′′)P ′′ | !(ν n)P → . . .
Furthermore, the names n, n′ and n′′ are generated by the same restriction and
hence have the same canonical name, i.e. bnc = bn′c = bn′′c
4.2.1.2 Analysis Components
The analysis components of the control flow analysis of LYSA are κ and ρ.
The κ component records the tuples of canonical values corresponding to the
tuples of values that may be communicated over network during a process exe-
cution. Formally, we have
κ ∈ P(bV alc∗)
The ρ component records a set of canonical values, for each variable, corre-
sponding to the set of values that each variable may become bound to during a
process execution. This can be formally written as
ρ : bV arc → P(bV alc)
4.2.2 Definition of the Analysis
The result of analysing a process P is a pair (ρ, κ). The first component, ρ,
is an abstract environment which gives information about the set of canonical
values to which names can be bound; the second component, κ, is an abstract
network environment which gives information about tuples of values that can
flow over the network. To be more precise, we have,
ρ, κ |= P
expressing that ρ and κ are valid analysis estimates of the process P . The
judgement is defined by the axioms and rules in the lower part of Table 4.1 and
is explained later.
The definition of the analysis for expressions makes use of an auxiliary predicate
ϑ and takes the form,
ρ |= E : ϑ
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for analysing expressions. This judgement is in a succinct form of flow logic and
expresses that ϑ ⊆ P(bV alc) is an acceptable estimate of the set of canonical
values that E may evaluate to given the environment ρ. It is defined inductively
in the structure of the expressions in the upper part of Table 4.1.
The rules (AN), (ANp), (ANm) express that names are evaluated to their canon-
ical representatives, by requiring that the corresponding canonical names are in
ϑ.
The rule (AVar) says that a variable is evaluated to the values described by ρ
for the corresponding canonical variables.
The rules (AEnc) and (AAEnc) evaluate k−tuple symmetric and asymmetric
encryptions, respectively. They are defined in a similar way. The rules first
recursively evaluate all the sub-expressions in the encryption, then compute all
the k−ary encrypted values that can be formed by combining the values that
the sub-expressions may be evaluated to, and finally require that those values
are in ϑ. Essentially, these two rules replace all the variables in the encryption
by their canonical values recorded in ρ.
The rest of the rules are defined for analysing processes.
The rule (AOut) analyses the output construct and does two things: first, all
the expressions are evaluated and then it is required that all the combinations of
the values found by this evaluation are recorded in κ. Finally, the continuation
process must be analysed.
The rule (AInp) analyses the input construct. It incorporates pattern matching,
which is dealt with by first evaluating all the first j expressions in the input to
be the sets ϑi for i = 1, . . . , j. Next, if any of the sequences of length k in
κ is such that the first j values component-wise are included in ϑi then the
match is concluded to be successful. In this case, the remaining values of the
k-tuple must be recorded in ρ as possible bindings of the variables. Finally, the
continuation process must be analysed.
The rules (ADec) and (AADec) analyse symmetric and asymmetric decryption,
respectively. They handle the matching similarly to the rule for input, (AInp).
The only difference is that here the matching is performed against j + 1 com-
ponents including the key. In case of symmetric decryption, the key used for
encryption and the one used for decryption have to match with each other. In
the case of asymmetric decryption, the two keys, for encryption and decryption,
have to form a key pair, m+ and m−. After the successful matching, values are
bound to the corresponding variables.
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(AN) ρ |= n : ϑ iff bnc ∈ ϑ
(ANp) ρ |= m+ : ϑ iff bm+c ∈ ϑ
(ANm) ρ |= m− : ϑ iff bm−c ∈ ϑ
(AVar) ρ |= x : ϑ iff ρ(bxc) ⊆ ϑ
(AEnc) ρ |= {E1, . . . , Ek}E0 : ϑ
iff ∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀U0, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=0 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
{U1, . . . , Uk}U0 ∈ ϑ
(AAEnc) ρ |= {|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 : ϑ
iff ∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀U0, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=0 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
{|U1, . . . , Uk|}U0 ∈ ϑ
(AOut) ρ, κ |= 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P
iff ∧ki=1 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀U1, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=1Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
(〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ ∧ ρ, κ |= P )
(AInp) ρ, κ |= (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P
iff ∧ji=1 ρ |= Ei : ϑ1 ∧
∀〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ji=1 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ |= P )
(ADec) ρ, κ |= decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{U1, . . . , Uk}U0 ∈ ϑ ∧
∧ji=0 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ |= P )
(AADec) ρ, κ |= decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}E0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{|U1, . . . , Uk|}U0 ∈ ϑ : ∀U ′0 ∈ ϑ0 :
∀(m+,m−) : {U0, U ′0} = {bm+c, bm−c}∧
∧ji=1 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ |= P )
(ANew) ρ, κ |= (ν n)P iff ρ, κ |= P
(AANew) ρ, κ |= (ν± m)P iff ρ, κ |= P
(APar) ρ, κ |= P1|P2 iff ρ, κ |= P1 ∧ ρ, κ |= P2
(ARep) ρ, κ |=!P iff ρ, κ |= P
(ANil) ρ, κ |= 0 iff true
Table 4.1: Analysis of terms; ρ |= E : ϑ, and processes: ρ, κ |= P
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The rules (ANew) and (AANew) require that the sub-process P has to be anal-
ysed.
The rule (APar) requires that the two sub-processes P1 and P2 are analysed.
The rule (ARep) requires that the sub-process is analysed.
The rule (ANil) trivially holds and does not put any requirement on the analysis
components.
Example 4.5 Consider the process from Example 4.1. We shall apply the con-
trol flow analysis to the process to illustrate how the analysis works and verify




(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0)
Semantically, the two parallel processes can make a communication, where the
message 〈A,B, {CCI}K〉 is sent onto the network, which results in binding the
value {CCI}K to y and the further decryption of y then binds CCI to the
variable yCCI. Finally the process evolves into 0 | 0.
The analysis rules from Table 4.1, that are applicable to this example, are:
ρ, κ |= (ν CCI)(〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0 | (A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0)
iff ρ, κ |= 〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0 | (A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0 (ANew)
iff ρ, κ |= 〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0 ∧
ρ, κ |= (A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0 (APar)
iff ρ |= A : ϑ1 ∧ ρ |= B : ϑ2 ∧ ρ |= {CCI}K : ϑ3 ∧
∀U1, U2, U3 : ∧3i=1Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒ 〈U1, U2, U3〉 ∈ κ ∧ ρ, κ |= 0 ∧ (AOut)
ρ |= A : ϑ1 ∧ ρ |= B : ϑ2 ∧ ∀〈U1, U2, U3〉 ∈ κ : ∧2i=1 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
U3 ∈ ρ(byc) ∧ ρ, κ |= decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0 (AInp)
iff ρ |= y : ϑ ∧ ρ |= K : ϑ0 ∧ ∀{U1}U0 ∈ ϑ ∧ U0 ∈ ϑ0 ⇒
U1 ∈ ρ(byCCIc) ∧ ρ, κ |= 0 (ADec)
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The least solution to these constraints is,
{{bCCIc}bKc} ⊆ ρ(byc)
{bCCIc} ⊆ ρ(byCCIc)
{〈bAc, bBc, {bCCIc}bKc〉} ⊆ κ
4.2.3 The Meta Level Analysis
An object level analysis, presented above, gives an account of the dynamic be-
haviour of an object level process. A meta levelM represents a set of object level
processes that it may be instantiated to. The meta level analysis will therefore
give an account of the dynamic behaviour of those object level processes.
The meta level process is an extension of the object level process with additional
sequence of indices, i1, . . . , ik, to names and variables. Consequently, the meta
level analysis relies on the object level analysis and extends it to account for the
instantiation of the meta level constructs.
The meta level analysis is defined in Table 4.2, which is of the form
ρ, κ |=Γ M
where Γ : SetID∪P(Indexfin)→ P(Indexfin) is a mapping from set identifiers
to finite sets.
Because the let- construct, e.g. letX ⊆ SinMP , may define an infinite indexing
set S, a meta level process may instantiate to infinitely many object level pro-
cesses. This problem is solved by partitioning each index set S into finitely many
equivalent classes, where each class contains indexes having the same canonical
representatives.
The rule (MLet) analyses the let-construct. It updates the environment Γ with
the mapping X 7→ S′, where S′ is required to be a finite set and has the same
canonical names as the set S.
The rule (MIPar) requires that the analysis holds for all the processes M where
the index i is substituted by all the elements in Γ(S).
The rules (MINew) and (MIANew) simply ignore the restriction operators.
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(MLet) ρ, κ |=Γ let X ⊆ S in M iff ρ, κ |=Γ[X 7→S′] M
where S′ ⊆fin Γ(S) and
bS′c = bΓ(S)c
(MIPar) ρ, κ |=Γ |i∈SM iff ∧a∈Γ(S)ρ, κ |=Γ M [i 7→ a]
(MINew) ρ, κ |=Γ (νi¯∈S¯ na¯i¯) iff ρ, κ |=Γ M
(MIANew) ρ, κ |=Γ (ν±i¯∈S¯ ma¯i¯) iff ρ, κ |=Γ M
(MOut) ρ, κ |=Γ 〈ME1, . . . ,MEk〉.M iff ∧ki=1ρ |=MEi : ϑi ∧
∀U1, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=1Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ ∧ ρ, κ |=Γ M
(MN) ρ |= ni¯ : ϑ iff bni¯c ∈ ϑ
(MVar) ρ |= xi¯ : ϑ iff ρ(bxi¯c) ⊆ ϑ
Table 4.2: Analysis of meta level processes. The remaining cases of the analysis
where the meta level and the object level overlap are as in Table 4.1 but using
meta level expressions and meta level variables instead of the object level ones.
The rest of the rules are similar to the ones for analysing object level, listed in
Table 4.1 except that they range over indexed names and variables.
4.3 The Attacker
Communications between principals over a computer network are vulnerable to
mischievous behaviour of other parties who have access to the network. This is
the typical scenario for protocol executions. Hence the attacker’s involvement
has to be taken into account when analysing cryptographic protocols. In this
section, we shall briefly recall how the control flow analysis is used to analyse
protocols running in a malicious environment.
In LYSA, the protocol and the attacker are modelled, formally, as two parallel
processes, Psys | P•, Psys represents the protocol process and P• is some arbi-
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trary attacker. The attacker considered here is the one proposed by Needham
and Schroeder [70] and later one formalised by Dolev and Yao [33], which is
often referred to as the Dolev-Yao attacker (or Dolev-Yao threat model). The
Dolev-Yao attacker is an active attacker and assumed to have the overall control
of the network, over which principals exchange messages. Therefore he has ac-
cess to messages transmitted over the network and is able to perform all kinds of
operations of the messages within the permission of the semantics of the LYSA,
e.g. he is not only able to eavesdrop or replay messages sending over the network
but also to encrypt, decrypt or generate messages providing that the necessary
information is within his knowledge. On the other hand, however, the secret
messages and keys, e.g. (ν Keyab), are restricted to their scope in Psys and thus
not immediately accessible to the attacker.
The attacker’s process is constructed in the way that all the attackers are char-
acterised and as the following.
Not to lose generality, some basic information of the protocol process, i.e. type
of the process, has to be abstracted out. A process Psys has the type whenever:
(1) it is close, (2) all the free names of Psys are in Nf , (3) all the arities of the
sent out or received messages are in Aκ and (4) all the arities of the encrypted
or decrypted messages are in AEnc. Obviously, Nf , Aκ and AEnc are all finite
and can be calculated out by inspecting the process Psys.
One concern regarding the attacker process is the names and variables it used,
which have to be distinct from the ones used by Psys. Let all the names used by
Psys to be in a finite set Nc and all the variables in a finite set Xc, a new name,
n•, is postulated , where n• is not in Nc, and a new variable z• not in Xc. This
means no overlapping between the names and variables used by the legitimate
principals and the ones used by the attacker.
In order to control the number of names and variables used by the attacker,
a semantically equivalent process, P ′, was constructed , for a process P• of
type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc), as follows: 1) all restrictions (ν n)P are α−converted into
restrictions (ν n′)P where n′ has the canonical representative n•, 2) all the
occurrences of variables xi in (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P and
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk} in P are α−converted to use variables x′i
with canonical representative z•. Therefore P• only has finitely many canonical
names and variables.
A formula FDYRM of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc) was defined as the conjunction of the
five components in Table 4.3, where each describes an ability of the attacker.
Furthermore, it was proved that the formula FDYRM is capable of characterising
the potential effect of all attackers P• of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc).
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(1) ∧k∈Aκ ∀ 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may learn by eavesdropping
(2) ∧k∈AEnc ∀{V1, . . . , Vk}V0 ∈ ρ(z•) : V0 ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ ∈ ρ(z•) : m− ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− ∈ ρ(z•) : m+ ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may learn by decrypting messages with keys already known
(3) ∧k∈AEnc ∀ V0, . . . , Vk : ∧ki=0Vi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀ m+, V1 . . . , Vk : m+ ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀ m−, V1 . . . , Vk : m− ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may construct new encryptions using the keys known
(4) ∧k∈Aκ ∀V1, . . . , Vk : ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ
the attacker may actively forge new communications
(5) {n•,m±• } ∪ Nf ⊆ ρ(z•)
the attacker initially has some knowledge
Table 4.3: The Attacker’s Capabilities
Example 4.6 Below is given the encoding of the Credit Card Information pro-
tocol from Example 4.1, where the key K is not restricted by (ν K).
(ν CCI)〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0 | (A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0
Since K is not restricted, it becomes one of the free names and hence is known
to the attacker, i.c. K ∈ ρ(z•), by (5) in Table 4.3. So the attacker is able to
decrypt {CCI}K , by (2), or generate arbitrary encryption using the key K, by
(3), and send it to the principal B, by (4).
4.4 Analysis Results of the Worked Example
A protocol can be deployed in different scenarios, thus when modelling a protocol
in LYSA, there are various assumptions to make. Depending on which options
one runs the analysis with, the analysis will, in most of the cases, return different
elements for the analysis components, i.e. ρ and κ. This is due to the choice
of 1) allowing the principals to take both the initiator and responder’s role or
merely one of the roles; and 2) allowing the principals to use different or the
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same key to initiate and respond in a session with others. In case the attacker is
allowed to behave as a legitimate principal, the different contents of the analysis
components may be also due to the possibility that the attacker behaves as a
principal and initiated a protocol run with another principal, which may result
in the server’s decrypting a message encrypted by the attacker at some point.
In section 3.3, the Otway-Rees protocol is used as a worked example to show
various encodings according to different assumptions of the protocol’s deploy-
ment, as listed in Table 3.8 - 3.11. The analysis on those protocol encodings
yields the following results. Due to space, only the entries that are not shared
by all the four cases are listed below.
Version Table 3.8 Table 3.9 Table 3.10 Table 3.11
ρ {bNAijc} ∈ ρ(znbij) {bNAijc} ∈ ρ(znbij)
{bNBijc} ∈ ρ(znaij) {bNBijc} ∈ ρ(znaij)
Table 4.4: Analysis results of the different encodings of the Otway-Rees proto-
cols
The analysis results do not directly tell anything about the security properties.
However, by carefully inspecting the entries, one can conclude that something
unintended may happen in the second and the fourth cases: the value bNAijc
may be bound to the variable znbij , which is only intended to be bound to
bNBijc, and the value bNBijc may be bound to the variable znaij , which is only
intended to be bound to bNAijc.
4.5 Why Annotations
Analysing a protocol is not an easy task, it has to do with calculating all the
possible behaviours of the protocols, which is, in most cases, uncomputable.
So instead of trying to represent the exact behaviour of the protocol, a control
flow analysis is employed to only abstract out certain aspects of the protocol
behaviours. However, because of the ”abstraction”, the analysis result cannot
be made as precise as the protocol really is. This imprecision means that the
analysis only computes over-approximations to the behaviour of the protocol
that is being analysed, in which case, absence of a particular element in the
analysis components means that the corresponding protocol execution is not
part of the behaviour of the protocol. In the context of security, this means
that the analysis can be used to verify security properties. However it is not
easy to tell directly from the analysis result whether a security property holds or
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not, e.g. the analysis results listed in Table 4.4 suggest something unintended
may happen in the case of encodings in Table 3.9 and 3.11, but it is almost
impossible to draw a conclusion about whether it represents a real attack and
which security property has been compromised. Nevertheless, in fact, there do
exist type flaw attacks in those cases.
In the following chapters, we shall introduce various kinds of annotations, which
syntactically express the intended behaviour of the protocols with respect to dif-
ferent security properties. Consequently, the control flow analysis is extended
correspondingly to take the annotations into account, and, as a result, the anal-
ysis result will give an explicit sign in case the security property in question has
been compromised.
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Chapter 5
Authentication
Authentication is an essential security property for security protocols, where
communications happen over an insecure network. In such a setting, messages
are not necessarily received by the intended principals because an attacker might
redirect them or replace them with forged messages. Hence it is very difficult to
ensure authentication: is the message received really sent out by the expected
principal?
To ensure that communications do take place in the expected way, it is necessary
to validate authentication properties of protocols. The authentication study
presented in this chapter comes from [20], where the property is referred to
as destination and origin authentication. The idea is based on the fact that
when designing a security protocol, one must have an explicit intension of where
messages are supposed to end up. Validating authentication properties then
amounts to checking whether messages which came out from some origin always
have the intended destination disregarding the interference of an attacker.
Example 5.1 Consider the credit card information protocol in Example 3.1,
which can be modelled in LYSA as the following,
(ν K)( (ν CCI)〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0
|
(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0)
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One intention of the protocols is to send the encrypted value {CCI}K from A
to B, which then decrypts the value and reads the credit card information CCI.
Furthermore, B should be able to conclude that the value CCI was indeed sent
by principal A.
In the rest of the chapter, we shall briefly recall the control flow analysis for
authentication from [15, 16], which makes use of annotations and reference mon-
itors.
5.1 Setting the Scene
Authentication, loosely speaking, can be expressed as ”messages should end up
at the expected places”. Because of the existence of the attacker, who is always
able to re-direct any message flowing over the network, this property can not
hold in the malicious environment. Rather, it is reasonable to consider only the
secret data, which is, in most cases, encrypted before being sent out. Therefore
authentication can further be refined as “encryptions should only be decrypted
at the expected places” and similarly for decryptions.
To reinforce this condition, the syntax of the LYSA calculus is extended to in-
clude some annotations, namely crypto-points, to express the intended protocol
behaviours. More specifically, each encryption is decorated with a crypto-point,
c ∈ CP and a set of crypto-points, C ∈ P(CP ). The idea is that, for each
encryption the annotations make explicit its origin, i.e. the point in the nar-
ration where the message is encrypted, and its destinations, i.e. the set of the
intended points of decryption. Similarly, for the decrypted data, the annota-
tions make explicit the destination, i.e. the point in the narration where they
are decrypted, c, and their intended origins, C, i.e. the set of expected places
of encryption. Each crypto-point is a label, which will be associated to a single
point of encryption or decryption in the dynamic view of the protocol.
Syntactically, encryption expressions with the annotations are:
{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 [at c dest C] and
{|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 [at c dest C]
and, correspondingly, decryption constructs with the intended points of origin
become
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E0 [at c orig C] in P and
decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}E0 [at c orig C] in P
5.2 Dynamic Property 69
Note that to check the authentication property of a process, its intended be-
haviour has to be explicitly expressed in terms of the destination and origin
annotations, and furthermore, in order for a LYSA process to ensure the desti-
nation and origin authentication all the requirements placed by the annotations
must be met every time a value is decrypted.
Example 5.2 In the credit card information protocol, the value {CCI}K is
expected to be decrypted in the decryption point in B. This intention can be
expressed in the destination and origin annotations as,
(ν CCI)〈A,B, {CCI}K [at a dest {b}]〉.0
|
(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K [at b orig {a}] in 0
from A’s side: {CCI}K [at a dest {b}]. The annotation expresses that the
{CCI}K is encrypted at the place a and should ONLY be decrypted at the
place b.
from B’s side: decrypt y as {; yCCI}K [at b orig {a}] in. The annotations
expresses that this decryption happens at the place b and the decrypted
value should be encrypted at a ONLY.
Technically, because of the extension of the syntax of the calculus, it is necessary
to redefine its semantics as well.
5.2 Dynamic Property
After extending the syntax with origin and destination annotations, the seman-
tics has to be redefined as well in order to take annotations into account. To
this aim, the annotations are carried on to the semantic domain of values. This





| {DV1, . . . , DVk}DV0 [at c dest C]
| {|DV1, . . . , DVk|}DV0 [at c dest C]
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Furthermore, an equivalence relation over DV al is defined as DV1 = DV2 where
the annotations associated with encrypted values are ignored. For example,
{n}K [at c1 dest C1] = {n}K [at c2 dest C2] for any c1, c2, C1 and C2.
The semantics of the annotated syntax now is then defined by Table 3.5 in Chap-
ter 3 interpreted over annotated values DV ∈ DV al, except for the symmetric
decryption and asymmetric decryptions, as listed in Table 5.1.
(Dec)
∧ki=0DVi = DV ′i ∧ RM(c, C, c′, C ′)
decrypt {DV1, . . . , DVk}DV0 [at c dest C] as
{DV ′1 , . . . , DV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk}DV0 [at c′ orig C ′] in P →R




∧ki=1DVi = DV ′i ∧ RM(c, C, c′, C ′)
decrypt {|DV1, . . . , DVk|}m+ [at c dest C] as
{|DV ′1 , . . . , DV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}m− [at c′ orig C ′] in P →R




∧ki=1DVi = DV ′i ∧ RM(c, C, c′, C ′)
decrypt {|DV1, . . . , DVk|}m− [at c dest C] as
{|DV ′1 , . . . , DV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}m+ [at c′ orig C ′] in P →R
P [DV ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , DV
′
k/xk]
Table 5.1: Operational Semantics for Authentication Property; P →R P ′, pa-
rametersed on R.
Now the reference monitor semantics P →RM P ′ takes destination and origin
annotations into account and defines RM as,
RM(c, C, c′, C ′) = (c ∈ C ′ ∧ c′ ∈ C)
This ensures that the crypto-point of the encrypted value is acceptable at the de-
cryption (i.e. c ∈ C ′), and that the crypto-point of the decryption is acceptable
for the encryption (i.e. c′ ∈ C).
Using this semantics, the property of destination and origin authentication can
be defined as follows:
Definition 5.1 (Authentication) A process P ensures destination and origin
authentication if there are no executions
P →∗ P ′ →R P ′′
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such that c /∈ C ′ or c′ /∈ C when P ′ →R P ′′ is derived using (Dec) on
decrypt {DV1, . . . , DVk}DV0 [at c dest C] as
{DV ′1 , . . . , DV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk}DV ′0 [at c′ orig C ′] in P
or using (ADec) or (ASig) on
decrypt {|DV1, . . . , DVk|}m+ [at c dest C] as
{|DV ′1 , . . . , DV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}m− [at c′ orig C ′] in P
or
decrypt {|DV1, . . . , DVk|}m− [at c dest C] as
{|DV ′1 , . . . , DV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}m+ [at c′ orig C ′] in P
It says that a process P ensures authentication property if there is no violation
of the annotations in any of its executions.
Next, we shall show how to extend the original analysis from Chapter 4 such
that it can be used to check whether a process ensures destination and origin
authentication according to Definition 5.1.
5.3 Static Property
In the semantics, the value domain is DV al carrying on the annotations. Sim-
ilarly, in the authentication analysis, the domain of the analysis components,
ρ, κ and ϑ, range over annotated canonical values from bDV alc rather than over
values from bV alc. The idea of making use of the origin and destination anno-
tations is to identify the intension of protocol, namely, an encrypted message
is ONLY decrypted at the expected places. To capture this, an auxiliary error
component, ψ, is added to the authentication analysis, which contains error
messages for the possible violations of the authentication property. The error
messages have the form of a pair of crypto-points, formally,
ψ ⊆ P(CP × CP )
A pair (bcc, bc′c) ∈ ψ means that the message encrypted at the place c is de-
crypted at other place c′ than the intended one, and thus the authentication
property may be violated. Note that similarly to names and values, canonical
values of crypto-points are required by the authentication analysis.
The authentication analysis extends the original one in Table 4.1 in a way that
the annotations are taken into account. This is done by
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• The value domain is DV al, which is basically V al carrying annotations
• An additional error component ψ is included as another analysis compo-
nent. The judgement of process becomes
ρ, κ, ψ |= P
saying that ρ, κ and ψ are an acceptable analysis estimate of the process
P
• The semantics of pattern matching in the extended syntax ignores the
annotations associated with values. Consequently, in the authentication
analysis annotations are ignored, too.
To allow these to work, the analysis rules were changed a little bit comparing
to the original one in order to take the annotations into account. The changed
rules are listed in Table 5.3 while others remain the same as in Table 4.1.
The rules for analysing symmetric and asymmetric encryptions (DEnc) and
(DAEnc) ensure that the annotations are attached to the values that the en-
cryptions are evaluated to.
The rule (DInp) is identical to the original rule (AInp) except that the analysis
of pattern matching ignores the annotations by using a special set inclusion
operator, E , defined formally as,
bV c ES if and only if there exists V ′ such that V = V ′ and V ′ ∈ S
Note that the equivalent relationship V1 = V2 is defined over DV al that ignores
the annotations.
The decryption rules (DDec) and (DADec) also use the operator E when there is
need to ignore the annotations. Additionally, they check whether it is the right
place to decrypt the message after a successful decryption. If a violation of the
destination and origin annotations may occur, the corresponding encryption and
decryption points are recorded in the error component ψ.
5.4 The Attacker
In the setup of Psys | P•, the attacker process P• has to be annotated with
respect to the extended syntax. A unique crypto-point c• is used to indicate the
encryption place of the attacker and is used in all the at part of annotations in
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(DEnc) ρ |= {E1, . . . , Ek}E0 [at c dest C] : ϑ
iff ∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀U0, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=0 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
{U1, . . . , Uk}U0 [at bcc dest bCc] ∈ ϑ
(DAEnc) ρ |= {|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 [at c dest C] : ϑ
iff ∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀U0, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=0 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
{|U1, . . . , Uk|}U0 [at bcc dest bCc] ∈ ϑ
(DInp) ρ, κ, ψ |= (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P
iff ∧ji=1 ρ |= Ei : ϑ1 ∧
∀〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ji=1 Ui Eϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= P )
(DDec) ρ, κ, ψ |= decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{U1, . . . , Uk}U0 [at bcc dest bCc] ∈ ϑ ∧
∧ji=0 Ui Eϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= P ∧
(bcc /∈ bC ′c ∨ bc′c /∈ bCc ⇒ (bc′c, bcc) ∈ ψ))
(DADec) ρ, κ, ψ |= decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}E0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{|U1, . . . , Uk|}U0 [at bcc dest bCc] ∈ ϑ : ∀U ′0 ∈ ϑ0 :
∀(bm+c, bm−c) : {U0, U ′0} = {m+,m−}∧
∧ji=1 Ui Eϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= P ∧
(bcc /∈ bC ′c ∨ bc′c /∈ bCc ⇒ (bc′c, bcc) ∈ ψ))
Table 5.2: Authentication Analysis of LYSA Terms, ρ |= E : ϑ, and Processes
ρ, κ, ψ |= P . The remaining cases of the analysis overlap the ones in the original
analysis as in Table 4.1.
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the attacker process. In the orig and dest part of the annotations in the attacker
process, a set of all crypto-points CP is used, which means that, in the setup of
Psys | P•, only the annotations in Psys will cause the authentication property
to be violated.
(2) ∧k∈AEnc ∀{DV1, . . . , DVk}DV0 [at c dest C] ∈ ρ(z•) :
DV0 E ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1DVi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (¬RM(c, CP, c•, C)⇒ (c, c•) ∈ ψ))
∧k∈AEnc ∀{|DV1, . . . , DVk|}m+ [at c dest C] ∈ ρ(z•) :
m− E ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1DVi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (¬RM(c, CP, c•, C)⇒ (c, c•) ∈ ψ))
∧k∈AEnc ∀{|DV1, . . . , DVk|}m− [at c dest C] ∈ ρ(z•) :
m+ E ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1DVi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (¬RM(c, CP, c•, C)⇒ (c, c•) ∈ ψ))
the attacker may learn by decrypting messages with keys already known
(3) ∧k∈AEnc ∀ DV0, . . . , DVk : ∧ki=0DVi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
{DV1, . . . , DVk}DV0 [at c• dest CP ] ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀ DV1, . . . , DVk : m+ ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1DVi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
{|DV1, . . . , DVk|}m+ [at c• dest CP ] ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀ DV1, . . . , DVk : m− ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1DVi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
{|DV1, . . . , DVk|}m− [at c• dest CP ] ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may construct new encryptions using the keys known
Table 5.3: The Attacker’s Capabilities in Authentication Analysis. The remain-
ing entries of the attacker’s capabilities overlap the original ones as in Table
4.3.
Some of the Dolev-Yao condition for the authentication analysis is listed in Table
5.3, while the others remain unchanged as in Table 4.3.
Theorem 5.2 (Soundness of Dolev-Yao condition) if (ρ, κ, ψ) satisfies
FDYRM of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc) then ρ, κ |= Q : ψ for all attackers Q of extended
type ({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Aκ,AEnc), namely, the canonical definition variables and
definition type variables are in {z•} and the canonical names are in Nf ∪ {n•}.
Example 5.3 Consider the credit card information protocol from Example 4.1.
Authentication analysis gives an empty error component ψ even when the process
is under attack. This is simply because no destination and origin annotations
are specified.
Example 5.4 Consider the credit card information protocol with destination
and origin annotations from Example 5.2. The annotations formalise the intu-
ition that the encryption at A is supposed to be decrypted at the decryption at
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principal B, only.
(ν K)(
(ν CCI)〈A,B, {CCI}K [at a dest {b}]〉.0
|
(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K [at b orig {a}] in 0
The analysis finds that the authentication property may be violated when the
process is put in parallel with the attacker’s process, i.e. P | P•:
{(a, c•), (c•, b)} ⊆ ψ
The first pair (a, c•) reports that something encrypted at the crypto-point a may
be decrypted by an attacker. The second pair (c•, b) reports that something
encrypted by the attacker may end up being decrypted at the crypto-point b.
This corresponds to the problems shown in Example 2.2.
5.5 Correctness of the Authentication Analysis
The most interesting part about the authentication analysis is whether it cor-
rectly captures violations of the authentication property. This is stated in the
following theorem and proved in [20]. We also refer to [20] for a complete list of
proofs regarding the correctness the control flow analysis and the authentication
analysis.
Theorem 5.3 (Static check for reference monitor) If ρ, κ, ψ |= P and ψ =
∅ then RM cannot abort P .
Theorem 5.4 (Analysis of Authentication) If ρ, κ, ψ |= P and ψ = ∅ then
P ensures destination and origin authentication.
5.6 Meta Level Analysis of Authentication
In a meta level process, indices are consistently added to names and variables
such that, say, names, variables used in a session between Ai and Bj are indexed
ij, in order to model the scenario in which the meta level process may be
deployed. The meta level authentication analysis is identical to the original
analysis listed in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 except that the authentication analysis
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listed in Table 5.3 is used to analyse object level constructs. Similar to the
object level analysis, in Table 5.3, an error component is included in the meta
level authentication analysis, i. e. the analysis is of the form
ρ, κ, ψ |=Γ M
Because each meta level process may instantiate to a set of object level processes,
a meta level process ensures destination and origin authentication only if all the
processes it instantiates to ensure destination and origin authentication.
Example 5.5 The credit card information protocol from Example 5.2 may be
modelled as a meta level process with annotations, as shown below,
let X ⊆ S1 in
let Y ⊆ S2 in
(ν K)(
|i∈X |j∈Y (ν CCIij)〈Ai, Bj , {CCIij}K [at a dest {b}]〉.0
|
|i∈X |j∈Y (Ai, Bj ; yij).decrypt yij as {; yCCIij}K [at b orig {a}] in 0)
The annotations are added to the meta level process saying that something
encrypted by principal Ai should only be decrypted by principal Bj. Taking
S1 = {1} and S2 = {1} the analysis gives the result ψ = ∅ even when the pro-
cess is under attack. This guarantees that any instance of the meta level process
ensures the authentication property as specified by the destination and origin
annotations.
However, in the above example, all the principals Ai share the same crypto-point
a and all the principals Bj share the same crypto-point b. The annotations do
not specify by which instance of the principals an encryption is decrypted. To
make the authentication property more refined with respect to different scenar-
ios, the crypto-points should be indexed as well. More specifically, crypto-points,
c, are now of the form ci¯. The indexes in i¯ will be substituted whenever the
meta level process is instantiated.
Example 5.6 Consider the object level process from Example 5.2. The meta
level process may be modelled as the following, where the crypto-points from
different sessions are distinguished by the indices. Assume it is deployed in a
scenario where each principal Ai is engaged in communicating with the principal
Bi.
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let X ⊆ S in
(ν K)(
|i∈X(ν CCIi)〈Ai, Bi, {CCIi}K [at ai dest {bi}]〉.0
|
|i∈X(Ai, Bi; yi).decrypt yi as {; yCCIi}K [at bi orig {ai}] in 0)
Here annotations have been added stating that an instance of the initiator, Ai,
uses the crypto-point ai for the encryptions it makes for communicating with
the instance of the responders, Bi. Taking bSc = {1, 2}, the analysis finds that
{(a1, b2), (a2, b1)} ⊆ ψ
Thus, the analysis reports possible attacks because something encrypted by A1
may be wrongfully decrypted by B2 and something encrypted by A2 may be wrong-
fully decrypted by B1. This is really a violation of the property, because one can
find an execution that leads to the above violations of the authentication property.
Consider the following message exchange of two sessions:
A1 A2 B2 Attacker
1.1 〈A1, B1, {CCI1}K (; zA1 , zB1 , zenc1)
[at a1 dest {b1}]〉
2.1 〈A2, B2, {CCI2}K (; zA2 , zB2 , zenc2)
[at a2 dest {b2}]〉
2.1′ (A2, B2; y2) 〈zA2 , zB2 , zenc1〉
After the last message exchange, variable y2 has become bound to the value of
zenc1, i.e. to the value {CCI1}K [at a1 dest {b1}]. The following decryption and
pattern matching can then successfully take place
decrypt {CCI1}K [at a1 dest {b1}] as {; yCCI2}K [at b2 orig {a2}] in 0→ 0
This decryption violates the authentication property and represents an attack
because something encrypted at principal A1 is wrongfully decrypted at principal
B2. This accounts for the error (a1, b2) in ψ.
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5.7 Summary
Authentication exists at many different levels of abstraction. At a lower level,
cryptographic primitives are employed by message authentication code. At a
higher level, one may validate on authentication property by reasoning about
the beliefs of principals. In the work presented in this chapter, the authen-
tication property is described at the level of the individual messages used in
communications, and in particular, the part of the messages that is safeguarded
by cryptography. Authentication is assured when there is no violation of the
destination and origin annotations. However, a violation of the property does
not necessarily mean the overall aims of the protocol have been compromised.
Rather, it points to potential vulnerabilities that should become subject of closer
inspection. The usefulness of the destination and origin annotations has been
demonstrated by applying the authentication analysis to a number of classical
protocols, e.g. Andrew Secure RPC protocol, Needham-Schroeder Symmetric
Key protocol, as well as real world protocol, e.g. PKMv2 Protocol in IEEE
802.16e-2005 specification. All the results show that the analysis is able to
reason about the authentication properties of the protocols by either revealing




An important security property concerning cryptographic protocols is confiden-
tiality. Confidentiality ensures that data is only available to those authorised to
obtain it. This is usually achieved through encryption of the data so that only
those with the correct decryption key can recover it. In cryptographic proto-
cols confidentiality is essential to ensure that keys and other data are available
only as intended, meaning that those important data should only be obtained
by the right party. This intension can be achieved by clarifying the intended
place where the data goes to, which, in our work, is expressed as confidentiality
annotations.
Example 6.1 Consider the credit card information protocol in Example 3.1,
which can be modelled in LYSA as the following,
((ν CCI)〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0
|
(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI}K in 0)
Again the scope of key K is not restricted such that it is known to the attacker.
By intercepting the encrypted value and decrypting it, the attacker will learn the
value of CCI. In this sense, the confidentiality of this protocol can be expressed
as the value CCI should only be bound to the variable yCCI.
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6.1 Setting the Scene
Confidentiality is about protecting sensitive data from unauthorised parties.
Because of the existence of the attacker, who has total control of the network,
legitimate protocol participants may be fooled into revealing some secret data
to the attacker or to accepting fake data as the real one. In this sense, confiden-
tiality is about “whether secret data ONLY reaches the intended place” and,
the other way around, “whether secret data comes from the intended place”.
Therefore confidentiality expressed in LYSA can be further refined as “whether
a value is bound to the right variable” and “whether a variable is the right one
to bind the value to”. It is reasonable to consider only the secret data, which
is, in most cases, encrypted before being sent out.
To describe the confidentiality intentions of protocols in LYSA, whenever a name
is introduced we extend LYSA with the annotation [within X ], where X ⊆ bV arc
is a set of canonical variables to which a name may be bound and at each
binding occurrence we add the annotations [from N ], where N ⊆ bV alc is a set
of canonical values that may be bound to a variable.
Syntactically, whenever we generate a new name, we have a LYSA term of the
form
(ν n[within X ])P and
(ν± m[within X1,X2])P
where X , X1 and X2 state the sets of variables to which the name n, the public
key m+ and the private key m− may be bound, respectively.
Similarly, variables occurring in binding places inside a decryption are also dec-
orated with annotations. The decryption constructs are of the form,
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]}lE0 in P and
decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]|}lE0 in P
where l ∈ Lab is a label uniquely identifying each decryption place.
Example 6.2 In the credit card information protocol from Example 6.1, the
value CCI is expected to be bound to the variable yCCI only and the variable
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yCCI is expected to be bound to the value CCI. These intensions can be ex-
pressed in the within and from annotations as,
((ν CCI[within {yCCI}])〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0
|
(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI[from {CCI}]}lK in 0)
from A’s side (ν CCI[within {yCCI}]). The annotation expresses that the
value CCI should only be bound to the variable yCCI, and
from B’s side decrypt y as {; yCCI[from {CCI}]}K in 0. The annotation ex-
presses that CCI is the only value that should be bound to the variable
yCCI.
Technically, because of the extension of the syntax of the LYSA calculus, it is
necessary to redefine the semantics as well.
6.2 Dynamic Property
The semantics of the LYSA calculus remains unchanged after the extension.
The confidentiality annotations are not carried around, but rather recorded in
an abstract environment, β, which is used to collect the within annotations
associated with each name,
β : N → P(V ar)
The reduction relation now holds between a pair of processes, written
β ` P → P ′
precisely P can evolve into P ′ when confidentiality annotations of names are as
described in the environment β.
The within and from annotations are enforced by a reference monitor, which
aborts unwanted variable bindings, the rules for symmetric and asymmetric
restrictions and decryptions are as shown in Table 6.1, the rest of the rules
are similar to the ones in the original semantics (Table 3.5) except that the
abstract environment β is taken into account. The reference monitor makes use
of a function I to determine the annotation of each value. Recall that values
V ∈ V al are built from the grammar
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V ::= n | m+ | m− | {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 | {|V1, . . . , Vk|}V0
Definition 6.1 Determine within Annotations




I({V1, . . . , Vk}V0) = X
I({|V1, . . . , Vk|}V0) = X
Note encryptions are implicitly allowed to become bound to all the variables,
X , that occur in the process.
(Dec)
∧ji=0Vi = V ′i ∧ ∧ki=j+1RM(Vi, I(Vi), xi,Ni)
β ` decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as
{V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]}lV ′0
in P →R P [V ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , V ′k/xk]
(ADec)
∧ji=1Vi = V ′i ∧ ∧ki=j+1RM(Vi, I(Vi), xi,Ni)
β ` decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ as
{|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]|}lm−
in P →R P [V ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , V ′k/xk]
(ASig)
∧ji=1Vi = V ′i ∧ ∧ki=j+1RM(Vi, I(Vi), xi,Ni)
β ` decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− as
{|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]|}lm+
in P →R P [V ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , V ′k/xk]
(New)
β[n 7→ X ] ` P →R P ′
β ` (ν n[within X ])P →R (ν n[within X ])P ′
(ANew)
β[m+ 7→ X1,m− 7→ X2] ` P →R P ′
β ` (ν± m[within X1,X2])P →R (ν± m[within X1,X2])P ′
Table 6.1: Operational Semantics β ` P →R P ′, parameterized on R
The operational Semantics β ` P →R P ′ with the relation R is considered in
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two variants;
• the standard semantics, β ` P → P ′, discards the annotations and takes
R(n,X , x,N ) to be universally true.
• the reference monitor semantics, β ` P →RM P ′, takes advantage of the
annotations and takes
RM(n,X , x,N ) = n ∈ N ∧ x ∈ X
Therefore at each binding occurrence, the reference monitor checks whether
it is allowed and captures any binding violations with respect to the within
and from annotations.
The rules (Dec), (ADec) and (ASig) in Table 6.1 require that in a successful
decryption, either symmetric or asymmetric, the values Vj+1, . . . , Vk have to
be allowed to be bound the corresponding variables xj+1, . . . , xk by the within
annotations of the values, and the variables have to be allowed to be binding
to the corresponding values by the from annotations. Therefore in the reference
monitor semantics no within and from annotation is violated.
The rules (New) and (ANew) update β to include the within annotations of the
names and asymmetric key pairs before proceeding.
Using this semantics, the property of within and from confidentiality can be
defined as follows:
Definition 6.2 (Confidentiality) A process P ensures within and from confi-
dentiality if for all the executions
β ` P →∗ P ′ → P ′′
there exists
β ` P →∗ P ′ →RM P ′′
This definition states that a process P , given the abstract environment β, en-
sures the confidentiality property if none of its executions is aborted when the
reference monitor is turned on. More precisely, there does not exist i (j + 1 ≤
i ≤ k) : Vi /∈ Ni or xi /∈ I(Vi) when P ′ → P ′′ is derived using (Dec) on
decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as
{V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]}lV ′0 in P
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or using (ADec) or (ASig) on
decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ as
{|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]|}lm− in P
or
decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− as
{|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]|}lm+ in P
Next, we shall show how to extend the original analysis from Chapter 4 such that
it can be used to check whether a process ensures within and from confidentiality
according to Definition 6.2.
6.3 Static Property
To capture violations of confidentiality annotations, similar to the authentica-
tion analysis, we make use of an error component ψ to collect all the error
messages, which is a label indicating where the violation happens. Formally,
ψ ⊆ P(bLabc)
A label l ∈ ψ means that a value binding inside the decryption, marked with
label l, violates the confidentiality annotations and therefore is not allowed.
The confidentiality analysis extends the original analysis in a way that the within
and from annotations are taken into account. The extended rules are listed in
Table 6.2, while the rest of the rules are similar to the original ones in Table
4.1 except that the abstract environment β is added as an additional analysis
component.
The rules for symmetric decryption (CDec) and asymmetric decryption (CADec)
use pattern matching and variable binding as before, but they further check
whether the bindings are allowed, or record the label l in the ψ component.
The rule for restrictions (CNew) and (CANew) require that the declared within
annotations for n, m+ and m− are included in the abstract environment β.
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(CDec) ρ, κ, β, ψ |=
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]}lE0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{U1, . . . , Uk}U0 ∈ ϑ ∧
∧ji=0 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P ∧
(∧ki=j+1(Ui /∈ bNic ∨ bxic /∈ β(Ui))⇒ blc ∈ ψ))
(CADec) ρ, κ, β, ψ |=
decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1[from Nj+1], . . . , xk[from Nk]|}lE0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{|U1, . . . , Uk|}U0 ∈ ϑ : ∀U ′0 ∈ ϑ0 :
∀(m+,m−) : {U0, U ′0} = {bm+c, bm−c}∧
∧ji=1 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P ∧
(∧ki=j+1(Ui /∈ bNic ∨ bxic /∈ β(Ui))⇒ blc ∈ ψ))
(CNew) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν n[within X ])P
iff bXc ⊆ β(bnc) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
(CANew) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν± m[within X ])P
iff bXc ⊆ β(bm+c) ∧ bXc ⊆ β(bm−c) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
Table 6.2: Confidentiality Analysis of LYSA Terms, ρ |= E : ϑ, and Processes,
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P . The remaining rules overlap with the original ones as in Table
4.1 but using the judgement form of the confidentiality analysis.
6.4 Correctness of the Confidentiality Analysis
The confidentiality analysis of LYSA defined in Table 6.2 statically predicts some
aspects of the behaviour of a process. The main result that will be shown in the
section is that the analysis of the LYSA calculus with within and from annotations
does indeed capture the entire behaviour of the process, and more importantly,
the confidentiality analysis correctly captures violations to the confidentiality
property.
Theorem 6.3 (Correctness of Confidentiality Analysis) if ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
and ψ = ∅ then P ensures within and from confidentiality.
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Proof. The theorem can be proven by showing an extended subject reduction
result that says if ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P and P → P ′ then ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P ′, and further-
more if ψ = ∅ then P → P ′ does not violate the confidentiality property. An
induction in the length of the execution sequences then gives that P ensures
confidentiality for all executions.
In case (Com) we assume
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉.P | (V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).Q
which amounts to:
(a) ∧ki=1ρ |= Vi : ϑi
(b) ∀U1, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=1Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒ 〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ
(c) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
(d) ∧ji=1ρ |= V ′i : ϑ′i
(e) ∀〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ji=1Ui ∈ ϑ′i ⇒ (∧ki=j+1Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q)
Moreover we assume that ∧ji=1Vi = V ′i because
〈V1, . . . , Vk〉.P | (V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).Q→ P |Q[Vj+1/xj+1, . . . , Vk/xk] and
we have to prove ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P | Q[Vj+1/xj+1, . . . , Vk/xk]. From (a) we have
∧ki=1Vi ∈ ϑi since ∧ki=1fv(Vi) = ∅ and then (b) gives 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ. From (d)
and the assumption ∧ji=1Vi = V ′i we get ∧ji=1Vi ∈ ϑ′i. Now (e) gives ∧ki=j+1Vi ∈
ρ(bxic) and ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q. The substitution result ?? then gives ρ, κ, β, ψ |=
Q[Vj+1/xj+1, . . . , Vk/xk] and together with (c) this gives the required result.
The second part is trivial: when ψ = ∅, obviously
〈V1, . . . , Vk〉.P | (V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).Q→RM P | Q[Vj+1/xj+1, . . . , Vk/xk]
In case (Dec) we assume
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as {V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1[fromNj+1], . . . , xk[fromNk]}lV ′0 in P
which amounts to:
(f) ∧ki=0 ρ |= Vi : ϑi
(g) ∀U0, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=0Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒ {U1, . . . , Uk}U0 ∈ ϑ
(h) ∧ji=0ρ |= V ′i : ϑ′i
(i) ∀{U1, . . . , Uk}U0 ∈ ϑ : ∧ji=0Ui ∈ ϑ′i
⇒ (∧ki=j+1Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧
(∧ki=j+1(Ui /∈ bNic ∨ bxic /∈ β(Ui))⇒ blc ∈ ψ) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P )
Furthermore we assume that ∧ji=0Vi = V ′i because
decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as {V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xj+1[fromNj+1], . . . , xk[fromNk]}lV ′0 in P →
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P [Vj+1/xj+1, . . . , Vk/xk] and we have to prove ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P [Vj+1/xj+1, . . . , Vk/xk].
From (f) and ∧ki=0fv(Vi) = ∅, we get ∧ki=0Vi ∈ ϑi and then (g) gives
{V1, . . . , Vk}V0 ∈ ϑ. From (h) and the assumption ∧ji=0Vi = V ′i we get ∧ji=0Vi ∈
ϑ′i. Now (i) gives ∧ki=j+1Vi ∈ ρ(bxic) and ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P . Using Lemma ?? we
get the required result ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P [Vj+1/xj+1, . . . , Vk/xk]
For the second part of the result we observe that ∧ki=j+1(Ui /∈ bNic ∨ bxic /∈
β(Ui)) ⇒ blc ∈ ψ follows from (i) and since ψ = ∅ it must be the case that
∧ki=j+1RM(Vi, I(Vi), xi,Ni). Thus the condition of the rule (Dec) are fulfilled
for →RM.
In case (ADec) and (ASig) are similar.
In case (New) we assume ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν n[within X ])P , which amounts to:
(a) bXc ⊆ β(n)
(b) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
Furthermore we assume that β[n 7→ X ] ` P → Q. By applying the induction
hypothesis on (b), we have ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q, which together with (a) gives the
expected result that ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν n[within X ])Q.
In case (ANew) is similar.
In cases (Par) and (Rep) follow directly from the induction hypothesis.
The case (Congr) also uses the congruence result.
6.5 The Attacker
In the setup of Psys | P•, the attacker process P• has to be annotated with respect
to the extended syntax. A unique label l• is used to indicate the decryption
places that are used by the attacker. In the annotations in the attacker process,
a set of all the names in the system process, N = Nf is used. The variables used
by the attacker, z•, are allowed to become bound to all the names. Furthermore,
we allow the name n• generated by the attacker to be bound to all the variables
X , i.e. β(n•) = X . Therefore, only the annotations in Psys will cause the
confidentiality property to be violated.
Some of the Dolev-Yao condition for the confidentiality analysis is listed in Table
6.3, while the others remain unchanged as in Table 4.3.
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(2) ∧k∈AEnc ∀{V1, . . . , Vk}V0 ∈ ρ(z•) :
V0 ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∨ki=1¬RM(Vi, β(Vi), z•,N )⇒ l• ∈ ψ)
∧k∈AEnc ∀{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ ∈ ρ(z•) :
m− ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∨ki=1¬RM(Vi, β(Vi), z•,N )⇒ l• ∈ ψ)
∧k∈AEnc ∀{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− ∈ ρ(z•) :
m+ ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∨ki=1¬RM(Vi, β(Vi), z•,N )⇒ l• ∈ ψ)
the attacker may learn by decrypting messages with keys already known
Table 6.3: The Attacker’s Capabilities in Confidentiality Analysis
Similar to the way described in Chapter 4.3, a formula FDYRM of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc)
is defined as the conjunction of the five components in Table 4.3 and Table 6.2,
where each describes an ability of the attacker. Furthermore, it was proved
that the formula FDYRM is capable of characterising the potential effect of all at-
tackers P• of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc). The soundness of the Dolev-Yao condition is
established by the following Theorem.
Theorem 6.4 (Correctness of Dolev-Yao Condition) If (ρ, κ, β, ψ) satis-
fies FDYRM of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc) then ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q for all attackers Q of ex-
tended type ({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Aκ,AEnc).
Proof. By structural induction on Q.
In case of (Inp), i.e. Q is the process of the form
(E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1[from N ], . . . , xk[from N ]).P
and here we need to find ϑ1, . . . , ϑj and show
(a) ∧ji=1ρ |= Ei : ϑi and
for all 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ with ∧ji=1Vi ∈ ϑi that:
(b) ∧ki=j+1Vi ∈ ρ(bxic)
(c) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
We choose ϑi(1 ≤ i ≤ j) as the least set such that ρ |= Ei : ϑi and prove
that ϑi ⊆ ρ(z•); intuitively, if Ei has free variables z1, . . . , zm then ϑi consists
of all values bEi[V1/z1, . . . , Vm/zm]c where Vj(1 ≤ j ≤ m) ∈ ρ(z•), and this
takes care of (a). Next consider 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ and assume that ∧ji=1Vi ∈ ϑi.
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Since ∧ji=1ϑi ⊆ ρ(z•), as above, we have ∧ji=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) and by FDYRM we get
∧ki=j+1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) Since bxic = z• this takes care of (b); furthermore P has
extended type ({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Aκ,AENC) and the induction hypothesis then
takes care of (c).
In case of (Dec), i.e. Q is the process of the form
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1[from N ], . . . , xk[from N ]}l•E0 in P
and we need to find ϑ and ϑ0, . . . , ϑj and show
(a) ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0ρ |= Ei : ϑi
and for all {V1, . . . , Vk}lV0 ∈ ϑ with ∧ji=0Vi ∈ ϑi that:
(b) ∧ki=j+1Vi ∈ ρ(xi)
(c) ∧ki=j+1¬RM(Vi, I(Vi), xi,N )⇒ l• ∈ ψ
(d) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P : ψ
We choose ϑ as the least set such that ρ |= E : ϑ and prove that ϑ ⊆
ρ(z•); intuitively, if E has free variables z1, . . . , zm then ϑ consists of all values
bE[V1/z1, . . . , Vm/zm]c where Vi ∈ ρ(z•). We perform a similar development
for ϑ0, . . . , ϑj and this takes care of (a). Next consider {V1, . . . , Vk}lV0 ∈ ϑ
and assume that V0 ∈ ϑ0. Since ϑ0 ⊆ ρ(z•), as above, we have V0 ∈ ρ(z•)
and by FDYRM we get ∧ki=j+1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) and ∧ki=j+1¬RM(Vi, I(Vi), xi,N ) ⇒ l• ∈
ψ. Since bxic = z• this takes care of (b) and (c); furthermore P has type
({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Aκ,AENC) and the induction hypothesis then takes care of
(d).
The remaining cases are similar.
For the dynamic property, we say that Psys guarantees dynamic confidentiality
with respect to the annotations in Psys if the reference monitor RM cannot abort
Psys | Q regardless of the choice of the attacker Q.
Similarly, for static property we say that Psys guarantees static confidentiality
with respect to the annotations in Psys if there exists ρ, κ, β and ψ such that
ρ, κ, β, ∅ |= P and (ρ, κ, β, ∅) satisfies FDYRM .
Theorem 6.5 If P guarantees static confidentiality then P guarantees dynamic
confidentiality.
Proof. If ρ, κ, β, ∅ |= Psys and (ρ, κ, β, ∅) satisfies FDYRM then, by Theorems
6.3 and 6.4, RM does not abort Psys | Q regardless of the choice of attacker Q.
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That is, P ensures within and from confidentiality no matter which attacker it
is composed with.
Example 6.3 Consider the CCI protocol in Example 6.2 with within and from
annotations. The annotations formalise the intuition that the value CCI is
supposed to be bound to the variable yCCI, only.
((ν CCI[within yCCI])〈A,B, {CCI}K〉.0
|
(A,B; y).decrypt y as {; yCCI[from CCI]}lK in 0)
The analysis finds that the confidentiality property may be violated when the
process is put in parallel with the attacker’s process, i.e. P | P•:
{l, l•} ⊆ ψ
The first element l reports that variable bindings after the successful decryption
of label l is not allowed: the value bound to the variable may come from the
attacker. This is because that the attacker knows the key K. Therefore he is able
to generate encryptions that are accepted by the principal B. The second element
l• reports that a value may be bound to a variable belonging to the attacker after
a successful decryption, i.e. the value becomes known to the attacker. This
corresponds to the problem shown in Example 2.2.
The remaining part of the analysis results is as in Example 4.3 except that
annotations are recorded in the analysis component β:
{{bCCIc}bKc} ⊆ ρ(byc)
{bCCIc} ⊆ ρ(byCCIc)
{〈bAc, bBc, {bCCIc}bKc〉} ⊆ κ
{byCCIc} ⊆ β(bCCIc)
{l, l•} ⊆ ψ
6.6 Confidentiality Analysis at the Meta Level
The meta level confidentiality analysis is identical to the original analysis listed
in Table 4.2 in Chapter 4 except that the confidentiality analysis of Table 6.2 is
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used to analyse object level constructs. Similar to the object level analysis, in
Table 6.2, the environment, β, and the error component, ψ, are included in the
meta level confidentiality analysis, i. e. the analysis is of the form
ρ, κ, β, ψ |=Γ M
Example 6.4 Consider the object level process from Example 6.3. The meta
level process may be modelled as the following, where the within and from an-
notations from different sessions are distinguished by the indices. Assume it is
deployed in a scenario where there are many principals Ai and many principals
Bj and all of them share the same key, K, which is kept secret from the attacker
by using the restriction (ν K)
let X ⊆ S1 in
let Y ⊆ S2 in
(ν K)(
|i∈X |j∈Y (ν CCIij [within yCCIij ])〈Ai, Bj , {CCIij}K〉.0
|
|i∈X |j∈Y (Ai, Bj ; yij).decrypt yij as {; yCCIij [from CCIij ]}lijK in 0)
Note that unlike CCI, the key K does not carry any annotations. This expresses
the intuition that K is not allowed to be bound to any variable.
When taking S1 = {1, 2} and S2 = {1, 2}, the analysis result of the process gives
an non-empty error component:
{l11, l12, l21, l22} ⊆ ψ
The elements in ψ show that variable bindings in the decryptions with label
l11, l12, l21 and l22 violate the within and from annotations. This corresponds to
an attack that forces the principal Bj to decrypt a replayed value, which happens
because all the principals share the same key K. Consider the following message
exchange:
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A1 A2 B1 Attacker
1.1 〈A1, B1, (A1, B1;Ze1)
{CCI11}K〉
2.1 〈A2, B2, (A2, B2;Ze2)
{CCI22}K〉
1.2 (A1, B1; y11) 〈A1, B1, Ze2〉
decrypt y11 as
{; yCCI11[from CCI11]}l11K
In the step 1.2, the following pattern matching can successfully take place in the
input construct,
(A1, B1; y11) | 〈A1, B1, {CCI22}K〉
and let the variable y11 become bound to the value {CCI22}K . This gives rise
to the successful decryption
decrypt y11 as {; yCCI11[from CCI11]}l11K
This decryption results in binding the variable yCCI11 to the value CCI22. After
the decryption, the principal B1 then gets hold of the value, CCI22, which is
supposed to be accessible by the principal B2 only. Therefore a confidentiality
violation is caused and is recorded by letting l11 in ψ.
Example 6.5 In this example we shall see whether the protocol preserves the
confidentiality when deployed in a scenario that each initiator Ai shares a unique
key Kij with a responder Bj. The scenario is modelled as the meta level process
as,
let X ⊆ S1 in
let Y ⊆ S2 in
|i∈X |j∈Y (ν Kij)(
(ν CCIij [within yCCIij ])〈Ai, Bj , {CCIij}Kij 〉.0
|
(Ai, Bj ; yij).decrypt yij as {; yCCIij [from CCIij ]}lijKij in 0)
Again the key Kij does not carry any annotation because it is not allow to be
bound to any variable.
This time the analysis result gives an empty error component, i.e. ψ = ∅, which
verifies that the protocol holds the confidentiality property.
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6.7 Summary
Confidentiality, defined by the International Organization for Standardization
(ISO) as “ensuring that information is accessible only to those authorised to have
access”, is one of the key security properties that cryptographic protocols have
to maintain. Many researches in the formal methods field have been carried out
for validating confidentiality property of security protocols. Some of the related
work includes type system and model checking.
Type systems have been used for checking confidentiality of security protocols.
For example, Abadi proposed in [1] a type-based methodology, where each piece
of data is annotated as either secret or public according the protocol intention,
and confidentiality of a process is guaranteed when a type checker confirms that
the process conforms with the annotations by means of applying a set of typing
rules.
The model checking approach [6, 5, 18] is another way to verify confidentiality of
security protocols. The basic idea is to formalise a model of a system running the
protocol and then to use state space exploration to search for attacks. However
the search does not always terminate because, in general, the state space for
protocols is infinite. Consequently, model checking approaches cannot guarantee
the confidentiality property of a protocol, as they can not search through the
entire state space.
In the work presented in this chapter, the confidentiality property is clarified
by means of the within and from annotations, which basically express where a
piece of information is supposed to end up. The control flow analysis is adapted
correspondingly to take the annotations into account and searches for violations
to the annotations. An empty set of violations then guarantees the absence of
confidentiality flaws. Unlike type systems, which only check whether a secret
piece of information may be leaked to an attacker, the control flow analysis is
able to verify that secret information will never end up in the “wrong hands”, i.e.




Another security property, desirable in some practical applications but not dis-
cussed in [1], is key freshness. By this we mean the property that the party to
a key establishment process knows that the key is a new key. In particular, the
party should have evidence that the messages received during the protocol by
which the key has been established are fresh messages, i.e. they are not replays
of old messages from a previous session of the protocol.
Example 7.1 To see why this property is necessary in addition to implicit or
explicit key authentication, consider the credit card information protocol from
Example 3.1. It is clear that the protocol does not provide key freshness, since
B has no way of telling whether the message has just been generated by A, or is
a replay of a message sent by A at any time since K was first established. Of
course, this lack of key freshness can easily be rectified by including a time stamp
or sequence number within the scope of the encrypted message. The absence of
key freshness would enable an attacker to force B to accept an old data as a
fresh one. In even worse cases, the attacker may fool a principal to re-use an old
session key, which might have been compromised, and hence learn some sensitive
data encrypted using the old session key. It would therefore seem reasonable to
make key freshness a requirement for most applications of key establishment
protocols.
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[{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 ]s symmetric encryption
[{|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 ]s asymmetric encryption
P ::= extended processes
〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P output
(E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P input
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}lE0 in P symmetric decryption
decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}lE0 in P asymmetric decryption
(ν [n]s)P restriction
(ν± [m]s)P pair restriction
P1 | P2 parallel composition
[!P ]s replication
0 nil
Table 7.1: Syntax of LYSA calculus extended with session identifiers
7.1 Setting the Scene
Replay attacks are classified, by Syverson in [81], at the highest level as run-
external and run-internal attacks, depending on the origin of messages. In this
chapter, we restrict our attention to run-external attacks. This type of attacks
allows the attacker to obtain messages from one run of a protocol, often referred
to as a session, and to send them to a principal participating in another run
of the protocol. To distinguish messages from different sessions, we extend the
LYSA calculus with annotations about sessions identifiers. In order to do that,
we change the syntax of standard LYSA so that each term and process now
carry identifiers of the sessions they belong to. In what follows, we assume that
SID is a fixed enumerable set of session identifiers s, and denote E1, E2, . . . the
extended terms and P,Q, . . . the extended processes defined below. Note that
variables carry no annotation and therefore we shall consider [x]s and x to be
the same (see below).
We define a function F and a function T , that map standard terms and processes
into the extended ones, by attaching the session identifiers inductively. Note that
F unwinds the syntactic structure of an extended term until reaching a basic
term (a name or a variable), while T unwinds the structure of an extended
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process until reaching a nil (which is untagged) or a replication.
Definition 7.1 Distributing Session Identifiers
F : E × s→ E
F(n, s) = [n]s
F(x, s) = x
F(m+, s) = [m+]s
F(m−, s) = [m−]s
F({E1, . . . , Ek}E0 , s) = [{F(E1, s), . . . ,F(Ek, s)}F(E0,s)]s
F({|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 , s) = [{|F(E1, s), . . . ,F(Ek, s)|}F(E0,s)]s
T : P × s→ P
T (〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P, s) = 〈F(E1, s), . . . ,F(Ek, s)〉.T (P, s)
T ((E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P, s) =
(F(E1, s), . . . ,F(Ej , s);xj+1, . . . , xk).T (P, s)
T (decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}lE0 in P, s) =
decrypt F(E, s) as
{F(E1, s), . . . ,F(Ej , s);xj+1, . . . , xk}lF(E0,s) in T (P, s)
T (decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}lE0 in P, s) =
decrypt F(E, s) as
{|F(E1, s), . . . ,F(Ej , s);xj+1, . . . , xk|}lF(E0,s) in T (P, s)
T ((ν n)P, s) = (ν [n]s)T (P, s)
T ((ν± m)P, s) = (ν± [m]s)T (P, s)
T (P | Q, s) = T (P, s) | T (Q, s)
T (!P, s) = [!P ]s
T (0, s) = 0
7.2 Dynamic Property
Technically, the addition of session identifiers to the syntax means that it is
necessary to define its semantics as well. By directly using the semantics def-
inition from the Chapter 3 on the extended syntax, the session identifiers will
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be carried on to the semantics of values. This extended value domain will be




| [{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s
| [{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}FV0 ]s
An equivalent relation FV1 = FV2 is defined to be the least equivalence over
FV al that (inductively) ignores the session identifiers. For example, [n]s = [n]s′
for any s and s′ and [{[n1]s1 , [n2]s2}[n0]s0 ]s = [{[n1]s′1 , [n2]s′2}[n0]s′0 ]s′ for any
s, s′, s1, s2, s′1 and s2. The semantics of the extended syntax is then defined by
the tables for the reduction semantics in Chapter 3 interpreted over extended
values FV ∈ FV al.
For the subsequent treatment, it is convenient to introduce an auxiliary operator,
I, which extracts the outermost session identifer of an extended value FV , with
respect to encryptions, of an extended term.
Definition 7.2 An auxiliary operator




I([{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s) = s
I([{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}FV0 ]s) = s
The goal of adding session identifers is to distinguish terms from different ses-
sions.
We remove the rule !P ≡ P | !P from the structural congruence rules, in Table
3.3, for the LYSA calculus, namely !P and P | !P are no longer structurally
equivalent in this Chapter. On the contrary, the relationship is lifted to the
extended processes, which gives the rule (Repl) in Table 7.2.
Following the tradition of the pi-calculus, we shall give the extended LYSA a
reduction semantics. The reduction relation →R is the least relation on closed
processes that satisfies the rules in Table 3.5. It uses the standard notion of sub-
stitution, P[FV/x], structural congruence, as defined above, and the disciplined
treatment of α-conversion.
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As far as the semantics is concerned, we consider two variants of reduction
relation →R, graphically identified by a different instantiation of the relation
R, which decorates the transition relation. One variant (→RM) takes advantage
of annotations, the other one (→) discards them: essentially, the first semantics
checks the freshness of messages, while the other one does not:
• the reference monitor semantics P →RM Q takes
RM(s, s′) = (s = s′)
• the standard semantics P → Q takes, by construction, R to be universally
true.
The rule (Com) expresses that an output 〈FV1, . . . , FVj , FVj+1, . . . , FVk〉.P is
matched by an input (FV1, . . . , FVj ;xj+1, . . . , xk) in case the first j elements
are pairwise the same when all the session identifiers are recursively removed,
by using the equivalent operator = . When the matchings are successful each
FVi(j + 1 ≤ i ≤ k) is bound to the corresponding xi.
Similarly, the rules (Dec), (ADec) and (ASig) require that in a successful de-
cryption, either symmetric or asymmetric, the first j values FVi and FV ′i must
be equal, and additionally the keys must be either the same, in case of sym-
metric decryption, or from the same key pair, in case of asymmetric decryption.
When the matching is successful, each FVi is bound to the corresponding xi. In
the reference monitor semantics we ensure that the decrypted message comes
from the current session by checking whether the first j values FVi and FV ′i
have the same session identifiers, by using the function I.
The rule (Congr) makes use of the function T , which bridges the gap between
the semantics defined on the extended processes P and the structural congruence
defined on the standard processes P .
The rules (New) and (ANew) let an extended process evolve inside a restriction,
however the restriction operator itself does never disappear.
In case of (Repl), the process is unfolded once. Note that the new session
identifier, s′, in this case, has to be unique for not mixing the processes up.
The rule (Par) is standard.
Using this semantics, the property of freshness can be defined as follows:
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(Com)
∧ji=1FVi = FV ′i
〈FV1, . . . , FVk〉.P | (FV ′1 , . . . , FV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P ′
→R P | P ′[FV ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , FV ′k/xk]
(Dec)
∧ji=0FVi = FV ′i ∧ ∧ji=1R(I(FVi), I(FV ′i ))
decrypt {FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 as {FV ′1 , . . . , FV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk}lFV ′0 in P→R P[FV ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , FV ′k/xk]
(ADec)
∧ji=1FVi = FV ′i ∧ ∧ji=1R(I(FVi), I(FV ′i ))
decrypt {|FV1, . . . , FVk|}[m+]s as {|FV ′1 , . . . , FV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}l[m−]s′ in P→R P[FV ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , FV ′k/xk]
(ASig)
∧ji=1FVi = FV ′i ∧ ∧ji=1R(I(FVi), I(FV ′i ))
decrypt {|FV1, . . . , FVk|}[m−]s as {|FV ′1 , . . . , FV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}l[m+]s′ in P→R P[FV ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , FV ′k/xk]
(New)
P →R P ′
(ν [n]s)P →R (ν [n]s)P ′
(ANew)
P →R P ′
(ν± [m]s)P →R (ν± [m]s)P ′
(Par)
P1 →R P ′1
P1 | P2 →R P ′1 | P2
(Congr)
P ≡ P ′ ∧ T (P ′, s)→R T (P ′′, s)
T (P, s)→R T (P ′′, s)
(Repl) [!P ]s →R T (P, s) | [!P ]s′
Table 7.2: Operational Semantics P →R P ′, parameterized on R
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Definition 7.3 (Freshness) A process P ensures the freshness property if for
all the executions
P →∗ P ′ →R P ′′
such that there does not exist i (1 ≤ i ≤ j + 1) : I(FVi) 6= I(FV ′i ) when
P ′ →R P ′′ is derived using (Dec) on
decrypt [{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s as
{FV ′1 , . . . , FV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk}lFV ′0 in P
or using (ADec) or (ASig) on
decrypt [{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}[m+]s′ ]s as{|FV ′1 , . . . , FV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}l[m−]s′ in P
or
decrypt {|FV1, . . . , FVk|}[m−]s′ as{|FV ′1 , . . . , FV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}l[m+]s′ in P
It says that an extended process P ensures freshness property if there is no
violation of the annotations in any of its execution.
Next, we shall show how to extend the original analysis from Chapter 3 such that
it can be used to check whether a process ensures within and from confidentiality
according to Definition 7.3.
7.3 Static Property
To capture violations of freshness annotations, similar to the authentication
analysis, we make use of an error component ψ to collect all the labels, which
indicate where the violation happens. Formally, we have
ψ ⊆ P(bLabc)
A label l ∈ ψ means that the value binding after a successful decryption, marked
with label l, violates the freshness annotations and therefore is not allowed.
The freshness analysis extends the original analysis in a way that the session
identifiers are taken into account and at each decryption, the analysis will check
whether the freshness property is preserved and any possible violation will be
recorded in the error component ψ.
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(FN) ρ |= [n]s : ϑ iff [bnc]s ∈ ϑ
(FNp) ρ |= [m+]s : ϑ iff [bm+c]s ∈ ϑ
(FNm) ρ |= [m−]s : ϑ iff [bm−c]s ∈ ϑ
(FVar) ρ |= x : ϑ iff ρ(bxc) ⊆ ϑ
(FE) ρ |= [{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 ]s : ϑ
iff ∧ki=0ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀FV0, . . . , FVk : ∧ki=0FVi ∈ ϑi ⇒
[{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s ∈ ϑ
(FAE) ρ |= [{|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 ]s : ϑ
iff ∧ki=0ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀FV0, . . . , FVk : ∧ki=0FVi ∈ ϑi ⇒
[{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}FV0 ]s ∈ ϑ
Table 7.3: Freshness Analysis of LYSA terms, ρ |= E : ϑ
In the freshness analysis, patter matching ignores the session identifers by using
a special set inclusion operator, ∝, which is formally defined as,
FV ∝ ϑ if and only if there exists FV ′ such that FV = FV ′ and FV ′ ∈ ϑ
Note that the equivalent relationship = is defined over FV al that ignores the
session identifers.
The rules of analysing expressions (FN), (FNp), (FNm), (FV), (FE) and (FAE)
ensure that the session identifers are attached to the values that they are eval-
uated to.
The rule (FInp) is identical to the original rule (AInp) except for the use of the
inclusion operator ∝ for pattern matching.
The decryption rules (FDec) and (FADec) also use the operator ∝ when there is
need to ignore the session identifers. Additionally, they check after a successful
decryption whether there is at least one value bound to a variable has the
expected session identifer. If a mismatch of session identifer may occur, the
corresponding decryption point is recorded in the error component ψ.
The rule (FRep) attaches two different session identifiers to two copies of the
process before analysing both of them. The newly generated session identifier,
s′, has to be unique in order not to mix processes up.
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(FOut) ρ, κ, ψ |= 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P
iff ∧ki=1ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀FV1, . . . , FVk ∧ki=1 FVi ∈ ϑi ⇒
(〈FV1, . . . , FVk〉 ∈ κ ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= P)
(FInp) ρ, κ, ψ |= (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P
iff ∧ji=1ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀〈FV1, . . . , FVk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ji=iFVi ∝ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1FVi ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= P)
(FDec) ρ, κ, ψ |= decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}lE0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀[{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s ∈ ϑ : ∧ji=0FVi ∝ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1FVi ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧
(∃i : 1 ≤ i ≤ j : I(FVi) 6= I(Ei)⇒ blc ∈ ψ) ∧
ρ, κ, ψ |= P)
(FADec) ρ, κ, ψ |= decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}lE0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀[{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}FV0 ]s ∈ ϑ : ∀v′0 ∝ ϑ0 :
∀m+,m−, s, s′ : {FV0, v′0} = {[bm+c]s, [bm−c]s′}∧
∧ji=1FVi ∝ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1FVi ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧
(∃i : 1 ≤ i ≤ j : I(FVi) 6= I(Ei)⇒ blc ∈ ψ) ∧
ρ, κ, ψ |= P)
(FRep) ρ, κ, ψ |= [!P ]s iff ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P ]s) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P ]s′)
(FPar) ρ, κ, ψ |= P | Q iff ρ, κ, ψ |= P ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= Q
(FNew) ρ, κ, ψ |= (ν[n]s)P iff ρ, κ, ψ |= P
(FNil) ρ, κ, ψ |= 0 iff true
Table 7.4: Freshness Analysis of LYSA processes, ρ, κ, ψ |= P
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The rest of the rules are similar to the original ones in Table 4.1 except that the
analysis is now defined for the extended terms and processes.
7.4 Correctness of the Freshness Analysis
We prove below that our analysis respects the operational semantics of extended
LYSA. More precisely, we prove a subject reduction result for both the standard
and the reference monitor semantics: if ρ, κ, ψ |= P, then the same triple (ρ, κ, ψ)
is a valid estimate for all the states passed through in a computation of P, i.e. for
all the derivatives of P. Additionally, we show that when the ψ component is
empty, then the reference monitor is useless.
It is convenient to prove the following lemmata. The first states that estimates
are resistant to substitution of closed terms for variables, and it holds for both
extended terms and processes. The second lemma says that an estimate for an
extended processes P is valid for every process congruent to P, as well.
Lemma 7.4 (Substitution in expressions) ρ |= E : ϑ and E ′ ∈ ρ(x) imply
ρ |= E [E ′/x] : ϑ
Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction over expressions by regard-
ing each of the rules in the analysis.
Case (Name). Assume that ρ |= [n]s : ϑ. For arbitrary choices of E ′ and x it
holds that [n]s[E ′/x] = [n]s so it is immediate that also ρ |= [n]s[E ′/x] : ϑ.
Case (Variable). Assume that E = x′, i.e. that ρ |= x′ : ϑ and therefore
ρ(x′) ⊆ ϑ. Then there are two cases. Either E 6= x in which case x′[E ′/x] = x′
so clearly ρ |= x′[E ′/x] : ϑ. Alternatively, E = x in which case x′[E ′/x] = E ′.
Furthermore assume that E ′ ∈ ρ(x) and because ρ(x′) ⊆ ϑ, it holds that ρ |=
E ′ : ϑ in which case ρ |= E [E ′/x] : ϑ by the analysis.
Case (Encryption). Assume that E = {E1, . . . , Ek}E0 , i.e. ρ |= {E1, . . . , Ek}E0 :
ϑ. The result holds by applying the induction hypothesis on each individual Ei.
Lemma 7.5 (Substitution in processes) ρ, κ, ψ |= P and E ∈ ρ(x) imply
ρ, κ, ψ |= P [E/x]
Proof. The proof is done by straightforward induction applying the induction
hypothesis on any sub-process and Lemma 7.4 on any sub-terms.
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Lemma 7.6 (Congruence) If P ≡ Q and ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P ]s) then ρ, κ, ψ |=
T ([Q]s)
Proof. The proof amounts to a straightforward inspection of each of the clauses
defining P ≡ Q, e.g.
In case P | 0 ≡ P We assume ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P | 0]s), which amounts to ρ, κ, ψ |=
T ([P ]s) | 0 according to the definition of T , then it must be the case that
ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P ]s) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= 0
ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P ]s) | 0
by the analysis rule. Therefore ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P ]s) is proved.
Other cases are similar and we skip the proofs because of space.
We are now ready to state the subject reduction result. It expresses that our
analysis is semantically correct regardless of the way the semantics is parame-
terised, furthermore the reference monitor cannot abort P when ψ is empty.
Theorem 7.7 (Correctness of Freshness Analysis) if ρ, κ, ψ |= P and ψ =
∅ then P ensures freshness.
Proof. The theorem can be proven by showing an extended subject reduction
result that says if ρ, κ, ψ |= P and P → P ′ then ρ, κ, ψ |= P ′, and furthermore
if ψ = ∅ then P → P ′ does not violate the freshness property. An induction on
the length of the execution sequences then gives that P ensures freshness for all
executions.
In case (Com) we assume
ρ, κ, ψ |= 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P | (E ′1, . . . , E ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).Q
which amounts to:
(a) ∧ki=1ρ |= Ei : ϑi
(b) ∀FV1, . . . , FVk : ∧ki=1FVi ∈ ϑi ⇒ 〈FV1, . . . , FVk〉 ∈ κ
(c) ρ, κ, ψ |= P
(d) ∧ji=1ρ |= E ′i : ϑ′i
(e) ∀〈FV1, . . . , FVk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ji=1FVi ∝ ϑ′i ⇒ (∧ki=j+1FVi ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= Q)
Moreover we assume that ∧ji=1Ei = E ′i because
〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P | (E ′1, . . . , E ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).Q →R P | Q[Ej+1/xj+1, . . . , Ek/xk]
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and we have to prove ρ, κ, ψ |= P | Q[Ej+1/xj+1, . . . , Ek/xk]. From (a) we
have ∧ki=1Ei ∈ ϑi since ∧ki=1fv(Ei) = ∅ and then (b) gives 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉 ∈ κ.
From (d) and the assumption ∧ji=1Ei = E ′i we get ∧ji=1Ei ∝ ϑ′i. Now (e) gives
∧ki=j+1Ei ∈ ρ(bxic) and ρ, κ, ψ |= Q. The substitution result (Lemma 7.5) then
gives ρ, κ, ψ |= Q[Ej+1/xj+1, . . . , Ek/xk] and together with (c) this gives the
required result.
The second part is trivial: when ψ = ∅, obviously
〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P | (E ′1, . . . , E ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk).Q →RM P | Q[Ej+1/xj+1, . . . , Ek/xk]
In case (Decr) we assume
ρ, κ, ψ |= decrypt [{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 ]s as {E ′1, . . . , E ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk}lE′0 in P
which amounts to:
(f) ∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi
(g) ∀FV0, . . . , FVk : ∧ki=0FVi ∈ ϑi ⇒ [{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s ∈ ϑ
(h) ∧ji=0ρ |= E ′i : ϑ′i
(i) ∀[{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s′ ∈ ϑ : ∧ji=0FVi ∝ ϑ′i
⇒ (∧ki=j+1FVi ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧
(∃i : 1 ≤ i ≤ j : I(FVi) 6= I(Ei)⇒ blc ∈ ψ) ∧
ρ, κ, ψ |= P)
Furthermore we assume that ∧ji=0Ei ≈ E ′i because
decrypt [{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 ]s as {E ′1, . . . , E ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xk}E′0 in P →RP[Ej+1/xj+1, . . . , Ek/xk] and we have to prove ρ, κ, ψ |= P[Ej+1/xj+1, . . . , Ek/xk].
From (f) and ∧ki=0fv(Ei) = ∅, we get ∧ki=0Ei ∈ ϑi and then (g) gives
[{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 ]s ∈ ϑ. From (h) and the assumption ∧ji=0Ei ≈ E ′i we get
∧ji=0Ei ∝ ϑ′i. Now (i) gives ∧ki=j+1Ei ∈ ρ(bxic) and ρ, κ, ψ |= P. Using Lemma
7.5 we get the required result ρ, κ, ψ |= P[Ej+1/xj+1, . . . , Ek/xk]
For the second part of the result we observe that
∃i : 1 ≤ i ≤ j : I(FVi) 6= I(Ei) ⇒ blc ∈ ψ follows from (i) and since ψ = ∅ it
must be the case that ∧ji=1RM(I(FVi), I(E0)). Thus the condition of the rule
(Decr) are fulfilled for →RM.
In case (Repl) we assume
ρ, κ, ψ |= [!P ]s, which amounts to:
(a) ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P ]s)
(b) ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P ]s′)
(c) ρ, κ, ψ |= [!P ]s′ (because ψ does not contain any session information)
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(a) together with (c) then gives the required result ρ, κ, ψ |= (T ([P ]s) | [!P ]s′).
Furthermore, it is obvious that when ψ = ∅, [!P ]s →RM T ([P ]s) | [!P ]s′
The cases (Par) and (Res) follow directly from the induction hypothesis. The
case (Congr) also uses the congruence result.
7.5 The Attacker
The attacker process in the freshness analysis is constructed in a similar way
to the one for the confidentiality analysis in Chapter 6.5. The construction
additionally includes letting 1) all the names used by Psys be in a finite set
Nf , 2) all the variables in a finite set Xc, and 3) all the session identifiers in a
finite set Sc, and postulating a new extended name [n•]s• , where n• is not in
Nf , a new session identifier s• not in Sc, and a new variable z• not in Xc. This
means no overlapping between the names and variables used by the legitimate
principals and the ones used by the attacker. Furthermore, a unique label l• is
used to indicate the decryption place of the attacker.
In order to control the number of names and variables used by the attacker,
we construct a semantically equivalent process Q′, for a process Q of type
(Nf ,Aκ,AEnc), as follows: 1) all restrictions (ν[n]s)P are α−converted into re-
strictions (ν[n′]s)P where n′ has the canonical representative n•, 2) all the
occurrences of variables xi in (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk).P and
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}lE0 in P are α−converted to use variables
x′i with canonical representative z•. Therefore Q′ only has finitely many canon-
ical names and variables.
Similar to previous, the formula FDYRM of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc), defined as the
conjunction of the five components in Table 7.5, is capable of characterising the
potential effect of all attackers Q of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc). The soundness of our
Dolev-Yao condition is established by the following Theorem.
Theorem 7.8 (Correctness of the Dolev-Yao Condition) if (ρ, κ, ψ) sat-
isfies FDYRM of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc) then ρ, κ, ψ |= Q for all attackers Q of extended
type ({z•},Nf ∪ {[n•]s•},Aκ,AEnc), namely, the canonical variables are in {z•}
and the canonical names are in Nf ∪ {[n•]s•}.
Proof. By structural induction on Q
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(1) ∧k∈Aκ ∀ 〈FV1, . . . , FVk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ki=1FVi ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may learn by eavesdropping
(2) ∧k∈AEnc ∀[{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s ∈ ρ(z•) :
FV0 ∝ ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1FVi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (∧ki=1(I(FVi) 6= s•)⇒ l• ∈ ψ))
∧k∈AEnc ∀[{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}m+ ]s ∈ ρ(z•) :
m− ∝ ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1FVi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (∧ki=1(I(FVi) 6= s•)⇒ l• ∈ ψ))
∧k∈AEnc ∀[{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}m− ]s ∈ ρ(z•) :
m+ ∝ ρ(z•)⇒ (∧ki=1FVi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (∧ki=1(I(FVi) 6= s•)⇒ l• ∈ ψ))
the attacker may learn by decrypting messages with keys already known
(3) ∧k∈AEnc ∀ FV0, . . . , FVk : ∧ki=0FVi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
[{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s• ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀ m+, FV1, . . . , FVk : m+ ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1FVi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
[{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}m+ ]s• ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀ m−, FV1, . . . , FVk : m− ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1FVi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
[{|FV1, . . . , FVk|}m− ]s• ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may construct new encryptions using the keys known
(4) ∧k∈Aκ ∀FV1, . . . , FVk : ∧ki=1FVi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ 〈FV1, . . . , FVk〉 ∈ κ
the attacker may actively forge new communications
(5) {[n•]s•} ∪ Nf ⊆ ρ(z•)
the attacker initially has some knowledge
Table 7.5: The Attacker’s Capabilities in Freshness Analysis
In case (Dec) we need to find ϑ and ϑ0, . . . , ϑj , and show
(a) ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0ρ |= Ei : ϑi
and for all [{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s ∈ ϑ with ∧ji=0FVi ∝ ϑi that:
(b) ∧ki=j+1FVi ∈ ρ(xi)
(c) ∧ki=j+1¬RM(I(Ei), I(E ′i))⇒ l• ∈ ψ
(d) ρ, κ, ψ |= P
We choose ϑ as the least set such that ρ |= E : ϑ and prove that ϑ ⊆ ρ(z•); intu-
itively, if E has free variables z1, . . . , zm then ϑ consists of value E[FV1/z1, . . . , FVm/zm]
where FVi ∈ ρ(z•). We perform a similar development for ϑ0, . . . , ϑj and this
takes care of (a). Next consider [{FV1, . . . , FVk}FV0 ]s ∈ ϑ and assume that
FV0 ∝ ϑ0. Since ϑ0 ⊆ ρ(z•), as above, we have FV0 ∝ ρ(z•) and by FDYRM we
get ∧ki=1FVi ∈ ρ(z•) and ¬RM(I(Ei), I(E ′i))⇒ l• ∈ ψ. Since xi = z• this takes
care of (b) and (c); furthermore P has type ({z•},Nf ∪{[n•]s•},Aκ,AENC) and
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the induction hypothesis then takes care of (d).
In case (Repl) We need to show that
(a) ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P]s)
(b) ρ, κ, ψ |= T ([P]s′)
By inspecting the functions F and T , it is easy to tell that both T ([P]s) and
T ([P]s′) have the same type as [!P]s and thus the induction hypothesis takes
care of (a) and (b).
The remaining cases are similar.
The session identifiers in the extended LYSA are designed to capture replay
attacks and thus ensure the receiving messages are fresh. For the dynamic
property, we say that Psys guarantees dynamic freshness with respect to the
annotations in Psys if the reference monitor RM cannot abort Psys | Q regardless
of the choice of the attacker Q.
Similarly, for static property we say that Psys guarantees static freshness with
respect to the annotations in Psys if there exists ρ and κ such that ρ, κ |= P : ∅
and (ρ, κ, ∅) satisfies FDYRM .
Theorem 7.9 If P guarantees static freshness then P guarantees dynamic fresh-
ness.
Proof. If ρ, κ |= Psys : ∅ and (ρ, κ, ∅) satisfies FDYRM then, by Theorems 7.7 and
7.8, RM does not abort Psys | Q regardless of the choice of attacker Q.
7.6 Freshness Analysis at the Meta Level
As stated in Chapter 4.2, a meta level process is an extension of the object level
process with additional sequence of indices, i1, . . . , ik, to names and variables.
In this case, an index sequence i1, i2 can be viewed as an identifier of the session
between the principal Ai1 and the principal Bi2 .
To show in detail how the meta level freshness analysis works, we use the Wide
Mouthed Frog (WMF) protocol as an example. The narration of the Wide
Mouthed Frog protocol is as the following (please refer to section 2.4.1 for detail
explanations):
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1. A→ S : {K}Ka
2. S → B : {K}Kb
The Wide Mouthed Frog protocol is subject to a replay attack, namely, in the
step 2, the principal B may receive a message replayed by the attacker from an
old session, {Kold}Kb , and thus accept an old session key Kold as a new old.
If later on the principal B uses the old session key Kold to encrypt a message
and in case the key is leaked to an attacker, the attacker is able to perform
decryption and get the secret message.
Below is an encoding of the protocol. Note that a sequence of indices, ij,
is attached to all the names, variables and encryptions, indicating that they
belong to a session between initiator i and responder j.
let X ⊆ S1 in let Y ⊆ S2 in (ν Kaij)(ν Kbij)
|i∈X |j∈Y !(ν Kij)〈Aij , Sij , [{Kij}Kaij ]ij〉.0
| |i∈X |j∈Y !(Sij , Bij ; y1ij).
decrypt y1ij as {; ykij}l2ijKbij in 0
| |i∈X |j∈Y !(Aij , Sij ; z1ij).
decrypt z1ij as {; zkij}l1ijKaij in
〈Sij , Bij , [{zkij}Kbij ]ij〉.0
Taking S1 = {1} and S2 = {1, 2}, the analysis holds whenever
{l211, l212} ∈ ψ
Thus the analysis reports possible freshness attacks such that in the decryption
decrypt y1ij as {; ykij}l2ijKbij in 0, a violation to the freshness property may occur.
One may find an execution that leads to the above violation. This can be
attempted for two sessions, one is between A1 and B1, and the other is between
A1 and B2. Consider the following message exchange:
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A B S Attacker




1.2 〈S11, B11 (S11, B11; ze11)
[{zk11}Kb11 ]11〉




1.2 (S12, B12; y112) 〈S12, B12, ze11〉
decrypt y112 as
{; yk12}l212Kb12
In step 1.1, the server S receives the value [{K11}Ka11 ]11 sent from the principal
A and generates encryption [{K11}Kb11 ]11. This value is, somehow, intercepted
by the attacker and becomes bound to the variable ze11. In step 1.2, the at-
tacker pretends to be the server S and sends the encryption [{K11}Kb11 ]11 to
the principal B. The following pattern matching can successfully take place in
the input construct,
〈S12, B12, [{K11}Kb11 ]11〉 | (S12, B12; y112)
and let the variable y112 become bound to the value [{K11}Kb11 ]11. In the
decryption decrypt y112 as {; yk12}l212Kb12 , a violation to the freshness property
then happens: the session identifer of K11, e.g. 11, does not match the session
identifer of yk12, e.g. 12. The violation is recorded in the error component as
l212 ∈ ψ. The attack corresponds to the replay attack described before.
7.7 Summary
Many times protocols are successfully attacked when an honest principal in-
correctly accepts messages, ”believing” that they posses some properties (e.g.
freshness). Whether a technique detects certain attacks depends upon success-
fully identifying whether the accepted messages have the properties they claimed
(e.g. fresh).
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Several papers deal with replay attacks and freshness, i.e. [44, 43, 45] and [22],
where the approach is based on type (and effects) systems that statically guar-
antee entity authentication of protocols. Gordon and Jeffrey [44, 43, 45] defined
type (and effects) systems that statically guarantee authentication of proto-
cols specified in a Spi-calculus enriched with assertions a` la Woo-Lam. In [22],
Bugliesi, Focardi, Maffei still use a type and effect system, but use a different
technique and a different calculus (the ρ-spi calculus).
In most of the cases, cryptographic protocols use nonce handshakes to estab-
lish message freshness, and therefore to prevent replay attacks from happening.
Three styles of nonce handshakes may happen [44],
• Public Out Secret Home (POSH): nonces go out in clear and return en-
crypted
• Secret Out Public Home (SOPH): nonces go out encrypted and return in
clear
• Secret Out Secret Home (SOSH): nonces go out encrypted and return
encrypted
Note that it is very unlikely a nonce is sent out and received both in clear.
With the help of this nonce handshakes classification, as well as the fact that
the attacker can manipulate any message in clear, but it has no direct control
on the encrypted messages, a conclusion can be drawn safely that it is sufficient
only to check whether, after each successful decryption, the decrypted messages
in fresh or not.
The way to validate freshness, as presented in this chapter, is inspired by the
BAN logic [23]. In BAN logic, reasoning about the freshness of an entire message
amounts to reasoning about the freshness of its fields, i.e. “if one part of a
formula is known to be fresh, then the entire formula must also be fresh”.
To summarise, in this chapter we have introduced a sound way to detect re-
play attacks statically. To do that, we extended the standard LYSA calculus
with session identifiers and gave it a reduction semantics. The semantics en-
sures that session identifiers are properly treated along the evolution of a pro-
cess. On the static side, we extended the control flow analysis [15, 16] to verify
the freshness property of the extended processes. The static property ensures
that, if the secret information received by a principal is in the right context,
then a process is not subject to a run-external attack at execution time. It
is also proved that analysing two copies of a process in the framework is suf-
ficient for capturing run-external replay attacks, where similar results can be
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found in e.g. Comon & Cortier [63] and Millen [65]. The analysis has been
implemented and used to some significant protocols, including classical pro-
tocols, e.g. Wide Mouthed Frog, Yahalom, Andrew Secure RPC, Otway-Rees,
Needham-Schroeder, Amended Needham-Schroeder. Besides the classical pro-
tocols, the analysis has also been applied to other kinds of protocols, like the
ones in the family of IEEE 802.16 [52]. The results confirmed that potential




A simple type flaw attack on a security protocol arises when a field, originally
intended to have one type, is instead interpreted as having another type. To
prevent such attacks, the current techniques [48, 57] consist of systematically as-
sociating each message field with a tag representing its intended type. Therefore
fields with different types cannot be mixed up. Nevertheless, these may result
in requiring extra and somehow unnecessary computational power and network
transmission band. This is particularly the case, when resource are limited such
as in battery-powered embedded systems like PDAs, cell phones, laptops, etc.
Example 8.1 Consider a scenario that a principal A sends out an encrypted
nonce onto the network and another principal B is expecting an encrypted key
received from the network. Assume both encryptions use the same key K, obvi-
ously, B could be cheated into accepting the nonce as the key.
A → : {N}K
→ B : {K ′}K
In this chapter, we further explore these issues and propose a static analysis
technique, based on Control Flow Analysis, for detecting type flaw attacks in
the presence of a Dolev-Yao attacker [33]. The proposed approach abstracts
the fields of protocol messages to a lower level, such that the misinterpretation
can be formally modelled. To this end, we extend the LYSA calculus with
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special tags, which represent the type of terms. The Control Flow Analysis
approximates the behaviour of protocols in terms of the possibly exchanged
messages and potential values of variables. The analysis can be working in either
a prescriptive way, such that type flaws are avoided; or a descriptive way, such
that type flaws are detected and recorded as violations to the intended types.
Furthermore, if no type violation is found, we can prove that the protocol is free
of simple type flaw attacks at run time.
8.1 Setting the Scene
Type information is used to identify the intension of each field. To make explicit
what type means, we extend the syntax of LYSA to cope with types, by using
tags to represent the types of terms. The syntax of the LYSA is extended to





T ::= tag | u
Table 8.1: Syntax of Types
A type T is either a constant type tag ∈ Tag, which is a base type for each
term, or a variable type u ∈ U , which is used to be bound constant types in
variable binding.
The syntax of the LYSA calculus is extended to include types as listed in Table
8.2, while the rest of the constructs are the same as the original ones in Table
3.1.
In expressions, each variable x is annotated by a type T , i.e. an extended
variable may be of the form xtag or xu. This is essential in modelling protocols
for different purposes, which shall be explained later.
To describe the type intentions of protocols in LYSA, whenever a name n is in-
troduced, i.e. (ν n : tag)P we decorate it with the annotation tag, which spec-
ifies the type associated to it. The restriction construct is further overloaded
for declaring the expected value of a type variable, for example (ν u : key)P
states that the type variable u is supposed to be the type key. At each bind-
ing occurrence inside a decryption, we add the annotations T to each variable





decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk }lE0 in P symmetric decryption
decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk |}lE0 in P asymmetric decryption
(ν n : tag)P restriction
(ν± m)P pair restriction
(ν u : tag)P type declaration
...
Table 8.2: Syntax of extended LYSA calculus with types
x, where T is the expected type of x. As usual we use l ∈ Lab as a label
uniquely identifying each decryption place. Matching patterns, in the form




j+1 , . . . , x
Tk
k ), against tuples of expressions (E1, . . . , Ek) in the
extended LYSA works in a slightly different way from the original one: the list
of variables xTj+1j+1 , . . . , x
Tk
k is implicitly partitioned into two groups, the type of
which is to be matched, i.e. xtag, and the type of which is to be bound, i.e. xu,
by the kind of the annotated type for each variable. The pattern matching only
succeeds when 1) the first j elements are pairwise equal, and 2) the constant
types of variables have to be equal to the types of the corresponding expres-
sions. The effects of a successful pattern matching are to bind the remaining
expressions Ei to the corresponding variables xi and also to bind the remaining
types of expressions to the corresponding type variables.
Example 8.2 To exemplify, consider the following two processes.
P = (ν N : nonce) decrypt {A,N}K as {A;xnonce}lK in P ′
Q = (ν N : nonce) decrypt {A,N}K as {A;xt}lK in Q′
The pattern matching in the decryption in P succeeds because the type of x,
nonce, matches the type of N , and results in binding x to N . The second
decryption in Q always succeeds, and results in binding x to N and binding t to
nonce.
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8.2 Dynamic Property
In the semantics, type declarations are recorded in the abstract environment β,
i.e. β : N ∪U → Tag is an abstract environment containing the types of names,
N , and the expected types of type variables, U . The operation I, is used to
determine the type of each value by looking up in the environment β. The type
of each encryption is enc implicitly. Recall that values V ∈ V al are built from
the grammar:
V ::= n | m+ | m− | {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 | {|V1, . . . , Vk|}V0
Definition 8.1 Type Determination





I({V1, . . . , Vk}V0) = enc
I({|V1, . . . , Vk|}V0) = enc
The type annotations are enforced by a reference monitor, which aborts type
mismatched variable bindings. The rules for communication, symmetric and
asymmetric restrictions and decryptions are as shown in Table 8.3, the rest of
the rules are similar to the ones in the original semantics (Table 3.5) except that
the abstract environment β is taken into account, i.e. the operational semantics
has the form
β ` P →R P ′
with the relation R considered in two variants;
• the standard semantics, β ` P → P ′, discards the annotations and takes
R to be universally true




T1 = I(T2) if T2 ∈ U
true else
This function affects only type variables, i.e. when T2 is of the form u. It
checks whether the type associated with the type variable u equals to T1.
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Moreover, we define an auxiliary function that matches the constant type of a
variable x against the type of a value V . This function affects the variables of
constant types.
COMP (V, xT ) =
{ I(V ) = T if T ∈ Tag
true otherwise
The judgement β ` P →R P ′ means that the process P can evolve into P ′,
given the type environment β. The extended semantics rules are given in Table
8.3, while the rest of the rules are similar to the ones in Table 3.5.
The rules (Dec), (ADec) and (ASig) in Table 8.3 require that in a successful
decryption, either symmetric or asymmetric, besides the first j elements have
to be pairwise equal, the values Vj+1, . . . , Vk have to be allowed to be bound
to the corresponding variable xTj+1j+1 , . . . , x
Tk
k by the type annotations. More
specifically, in case the type of the variable x is a constant type, tag, it has to
be the same as the type of the corresponding value, in which case the types of
the values are bound to the types of the corresponding variable. If it is not the
case, a type-mismatching violation is captured by the reference monitor.
The rules (ANew), (AANew) and (ATNew) update β to include the types of
the names, the asymmetric key pair and the type variable before proceeding.
Using this semantics, the property of type matching can be defined as follows:
Definition 8.2 (Type matching) A process P ensures type matching and there-
fore is simple type flaw attack free if there are no executions
β ` P →∗ P ′ →R P ′′
such that there does not exist i (j + 1 ≤ i ≤ k) : ¬RM(I(Vi), Ti) when β `
P ′ →R P ′′ is derived using (Dec) on
decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as {V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk }lV0 in P
or using (ADec) or (ASig) on
decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ as {|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk |}lm− in P
or
decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− as {|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk |}lm+ in P
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(Com)
∧ji=1Vi = V ′i ∧ ∧ki=j+1COMP (Vi, xTii )
β ` 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉.P | (V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk ).P ′ →R
P | P ′[V ′j+1/xTj+1j+1 , . . . , V ′k/xTkk ]
(Dec)
∧ji=0Vi = V ′i ∧ ∧ki=j+1COMP (Vi, xTii ) ∧ ∧ki=j+1R(I(Vi), Ti)
β ` decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as
{V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk }lV ′0 in P →R
P [V ′j+1/x
Tj+1






∧ji=1Vi = V ′i ∧ ∧ki=j+1COMP (Vi, xTii ) ∧ ∧ki=j+1R(I(Vi), Ti)
β ` decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ as
{|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk |}lm− in P →R
P [V ′j+1/x
Tj+1






∧ji=1Vi = V ′i ∧ ∧ki=j+1COMP (Vi, xTii ) ∧ ∧ki=j+1R(I(Vi), Ti)
β ` decrypt {|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− as
{|V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk |}lm+ in P →R
P [V ′j+1/x
Tj+1






β[n 7→ tag] ` P →R P ′
β ` (ν n : tag)P →R (ν n : tag)P ′
(AANew)
β[m+ 7→ key,m− 7→ key] ` P →R P ′
β ` (ν± m)P →R (ν± m)P ′
(ATNew)
β[u 7→ tag] ` P →R P ′
β ` (ν u : tag)P →R (ν u : tag)P ′
Table 8.3: Operational Semantics β ` P →R P ′, parameterized on R. The rest
of the rules overlap the original ones as in Table 3.5.
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It says that a process P is free of type flaw attacks if there is no violation of
the annotations in any of its executions, i.e. each type variable is bound to the
expected constant type. Consequently, the reference monitor will never stop
any execution step. Note that we only consider the type flaws occurring inside
encryptions and decryptions.
Next, we shall show how to extend the original analysis from Chapter 4 such
that it can be used to check whether a process ensures type matching according
to Definition 8.2.
8.3 Static Property
To capture violations of type annotations, similar to the authentication analysis,
we make use of an error component ψ to collect all the error messages, which is
a label indicating where the violation happens. Formally,
ψ ⊆ P(bLabc)
A label blc ∈ ψ means that the variable binding inside the decryption, marked
with label l, violates the type annotations and therefore is not allowed. Note
that the analysis requires that labels are subject to a notion of canonicity. Fur-
thermore, the analysis only analyses a LYSA process up to canonical values.
The abstract environment β and function I have to respect this and that is the
reason that we overload their domains in the analysis i.e.
I : bV alc ∪ bUc → Tag and
β : bNc ∪ bUc → Tag
Before commenting on the analysis rules, we introduce two auxiliary functions,
each of which generates some logic predicates to be used in the analysis rules.
The first function is a matching function. It takes a canonical value U and a
variable (with type annotation) as input and matches the type of the variable
against the type of the value. This matching only happens when the type of the
variable is a constant type, tag, and is ignored otherwise.
match(U, xT ) =
{ ∀t : (t = I(U))⇒ (t = T ) if T ∈ Tag
true otherwise
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The second function is a type-checking function. It takes a value U and a typed
variable as input and checks whether the type of the value U equals to the
expected type of the variable. The type-checking happens only when the type
of the variable is a variable type u.
chk(U, xT ) =
{ ∀t : (t = I(U))⇒ (t = I(bT c)) if T ∈ U
true otherwise
Example 8.3 Given an abstract environment β, where β(bNc) = nonce, the
two functions, match and chk, generate the following logic predicates for the
given arguments,
{
match(bNc, xnonce) = ∀t : (t = I(bNc))⇒ (t = nonce)
match(bNc, xu) = true{
chk(bNc, xu) = ∀t : (t = I(bNc))⇒ (t = I(buc))
chk(bNc, xnonce) = true
The type analysis extends the original analysis in a way that the type annota-
tions are taken into account. The extended rules are listed in Table 8.4, while
the rest of the rules are similar to the original ones in Table 4.1 except that the
abstract environment β is added as an additional analysis component.
The rules for decryptions (SDec) and (SADec) use pattern matching and vari-
able binding as before except that types of the values and the corresponding
variables have to be matched as well, using the function match. Further the
analysis checks whether the bindings are allowed according to the types using
the function chk, or records the label l in the ψ component.
The rules for restrictions (SNew), (SANew) and (STNew) require that the de-
clared type tag for the name n, the asymmetric key pair m+ and m− and the
type variable u are included in the environment β.
8.4 Correctness of the Simple Type Flaw Anal-
ysis
Theorem 8.3 (Correctness of Simple Type Flaw Analysis) If β ` P →
Q and ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P then also ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q. Furthermore, if ψ = ∅ then
P →RM Q
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(SVar) ρ |= xT : ϑ iff ρ(bxc) ⊆ ϑ
(SInp) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (E1, . . . , Ej ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk ).P
iff ∧ji=1 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ji=1 Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P )
(SDec) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk }lE0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{U1, . . . , Uk}U0 ∈ ϑ ∧
∧ji=0 Ui ∈ ϑi ∧ ∧ki=j+1match(Ui, xTii )⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧
(∧ki=j+1¬chk(Ui, xTii )⇒ blc ∈ ψ)∧
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P )
(SADec) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk |}lE0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{|U1, . . . , Uk|}U0 ∈ ϑ : ∀U ′0 ∈ ϑ0 :
∀(m+,m−) : {U0, U ′0} = {bm+c, bm−c}∧
∧ji=1 Ui ∈ ϑi ∧ ∧ki=j+1match(Ui, xTii )⇒
(∧ki=j+1 Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧
(∧ki=j+1¬chk(Ui, xTii )⇒ blc ∈ ψ) ∧
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P )
(SNew) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν n : tag)P
iff tag ∈ β(bnc) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
(SANew) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν± m)P
iff key ∈ β(bm+c) ∧ key ∈ β(bm−c) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
(STNew) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν u : tag)P
iff tag ∈ β(buc) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
Table 8.4: Simple Type Analysis of LYSA Terms, ρ |= E : ϑ, and Processes,
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P . The remains cases overlap the ones in the original analysis as in
Table 4.1 but using the judgement form of the simple type analysis.
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Proof. By induction on the inference of P → Q.
In case (Com) Let we assume
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉.P | (V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk ).Q
which amounts to:
(a) ∧ki=1ρ |= Vi : ϑi
(b) ∀U1, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=1Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒ 〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ
(c) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
(d) ∧ji=1ρ |= V ′i : ϑ′i
(e) ∀〈U1, . . . , Uk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ji=1Ui ∈ ϑi ∧ ∧ki=j+1match(Ui, xTii )⇒
(∧ki=j+1Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ (∧ki=j+i¬chk(Ui, xTii )⇒ blc ∈ ψ) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q : ψ)
Moreover we assume that ∧ji=1Vi = V ′i and ∧ki=j+1COMP (Vi, xTii ) because
〈V1, . . . , Vk〉.P | (V1, . . . , Vj ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk ).Q→ P | Q[Vj+1/xTj+1j+1 , . . . , Vk/xTkk ]
and we have to prove ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P | Q[Vj+1/xTj+1j+1 , . . . , Vk/xTkk ]. From (a) we
have ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ϑi since ∧ki=1fv(Vi) = ∅ and then (b) gives 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ.
From (d), the assumption ∧ji=1Vi = V ′i and ∧ki=j+1COMP (Vi, xTii ) we get
∧ji=1Vi ∈ ϑ′i and ∧ki=j+1match(Vi, xTii ). Now (e) gives ∧ki=j+1Vi ∈ ρ(bxic) and
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q. The substitution result in Lemma ?? then gives ρ, κ, β, ψ |=
Q[Vj+1/x
Tj+1
j+1 , . . . , Vk/x
Tk
k ] and together with (c) this gives the required result.
The second part is straightforward: when ψ = ∅, obviously
∧ki=j+1chk(Ui, xTii ), which corresponds to ∧ki=j+1RM(Ui, Ti). Thus the condi-
tion of the rule (Com) are fulfilled for →RM .
In case (Dec) we assume
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as {V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk }lV ′0 in P
which amounts to:
(f) ∧ki=0 ρ |= Vi : ϑi
(g) ∀U0, . . . , Uk : ∧ki=0Ui ∈ ϑi ⇒ {U1, . . . , Uk}U0 ∈ ϑ
(h) ∧ji=0ρ |= V ′i : ϑ′i∧
(i) ∀{U1, . . . , Uk}U0 ∈ ϑ : ∧ji=0Ui ∈ ϑ′i ∧ ∧ki=j+1match(Ui, xTii )⇒
(∧ki=j+1Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ (∧ki=j+1¬chk(Ui, xTii )⇒ blc ∈ ψ) ∧ ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P )
Furthermore we assume that ∧ji=0Vi = V ′i and ∧ki=j+1COMP (Vi, xTii ) because
decrypt {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 as {V ′1 , . . . , V ′j ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk }lV ′0 in P →
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P [Vj+1/x
Tj+1
j+1 , . . . , Vk/x
Tk
k ] and we have to prove
ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P [Vj+1/xTj+1j+1 , . . . , Vk/xTkk ]. From (f) and ∧ki=0fv(Vi) = ∅, we get
∧ki=0Vi ∈ ϑi and then (g) gives
{V1, . . . , Vk}V0 ∈ ϑ. From (h), the assumption ∧ji=0Vi = V ′i and
∧ki=j+1COMP (Vi, xTii ) we get ∧ji=0Vi ∈ ϑ′i and ∧ki=j+1match(Vi, xTii ). Now (i)
gives ∧ki=j+1Ui ∈ ρ(bxic) and ∧ki=j+1¬chk(Ui, xTii ) ⇒ l ∈ ψ and ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P .
Using Lemma A.2 we get the required result ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P [Vj+1/xTj+1j+1 , . . . , Vk/xTkk ].
For the second part of the result we observe that
∧ki=j+1chk(Ui, xTii ) ⇒ blc ∈ ψ follows from (i) and since ψ = ∅ it must be the
case that ∧ki=j+1chk(Ui, xTii ) and correspondingly ∧ki=j+1RM(Ui, Ti). Thus the
condition of the rule (Dec) are fulfilled for →RM.
In case (ADec) and (ASig) are similar.
In case (ATNew) we assume ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν u : tag)P , which amounts to:
(a) tag ∈ β(buc)
(b) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P
Furthermore we assume that β[u 7→ tag] ` P → Q. By applying the induction
hypothesis on (b), we have ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q, which together with (a) gives the
expected result that ρ, κ, β, ψ |= (ν n : tag)Q.
In case (ANew) is similar.
In cases (Par) and (Rep) follow directly from the induction hypothesis.
The case (Congr) also uses the congruence result.
8.5 The Attacker
The attacker’s capabilities in launching simple type flaw attacks are identical to
the ones described in Chapter 4.3. Additionally, the attacker is able to generate
new names, n• and new asymmetric key pairs, m±• . We associate them with
a special type t• ∈ Tag, which is within the initial knowledge of the attacker.
This association is included in the type environment β such that β(n•) = t• and
β(m±• ) = t•. Furthermore, we let Nf contain not only the free names but also
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(1) ∧k∈Aκ ∀ 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may learn by eavesdropping
(2) ∧k∈AEnc ∀{V1, . . . , Vk}V0 ∈ ρ(z•) : V0 ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
(∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (∧ki=1I(Vi) 6= t• ⇒ l• ∈ ψ))
∧k∈AEnc ∀{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ ∈ ρ(z•) : m− ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
(∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (∧ki=1I(Vi) 6= t• ⇒ l• ∈ ψ))
∧k∈AEnc ∀{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− ∈ ρ(z•) : m+ ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
(∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ (∧ki=1I(Vi) 6= t• ⇒ l• ∈ ψ))
the attacker may learn by decrypting messages with keys already known
(3) ∧k∈AEnc ∀ V0, . . . , Vk : ∧ki=0Vi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ {V1, . . . , Vk}V0 ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀ m+, V1 . . . , Vk : m+ ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m+ ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈AEnc ∀ m−, V1 . . . , Vk : V −0 ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
{|V1, . . . , Vk|}m− ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may construct new encryptions using the keys known
(4) ∧k∈Aκ ∀V1, . . . , Vk : ∧ki=1Vi ∈ ρ(z•)⇒ 〈V1, . . . , Vk〉 ∈ κ
the attacker may actively forge new communications
(5) {n•,m±• , t•} ∪ Nf ⊆ ρ(z•)
the attacker initially has some knowledge
Table 8.5: The Attacker’s Capabilities in Simple Type Flaw Attacks
all the types Tag. A unique label l• is used to indicate the decryption place of
the attacker.
Theorem 8.4 (Correctness of Dolev-Yao Condition) If (ρ, κ, β, ψ) satis-
fies FDYRM of type (Nf ,Aκ,AEnc) then ρ, κ, β, ψ |= Q for all attackers Q of ex-
tended type ({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Aκ,AEnc).
Proof. By structural induction on Q.
In case of (Dec), i.e. Q is the process of the form
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xTj+1j+1 , . . . , xTkk }l•E0 in P
and we need to find ϑ and ϑ0, . . . , ϑj and show
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(a) ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0ρ |= Ei : ϑi
and for all {U1, . . . , Uk}lU0 ∈ ϑ with U0 ∈ ϑ0 and ∧ji=1match(Ui, xTii ) that:
(b) ∧ki=j+1Ui ∈ ρ(bxic)
(c) ∧ki=j+1¬chk(Ui, xTii )⇒ l• ∈ ψ
(d) ρ, κ, β, ψ |= P : ψ
We choose ϑ as the least set such that ρ |= E : ϑ and prove that ϑ ⊆
ρ(z•); intuitively, if E has free variables z1, . . . , zm then ϑ consists of all values
bE[V1/z1, . . . , Vm/zm]c where Vi ∈ ρ(z•). We perform a similar development for
ϑ0, . . . , ϑj and this takes care of (a). Next consider {U1, . . . , Uk}lU0 ∈ ϑ and as-
sume that U0 ∈ ϑ0 and ∧ji=1match(Ui, xTii ). Since ϑ0 ⊆ ρ(z•), as above, we have
U0 ∈ ρ(z•) and by FDYRM we get ∧ki=j+1Ui ∈ ρ(z•) and ∧ki=j+1¬chk(Ui, xTii ) ⇒
l• ∈ ψ. Since bxic = z• this takes care of (b) and (c); furthermore P has type
({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Aκ,AENC) and the induction hypothesis then takes care of
(d).
The remaining cases are similar.
For the dynamic property, we say that Psys guarantees dynamic confidentiality
with respect to the annotations in Psys if the reference monitor RM cannot abort
Psys | Q regardless of the choice of the attacker Q.
Similarly, for static property we say that Psys guarantees static confidentiality
with respect to the annotations in Psys if there exists ρ, κ, β and ψ such that
ρ, κ, β, ∅ |= P and (ρ, κ, β, ∅) satisfies FDYRM .
Theorem 8.5 If P guarantees static simple type flaw free then P guarantees
dynamic simple type flaw free.
Proof. If ρ, κ, β, ∅ |= Psys and (ρ, κ, β, ∅) satisfies FDYRM then, by Theorems 8.3
and 8.4, RM does not abort Psys | Q regardless of the choice of attacker Q. That
is, P ensures free of simple type flaw no matter which attacker it is composed
with.
Example 8.4 Consider the protocol from Example 8.2.
A → : {N}K
→ B : {K ′}K
Our control flow analysis can work in two ways depending on how the protocol
is modelled: either detecting what B received is a wrong one or preventing B
from accepting it.
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• In case the goal is to detect any type flaw attack may happen to the protocol,
we can model it as the following,
(ν N : nonce)(ν t : key) (〈A, {N}K〉.0
| (A;xenc). decrypt xenc as {;xt}lK in 0)
where the type of the encrypted message that B received, i.e. xt, is declared to
be of the type key, by (ν t : key). The analysis then gives rise to the analysis
components ρ, κ, β and ψ with the following entries:
〈bAc, {bNc}bKc〉 ∈ κ (bNc, nonce) ∈ β (btc, key) ∈ β
{bNc}bKc ∈ ρ(bxencc) bNc ∈ ρ(bxc) blc ∈ ψ
which show that the attack is captured by blc ∈ ψ.
• In case one wants to prevent such a type flaw attack from happening, the
protocol can be modelled as,
(ν N : nonce) (〈A, {N}K〉.0
| (A;xenc). decrypt xenc as {;xkey}lK in 0)
It requires that the message inside the encryption that B got has to be a key. In
this case, the analysis result becomes:
〈bAc, {bNc}bKc〉 ∈ κ (bNc, nonce) ∈ β ψ = ∅
{bNc}bKc ∈ ρ(bxencc) ρ(bxkeyc) = ∅
Now ρ(xkey) = ∅ shows that no value binds to the variable xkey, i.e. the type
flaw attack is successfully prevented.
8.6 Simple Type Flaw Analysis at the Meta Level
To verify the usefulness of our Control Flow Analysis, a number of experiments
have been performed on security protocols from the literature. In this section,
we shall show the analysis results of some example protocols, which are subject
to type flaw attacks, namely the Woo and Lam protocol, version pi1 and the
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Andrew Secure RPC protocol (both the original version and the BAN version
with type flaw corrected). The analysis results show that those type flaw attacks
are successfully captured. Furthermore, it proves that after BAN’s correction,
the Andrew Secure RPC protocol does not suffer from type flaw attacks any
longer.
The narration of the Andrew Secure RPC protocol is the following (please see
Chapter 2.4.1 for a detailed explanations).
1. A→ B : A, {NA}K
2. B → A : {NA + 1, NB}K
3. A→ B : {NB + 1}K
4. B → A : {K ′, N ′B}K
Below is an encoding of the protocol in a scenario where each principal Ai and
Bj shares a pair of keys, Kij , respectively. This encoding focuses on detecting
the simple type flaw attacks, i.e. each variable is associated with a type variable,
of which the expected type is declared using a type declaration construct.
let X ⊆ S in (νi∈X,j∈X Kij : key)
|i∈X |j∈X !(ν Naij : nonce)(ν tx1ij : enc)(ν xnbij : nonce)
(ν tx2ij : enc)(ν txkij : key)(ν txnb′ij : nonce)
〈Ai, Bj , Ai, {Naij}Kij 〉.
(Bj , Ai;x1
tx1ij
ij ). decrypt x1
tx1ij
ij as {Naij + 1;xnbtxbijij )}l2ijKij in
〈Ai, Bj , {xnbtxnbijij + 1}Kij 〉.
(Bj , Ai;x2
tx2ij
ij ). decrypt x2
tx2ij
ij as {;xktxkijij , xnb
′txnb′ij
ij }l3ijKij in 0
| |i∈X |j∈X !(ν Nbij : nonce)(ν Nb′ij : nonce)(ν K ′ij : key)
(ν ty1ij : enc)(ν tynaij : nonce)
(Ai, Bj , Ai; y1
ty1ij
ij ). decrypt y1
ty1ij
ij as {; ynatynaijij }l1ijKij in
〈Bj , Ai, {ynatynaijij + 1, Nbij}Kbj 〉.
(Ai, Bj , {Nbij + 1; }Kij ; ).
〈Bj , Ai, {K ′ij , Nb′ij}Kij 〉.0
Taking S = {1}, the analysis holds whenever
{l311} ⊆ ψ
Thus, the analysis reports possible simple type flaw attacks such that in the
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decryption decrypt x2tx2ijij as {;xktxkijij , xnb
′txnb′ij
ij }l3ijKij , a type mismatch may
occur. An execution that led to this violation is listed below,
A B Attacker
1. 〈A1, B1, A1, {Na11}K11〉 (A1, B1, A1; y1ty11111 )
decrypt y1ty11111 as
{; ynatyna1111 }l111K11
2. (B1, A1;x1tx11111 ) 〈B1, A1, (B1, A1;Ztzencenc )
{ynatyna1111 + 1, Nb11}K11〉
decrypt x1tx11111 as
{Na11 + 1;xnbtxnb1111 }l211K11
3. 〈A1, B1, {xnbtxnb1111 + 1}K11〉 (A1, B1, {Nb11 + 1; }K11 ; )






In step 2, the attacker eavesdrops the message, 〈B1, A1, {Na11 + 1, Nb11}K11〉,
sent over the network, and binds the variable Zenc to the value {Na11+1, Nb11}K11 .
Note that the variable yna11 has become bound to the value Na11 in step 1. He
then replays the message to the principal A1 in step 4. The following successful
input can then take place
(B1, A1;x2tx21111 ) | 〈B1, A1, {Na11 + 1, Nb11}K11〉
after which the variable x211 is bound to {Na11 + 1, Nb11}K11 and the type
variable tx211 is bound to the type constant enc. This gives rise to the successful
decryption




This decryption results in binding the variable xk11 to the value Na11 + 1 and
binding the type variable txk11 to the type nonce, and therefore causes a type
mismatching violation, i.e. the type of Na11 + 1 is nonce while the expected
type of xk11 is key. This violation is recorded by letting l311 in ψ. Some of the
entries of the analysis components ρ and κ that are relevant to the attack are
shown below,
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ρ : Na11 ∈ ρ(yna11) {Na11 + 1, Nb11}K11 ∈ ρ(x211)
Na11 + 1 ∈ ρ(xk11) Nb11 ∈ ρ(xnb′11)
β : key ∈ β(txk11)
κ : 〈B1, A1, {Na11 + 1, Nb11}K11〉 ∈ κ
It is shown above that how the analysis can be used to detect simple type flaw
attacks. As one may also interested in using the analysis to prevent simple type
flaw attacks, we present below the encoding for that purpose.
let X ⊆ S in (νi∈X,j∈X Kij : key)
|i∈X |j∈X !(ν Naij : nonce)
〈Ai, Bj , Ai, {Naij}Kij 〉.
(Bj , Ai;x1encij ). decrypt x1
enc
ij as {Naij + 1;xnbnonceij )}l2ijKij in
〈Ai, Bj , {xnbnonceij + 1}Kij 〉.
(Bj , Ai;x2encij ). decrypt x2
enc
ij as {;xkkeyij , xnb′nonceij }l3ijKij in 0
| |i∈X |j∈X !(ν Nbij : nonce)(ν Nb′ij : nonce)(ν K ′ij : key)
(Ai, Bj , Ai; y1encij ). decrypt y1
enc
ij as {; ynanonceij }l1ijKij in
〈Bj , Ai, {ynanonceij + 1, Nbij}Kbj 〉.
(Ai, Bj , {Nbij + 1; }Kij ; ).
〈Bj , Ai, {K ′ij , Nb′ij}Kij 〉.0
In the above, each variable is associated with a type constant, i.e. xkkeyij states
that the value bound to the variable xkij has to be of the type key. For a
version of the process that has been encoded in this way, the analysis holds for
ψ = ∅ and thereby it guarantees absence of complex type flaw attacks.
8.7 Summary
A type flaw attack happens when a field in a message is interpreted as having a
type other than the originally intended one. Type flaw attacks on security pro-
tocols have been studied for some years, e.g. [48] also adopted the technique of
tagging each message field with intended type, and later on, [57] simplified the
tag structure for encryption. However these works aim at preventing type flaw
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attacks in the protocol execution stage by attaching some extra bits, represent-
ing types, to the messages transmitted over the network, and consequently the
size of each message is increased, which results in raising unnecessary burden to
the underlying network. Other works on type flaw attacks include applying type
and effect system to security protocols, e.g. [45], such that a protocol is free of
type flaw attacks if it is type checked. Type Systems are normally prescriptive
(i.e. they infer types and impose the well-formedness conditions at the same
time), while Control Flow Analysis is normally descriptive (i.e. it merely infers
the information and then leaves it to a separate step to actually impose demands
on when programs are well-formed). Our approach offers a mix of both ways.
Indeed, it can be either descriptive, i.e. it describes when the protocol does not
respect the typing (via binding of type variables) or prescriptive, i.e. some flaws
are avoided (via matching of tag terms). Under this regard, launching the tool
implementing our analysis can then correspond to a sort of approximate type
checking. More specifically, our control flow analysis can be used to 1) detect
type flaw attacks: it can be applied in the protocol design stage: once a tagged
protocol process is analysed to be free of type flaw attacks, it can be used un-
tagged while still ensures security; or 2) prevent type flaw attacks: the tags work
in a way such that fields with different types cannot be mixed up. Therefore, it
offers flexibility in satisfying different needs.
Chapter 9
Complex Type Flaws
In the last decades, formal analyses of cryptographic protocols have been widely
studied and many formal methods have been put forward.
Usually, protocol specification is given at a very high level of abstraction and
several implementation aspects, such as the cryptographic ones, are abstracted
away. Despite the abstract working hypotheses adopted, many attacks have
been found that are independent of these concrete aspects.
However, there are situations in which this abstract view is not completely
satisfactory. While, at a high level, messages consists of fields representing
certain information, such as the name of a principal, a nonce or a key. This
structure can be easily modelled by a process calculus.
Nevertheless, at a more concrete level, a message is nothing but a raw string of
bits. In this view, the recipient of a message has to decide the interpretation of
the bit string, i.e. how to decompose the string into substrings to be associated
to the expected fields (of the expected length) of the message. The message
comes with no indication on its arity or on the types of its components. This
source of ambiguity can be exploited by an intruder that can fool the recipient
into accepting as valid a message different from the expected one. A complex
type flaw attack arises in this case. Simply speaking, complex type flaw attacks
occurs when a concatenation of fields is confused with a single field [79].
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Example 9.1 Consider a scenario that a principal A encrypts its own identity
A and a nonce N and sends them out onto the network. Another principal B is
expecting an encrypted key received from the network. Assume both encryptions
use the same key K, obviously, B could be cheated into accepting the identity
and the nonce as the key.
A → : {A,N}K
→ B : {K ′}K
The central idea of this kind of attacks is to fool a principal by misinterpreting
the fields and accepting a concatenation of fields as one single field, as shown in
Figure 9.1. However, most existing analyses of certain protocols do not take this
kind of attack into account as simply assuming that the number of the fields is
known beforehand.
Figure 9.1: Graphical Representation of the Complex Type Flaw Attack
In this chapter complex type flaw attacks are explored and a formal method
is proposed for detecting complex type flaw attacks in cryptographic protocols.
The proposed approach abstracts the fields of protocol messages to a proper
level such that the misinterpretation can be formally modelled. Furthermore,
we extend our control flow analysis by multi-to-one variable binding, which
models the fields misinterpretation.
9.1 Setting the Scene
A complex type flaw attack happens when there is a possibility that a princi-
pal accepts a concatenation of fields as one field. In the LYSA calculus, values
are passed around among processes by means of pattern matching and variable
binding, which models exactly the process that principals acquire knowledge by
reading from the network (or performing decryptions). For example, match-
ing patterns of the form (V1, . . . , Vj ;xj+1, . . . , xk) against expressions of the
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form (V ′1 , . . . , V
′
k) succeeds when the first j values match each other and results
in binding the rest of the values V ′j+1, . . . , V
′
k to the corresponding variables
xj+1, . . . , xk. An implicit pre-requirement for pattern matching is that patterns
and expressions have to be of the same length, which is k is the above example.
This requirement ensures that the processes only receive (or decrypt) the mes-
sages of which the length is exactly as expected. However, on the other hand,
it implicitly removes the possibility of modelling complex type flaws.
Example 9.2 Consider the complex type flaw attack on the protocol from Ex-
ample 9.1, with a LYSA encoding as the following,
(ν N)〈A, {A,N}K〉.0
| (A;xenc)l1 .decrypt xenc as {;xk}l2K in 0
The principal B is expecting {K ′}K but is fooled by accepting {A,N}K and
taking (A,N) as the key K ′ after the decryption. In LYSA, A’s movement can
be roughly expressed as (ν N)〈A, {A,N}K〉.0. Because of the length requirement,
xk can only be binding to a single value but not a concatenation of values, say
(A,N).
To enable LYSA to model complex type flaws, we extend the notation of pattern
matching and variable binding in a way that the length requirement is relaxed
and variables are allowed to be bound to a concatenation of values, i.e. patterns
of the form (V1, . . . , Vj ;xj+1, . . . , xt) are allowed to be matched against expres-
sions of the form (V ′1 , . . . , V
′
k) when expressions have at least the same number
of elements as patterns, i.e. k ≥ t. Pattern matching succeeds when, as usual,
the first j elements are matched and the result is binding values to variables.
Since there are more (or the same) values than variables, we partition the values
into a number of groups such that each group of values is bound to the corre-
sponding variable. Additionally, since a variable is allowed to be bound to a list
of values, there raises the possibility that the list of values is used to encrypt
or decrypt a message. These facts require extension to the value domain, which




| {PV1, . . . , PVk}(PV ′1 ,...,PV ′t )| {|PV1, . . . , PVk|}(PV ′1 ,...,PV ′t )
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For easy presentation, we define a syntax category, P˜ V , which is a list of values.
P˜ V ::= (PV1, . . . , PVk)
In order to formally define the extended notation of pattern matching and vari-
able binding, it is handy to introduce three auxiliary functions. The first one is
the concatenate operator
⊎
, which returns the concatenation of lists of values.
Definition 9.1
⊎
is the concatenation of lists of values, formally,⊎
((PV11, . . . , PV1m), . . . , (PVj1, . . . , PVjn)) =
(PV11, . . . , PV1m, . . . , PVj1, . . . , PVjn)
The second one is to calculate the length of a list.
Definition 9.2
Len(PV1, . . . , PVk) = k
In order to perform multi-to-one bindings, we resort to a partition operator,∏
k, that given a list of values (PV1, . . . , PVn) returns all the possible partitions
composed by k non-empty groups (or lists), where the order among the values
is preserved. The function is formally defined as the following,
Definition 9.3
∏
k partitions a list of values into k non-empty groups, formally,
∏
k(PV1, . . . , PVn) =
{(P˜ V ′1 , . . . , P˜ V ′k) |⊎
(P˜ V ′1 , . . . , P˜ V
′




2(n1, n2, n3) returns two possible partitions: ((n1, n2), (n3))
and ((n1), (n2, n3))
Now binding variables (xj+1, . . . , xt) to values (PVj+1, . . . , PVk) amounts to
partitioning the values into t − j, i.e. the number of variables, lists of values
and binding variables to the corresponding lists of values (P˜ Vj+1, . . . , P˜ Vt) ∈∏
t−j(PVj+1, . . . , PVk).
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Example 9.4 Pattern matching (m;x1, x2) against (m,n1, n2, n3) succeeds and
results in two possible effects,
• binding variable x1 to the list of values (n1) and binding variable x2 to
(n2, n3), or
• binding variable x1 to the list of values (n1, n2) and binding variable x2 to
(n3)
9.2 Dynamic Property
Complex type flaw attacks may happen when a concatenation of fields is wrongly
accepted as one single field. Consequently, at run time, the complex type flaws
are checked by a reference monitor, which aborts when there is a possibility that
a concatenation of values is bound to a single variable. The semantics has the
form
P →R P ′
with the relation R is considered in two variants;
• the standard semantics, P → P ′ takes R to be universally true
• the reference monitor semantics, P →RM P ′, takes
RM(t, k) = (k = t)
The reference monitor makes use of the extended notation of pattern
matching and variable binding and checks after each successful communi-
cation and decryption that whether the pattern, PV1, . . . , PVj ;xj+1, . . . , xt,
and the value to be matched against, PV ′1 , . . . , PV
′
k, have the same length.
In case of k > t, it means that there exists variable xs (j + 1 ≤ s ≤ t),
which binds to a concatenation of at least of two values.
The rules for communication, symmetric and asymmetric decryptions are as
shown in Table 9.1, the rest of the rules are similar to the ones in the original
semantics (Table 3.5).
The semantics rules incorporate a flatten function, fl, which flattens the struc-
ture of a list by removing the outmost brackets. Formally, it is defined as the
following,
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(Com)
∧ji=1PVi = PV ′i ∧ R(t, k)
〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉.P | (PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt)l.P ′
→R P | P ′[fl(P˜ V j+1)/xj+1, . . . , f l(P˜ V t)/xt]
where (P˜ V j+1, . . . , P˜ V t) ∈
∏
t−j(PVj+1, . . . , PVk)
(Dec)
∧ji=1PVi = PV ′i ∧ P˜ V 0 = P˜ V
′
0 ∧ R(t, k)
decrypt {PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V 0 as {PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt}lP˜V ′0 in P
→R P [fl(P˜ V j+1)/xj+1, . . . , f l(P˜ V t)/xt]
where (P˜ V j+1, . . . , P˜ V t) ∈
∏
t−j(PVj+1, . . . , PVk)
(ADec)
∧ji=1PVi = PV ′i ∧ R(t, k)
decrypt {|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m+ as {|PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt|}lm− in P
→R P [fl(P˜ V j+1)/xj+1, . . . , f l(P˜ V t)/xt]
where (P˜ V j+1, . . . , P˜ V t) ∈
∏
t−j(PVj+1, . . . , PVk)
(ASig)
∧ji=1PVi = PV ′i ∧ R(t, k)
decrypt {|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m− as {|PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt|}lm+ in P
→R P [fl(P˜ V j+1)/xj+1, . . . , f l(P˜ V t)/xt]
where (P˜ V j+1, . . . , P˜ V t) ∈
∏
t−j(PVj+1, . . . , PVk)
Table 9.1: Operational Semantics for Complex Type Flaws; P →R P ′, param-
etersed on R.
Definition 9.4
fl((PV1, . . . , PVk)) = PV1, . . . , PVk
The flatten function is applied to a list of values before it is used to replace a
variable, by means of the substitution function, e.g. P [P˜ V /x], in a process. The
idea is to avoid introducing structures into the messages along the evolution of
a process.
The rule (Com) in Table 9.1 states that in order for a communication to happen,
the first j elements in the output and input constructs have to be pairwise equal
before variable binding can take place. If this is the case, the rest of the values
in the output, PVj+1, . . . , PVk, are partitioned into t − j non-empty lists such
that each variable is binding to the corresponding flattened value lists. This
ensures that in the continuation process, all the messages are plain-structured.
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Furthermore, the reference monitor checks the possibility of multi-to-one binding
and aborts the execution when it is the case.
The rules (Dec), (ADec) and (ASig) require that in a successful decryption,
either symmetric or asymmetric, both the keys and the first j values have to
be pairwise equal. In this case the rest of the values are partitioned to some
non-empty lists, of which the number equals to the number of the variables,
and the lists of values are bound to the corresponding variables. Furthermore,
the reference monitor checks the existence of multiple values bound to single
variable and aborts the execution in this case.
Example 9.5 Given the semantics in Table 9.1, the process below evolves as,
〈A, {n1, n2}k〉.0 | (A;x).decrypt x as {; y}lk in 〈y〉.0
→ decrypt x as {; y}lk in 〈y〉.0[{n1, n2}k/x]
= decrypt {n1, n2}k as {; y}lk in 〈y〉.0
→ 〈y〉.0[n1, n2/y]
= 〈n1, n2〉.0
Notice that, in the last step, the variable y is substituted by the flatten value list
n1, n2, which gives a plain-structured output message 〈n1, n2〉.
Using this semantics, detecting complex type flaw attacks can be defined as
follows:
Definition 9.5 (Complex type flaws) A process P is free of complex type flaws
if there are no executions
P →∗ P ′ →R P ′′
such that t < k when P ′ →R P ′′ is derived using (Com) on
〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉.Q | (PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt)l.Q′
or using (Dec) on
decrypt {PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V 0 as {PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt}lP˜V ′0 in P
or using (ADec) on
decrypt {|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m+ as {|PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt|}lm− in P
or using (ASig) on
decrypt {|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m− as {|PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt|}lm+ in P
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It says that a process P is free of complex type flaw attacks if there is no
violation of single-value-to-single-variable-binding in any of its executions, i.e.
each variable is bound to a single value. Consequently, the reference monitor
will never stop any execution step.
Next, we shall show how to extend the original analysis from Chapter 4 such
that it can be used to check whether a process ensures type matching according
to Definition 9.5.
9.3 Static Property
In this section we shall describe our control flow analysis. It is motivated by
the fact that principals have limited capacities for determining the number of
fields in a message he received and a complex type flaw attacks may happen if
a principal accepts a concatenation of fields as a single one.
In the LYSA calculus, a principal receiving a message is modelled by pattern
matching: if the first part (separated by semicolon) of the message matches,
the rest of the values will be bound to corresponding values, amounting to a
one-to-one binding. In practice, however, principals may be fooled by taking
a number of fields as a single one. For modelling this scenario, in the LYSA
calculus, a multiple-to-one binding is allowed. The control flow analysis then
checks whether there is any multiple-to-one binding possibly occurring inside an
input or a decryption and records it as a binding violation in an error component
ψ. Formally, we have
ψ ⊆ P(bLabc)
A label l ∈ ψ means that a value binding inside the input or decryption, marked
with label l, may be a binding violation and therefore is recorded.
Furthermore, we re-define the analysis component ρ as
ρ : bV arc → P(bPV alc∗)
to record all the potential value bindings to variables.
The complex type flaw analysis extends the original analysis in a way that
multiple-to-one value bindings are allowed and are regarded as violations. Some
of the rules are listed in Table 9.3 and Table 9.3, while the rest of them overlap
the original ones in Table 4.1.
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(TN) ρ |= n : ϑ iff (bnc) ∈ ϑ
(TNp) ρ |= m+ : ϑ iff (bm+c) ∈ ϑ
(TNm) ρ |= m− : ϑ iff (bm−c) ∈ ϑ
(TVar) ρ |= x : ϑ iff ρ(bxc) ⊆ ϑ
(TEnc) ρ |= {E1, . . . , Ek}E0 : ϑ
iff ∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀P˜ V 0, . . . , P˜ V k : ∧ki=0 P˜ V i ∈ ϑi ⇒
({fl(⊎(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V k))}P˜V 0) ∈ ϑ
(TAEnc) ρ |= {|E1, . . . , Ek|}E0 : ϑ
iff ∧ki=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀P˜ V 0, . . . , P˜ V k : ∧ki=0 P˜ V i ∈ ϑi ⇒
({|fl(⊎(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V k))|}P˜V 0) ∈ ϑ
Table 9.2: Complex Type Flaw Analysis of LYSA Terms; ρ |= E : ϑ
The rules for names and asymmetric key pairs (TN), (TNp) and (TNm) state
that they are evaluated to lists, of which the elements are their canonical rep-
resentatives.
The rules for encryptions (TEnc) and (TAEnc) are identical to the original ones
except that, since each sub-expression is evaluated to a list of values, the rules
compute all the encrypted values that can be formed by concatenating the lists
of values that the sub-expressions may be evaluated to, and require that those
concatenations are in ϑ.
The rule (TOut), similarly, analyses the output construct and does two things:
first all the expressions are evaluated to lists of values and then it is required
that all the concatenations of the lists of values found by the evaluation are
recorded in κ before the continuation process being analysed.
The rule (TInp) basically looks up in κ for matched tuples and performs variable
binding before analysing the continuation process. This is done in the following
steps: (1) evaluates the first j expressions and because the results are lists of
values, P˜ V , they have to be concatenated to be a single list in order for pattern
matching to be performed, (2) looks up in κ for the list of values matching
the value list from the previous step, (3) partitions the values into variable-
number of groups and requires each group is bound to the corresponding variable
P˜ V ∈ ρ(bxc), and (4) checks whether the pattern and the value list are of the
same length or puts l in the error component and analyses the continuation
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(TOut) ρ, κ, ψ |= 〈E1, . . . , Ek〉.P
iff ∧ki=1 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V k : ∧ki=1P˜ V i ∈ ϑi ⇒
(〈fl(⊎(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V k))〉 ∈ κ ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= P )
(TInp) ρ, κ, ψ |= (E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xt)l.P
iff ∧ji=1 ρ |= Ei : ϑi ∧
∀P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j : ∧ji=1P˜ V i ∈ ϑi ⇒
∀〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉 ∈ κ (k ≥ len+ t− j) :
(PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j)⇒




t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk)⇒
(∧ti=j+1 P˜ V
′
i ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ (k > len+ t− j ⇒ blc ∈ ψ)∧
ρ, κ, ψ |= P )
where len = Len(
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j))
(TDec) ρ, κ, ψ |= decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}lE0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j : ∧ji=1P˜ V i ∈ ϑi ⇒
∀{PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V 0 ∈ ϑ (k ≥ len+ t− j)∧
P˜ V 0 ∈ ϑ0 ∧ (PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j)⇒




t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk)⇒
(∧ti=j+1 P˜ V
′
i ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ (k > len+ t− j ⇒ blc ∈ ψ)∧
ρ, κ, ψ |= P )
where len = Len(
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j))
(TADec) ρ, κ, ψ |= decrypt E as {|E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk|}lE0 in P
iff ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0 ρ |= Ei : ϑi∧
∀{|PV1, . . . , PVk|}P˜V 0 ∈ ϑ : ∀P˜ V
′
0 ∈ ϑ0 :
∀(m+,m−) : {P˜ V 0, P˜ V
′
0} = {(bm+c), (bm−c)}∧
∀P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j : ∧ji=1P˜ V i ∈ ϑi ⇒
(PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j)⇒




t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk)⇒
(∧ti=j+1 P˜ V
′
i ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ (k > len+ t− j ⇒ blc ∈ ψ)∧
ρ, κ, ψ |= P )
where len = Len(
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j))
Table 9.3: Complex Type Flaw Analysis of LYSA Processes: ρ, κ, ψ |= P
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process.
The rules (TDec) and (TADec) do a similar job as (TInp): analyse E to get all
the possible encrypted values, perform pattern matching and variable binding,
and finally check the possibility of multi-to-one binding.
9.4 Correctness of the Complex Type Flaw Anal-
ysis
Lemma 9.6 (Substitution in expression) ρ |= E : ϑ and
(bPV1c, . . . , bPVkc) ∈ ρ(bxc) imply ρ |= E[PV1, . . . , PVk/x] : ϑ
Proof. The proof proceeds by structural induction over expressions by regard-
ing each of the rules in the analysis.
Case (Name). Assume that E = n and ρ |= n : ϑ. For arbitrary choices of x
and PV1, . . . , PVk it holds that n[PV1, . . . , PVk/x] = n so it is immediate that
also ρ |= n[PV1, . . . , PVk/x] : ϑ.
Case (Public Key), (Private Key) are similar.
Case (Variable). Assume that E = x′ and ρ |= x′ : ϑ, i.e. that ρ(bx′c) ⊆ ϑ.
Then there are two cases. Either x′ 6= x in which case x′[PV1, . . . , PVk/x] = x′
so clearly ρ |= x′[PV1, . . . , PVk/x] : ϑ. Alternatively, x′ = x in which case
x′[PV1, . . . , PVk/x] = PV1, . . . , PVk. Furthermore assume that
(bPV1c, . . . , bPVkc) ∈ ρ(bxc) and because ρ(bx′c) ⊆ ϑ, it holds that ρ |=
(PV1, . . . , PVk) : ϑ in which case ρ |= x′[PV1, . . . , PVk/x] : ϑ by the analy-
sis.
Case (Symmetric Encryption). Assume that E = {E1, . . . , Ek}E0 , i.e. ρ |=
{E1, . . . , Ek}E0 : ϑ. The result holds by applying the induction hypothesis on
each individual Ei.
Case (Asymmetric Encryption) is similar.
Lemma 9.7 (Substitution in processes) ρ, κ |= P : ψ and
(bPV1c, . . . , bPVkc) ∈ ρ(bxc) imply ρ, κ |= P [bPV1c, . . . , bPVkc/x] : ψ
Proof. The proof is done by straightforward induction applying the induction
hypothesis on any sub-process and lemma 9.6 on any sub-terms.
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Lemma 9.8 (Evaluation of values) The analysis ρ |= PV : ϑ holds if and
only if (bPV c) ∈ ϑ.
Proof. The proof is by induction in the structure of values. Remembering that
values, PV , are expressions without variables, the proof is straightforward.
Theorem 9.9 (Correctness of Complex Type Flaw Analysis) If P → Q
and ρ, κ, ψ |= P then also ρ, κ, ψ |= Q. Furthermore, if ψ = ∅ then P →RM Q
Proof. By induction on the inference of P → Q.
In case (Com) we assume that
ρ, κ |= 〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉.P | (PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt)l.Q
which amounts to:
(a) ∧ki=1ρ |= PVi : ϑi
(b) ∀P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V k : ∧ki=1P˜ V i ∈ ϑi ⇒ 〈fl(
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V k))〉 ∈ κ
(c) ρ, κ, ψ |= P
(d) ∧ji=1ρ |= PV ′i : ϑ′i
(e) ∀P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j : ∧ji=1P˜ V i ∈ ϑi ⇒
∀〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉 ∈ κ : (PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j)⇒




t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk)⇒
(∧ti=j+1 P˜ V
′
i ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= P∧
(k > len+ t− j)⇒ blc ∈ ψ)
where len = Len(
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j))
Moreover we assume that ∧ji=1PVi = PV ′i and k ≥ t because
〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉.P | (PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt).Q→ P |Q[P˜ V j+1/xj+1, . . . , P˜ V k/xk]
where (P˜ V j+1, . . . , P˜ V t) ∈
∏
t−j(PVj+1, . . . , PVk), and we have to prove that
ρ, κ, ψ |= P | Q[fl(P˜ V j+1)/xj+1, . . . , f l(P˜ V k)/xk].
From (a) we have ∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ϑi because of Lemma 9.8 since ∧ki=1fv(PVi) = ∅
and then (b) gives 〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉 ∈ κ since
⊎
((PV1), . . . , (PVk)) = (PV1, . . . , PVk).
From (d) and the assumption ∧ji=1PVi = PV ′i we get ∧ji=1(PVi) ∈ ϑ′i. Appar-
ently,
⊎
((PV1), . . . , (PVj)) = (PV1, . . . , PVj) and len = j. Now (e) gives




t−j(PVk−j , . . . , PVk) ⇒ ∧ti=j+1 P˜ V
′
i ∈ ρ(bxic) and
ρ, κ, ψ |= Q. The substitution result (Lemma 9.7) then gives
ρ, κ, ψ |= Q[fl(P˜ V ′j+1)/xj+1, . . . , f l(P˜ V
′
t)/xt] and together with (c) this gives
the required result.
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For the second part of the result we observe that (k > len + t − j) ⇒ l ∈ ψ
follows from (e) and since ψ = ∅ and len = j it must the case that t = k. Thus
the condition of the rule (Com) are fulfilled for →RM .
In case (Dec) we assume
ρ, κ, ψ |= decrypt {PV1, . . . , PVk}E0 as {PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt}lE′0 in P
which amounts to:
(f) ρ |= {PV1, . . . , PVk}E0 : ϑ
(g) ρ |= E′0 : ϑ′0 ∧ ∧ji=1ρ |= PV ′i : ϑ′i
(h) ∀P˜ V 0, . . . , P˜ V j : ∧ji=1P˜ V i ∈ ϑ′i ⇒
∀{PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V ′0 ∈ ϑ ∧ P˜ V 0 ∈ ϑ0∧
(PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j)⇒




t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk))⇒
(∧ti=j+1 P˜ V
′
i ∈ ρ(bxic) ∧ ρ, κ, ψ |= P∧
(k > len+ t− j)⇒ blc ∈ ψ)
where len = Len(
⊎
(P˜ V 1, . . . , P˜ V j))
Moreover we assume that E0 = E′0,∧ji=1PVi = PV ′i and k ≥ t because
decrypt {PV1, . . . , PVk}E0 as {PV ′1 , . . . , PV ′j ;xj+1, . . . , xt}lE′0 in P →
P [P˜ V j+1/xj+1, . . . , P˜ V k/xk] where (P˜ V j+1, . . . , P˜ V t) ∈
∏
t−j(PVj+1, . . . , PVt),
and we have to prove ρ, κ, ψ |= P [P˜ V j+1/xj+1, . . . , P˜ V k/xk].
From (f) we have E0) ∈ ϑi and PVi ∈ ϑi since fv(E0) = ∅ and ∧ki=1fv(PVi) =
∅, and then (g) gives {PV1, . . . , PVk}E0 ∈ ϑ since
⊎
((PV1), . . . , (PVk)) =
PV1, . . . , PVk. From (h) and the assumption E0 = E′0 and ∧ji=1PVi = PV ′i
we get E0 ∈ ϑ′0 and ∧ji=1(PVi) ∈ ϑ′i. Apparently,
⊎
((PV1), . . . , (PVj)) =
(PV1, . . . , PVj) and len = j. Now (e) gives




t−j(PVk−j , . . . , PVk) ⇒ ∧ti=j+1 P˜ V
′
i ∈ ρ(bxic) and
ρ, κ, ψ |= Q. The substitution result (Lemma 9.7) then gives
ρ, κ, ψ |= P [P˜ V ′j+1/xj+1, . . . , P˜ V
′
t/xt], which is the required result.
For the second part of the result we observe that (k > len + t − j) ⇒ l ∈ ψ
follows from (h) and since ψ = ∅ and len = j it must the case that t = k. Thus
the condition of the rule (Dec) are fulfilled for →RM .
In case (ADec) and (ASig) are similar.
In cases (New), (ANew), (Par) and (Rep) follow directly from the induc-
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tion hypothesis.
The case (Congr) also uses the congruence result.
9.5 The Attacker
The syntax of LYSA has now been extended for modelling complex type flaws.
Consequently, the way of modelling the attacker has to be changed correspond-
ingly.
In the complex type flaw analysis, each message sent to or received by princi-
pals is viewed as a sequence of bits. Protocol participants then parse the bit
sequences into a number of fields as specified by the protocol. It is reasonable to
assume that each protocol participants know the bit length of the expected mes-
sage beforehand and hence refuse to accept the messages of a different length.
Under this assumption, we say that the attack can only send out messages of
which the bit length equals to one of the messages exchanged during the protocol
execution. We claim that the attacker will not gain anything more by sending
out a message of a different bit length. Similarly for encryptions, the attacker
only generates encryptions of which the bit length equals to an encryption gen-
erated during the protocol execution. Formally, we define a function, BLen, to
represent the bit length of names and encryptions, i.e.
BLen(PV ) : the bit length of the value PV
Furthermore, we require that
• the bit lengths of all the sending or receiving messages are in Bκ, and
• the bit lengths of all the symmetric and asymmetric encryptions are in
BEnc
Obviously, Bκ and BEnc are all finite and can be computed by inspecting the
process Psys.
Given the assumptions as above, the extended Dolev-Yao condition for the LYSA
calculus can be expressed as the conjunction of the five components in Table
9.4.
Theorem 9.10 (Correctness of Dolev-Yao Condition) If (ρ, κ, ψ) satisfies
FDYRM of type (Nf ,Bκ,BEnc) then ρ, κ, ψ |= Q for all attackers Q of extended type
({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Bκ,BEnc).
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(1) ∧k∈Bκ ∀ 〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉 ∈ κ : ∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may learn by eavesdropping
(2) ∧k∈BEnc ∀({PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V0) ∈ ρ(z•) : P˜ V0 ∈ ρ(z•)⇒∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈BEnc ∀({|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m+) ∈ ρ(z•) : (m−) ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ρ(z•)
∧k∈BEnc ∀({|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m−) ∈ ρ(z•) : (m+) ∈ ρ(z•)⇒
∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may learn by decrypting messages with keys already known
(3) ∀ P˜ V0, PV1, . . . , PVk : P˜ V0 ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ρ(z•) ∧
BLen({PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V0) ∈ BEnc ⇒ ({PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V0) ∈ ρ(z•)
∀ m+, PV1 . . . , PVk : (m+) ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ρ(z•) ∧
BLen({|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m+) ∈ BEnc ⇒ ({|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m+) ∈ ρ(z•)
∀ m−, PV1 . . . , PVk : (m+) ∈ ρ(z•) ∧ ∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ρ(z•) ∧
BLen({|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m−) ∈ BEnc ⇒ ({|PV1, . . . , PVk|}m−) ∈ ρ(z•)
the attacker may construct new encryptions using the keys known
(4) ∀PV1, . . . , PVk : ∧ki=1(PVi) ∈ ρ(z•) ∧
BLen(PV1) + . . .+BLen(PVk) ∈ Bκ ⇒ 〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉 ∈ κ
the attacker may actively forge new communications
(5) {(n•), (m±• )} ∪ Nf ⊆ ρ(z•)
the attacker initially has some knowledge
Table 9.4: The Attacker’s Capabilities in Complex Type Flaw Analysis.
Proof. By structural induction on Q.
In case of (Inp), i.e. Q is the process of the form
(E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xt)l• .P
and here we need to find ϑ1, . . . , ϑj and show
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(a) ∧ji=1ρ |= Ei : ϑi and
for all P˜ V1, . . . , P˜ Vj that ∧ji=1P˜ Vi ∈ ϑi, and
for all 〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉 ∈ κ with (PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V1, . . . , P˜ Vj), and:




t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk) that
(b) ∧ti=j+1P˜ V ′i ∈ ρ(bxic)
(c) (k > len+ t− j)⇒ l• ∈ ψ
(d) ρ, κ, ψ |= P
We choose ϑi(1 ≤ i ≤ j) as the least set such that ρ |= Ei : ϑi and prove that
ϑi ⊆ ρ(z•); intuitively, if Ei has free variables z1, . . . , zm then ϑi consists of all
values bEi[PV1/z1, . . . , PVm/zm]c where (PVj)(1 ≤ j ≤ m) ∈ ρ(z•). Next con-
sider 〈PV1, . . . , PVk〉 ∈ κ and assume that (PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V1, . . . , P˜ Vj)
where ∧ji=1P˜ Vi ∈ ϑi and let P˜ V ′j+1, . . . , P˜ V ′t ∈
∏
t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk), and
this takes care of (a). Since ∧ji=1ϑi ⊆ ρ(z•), as above, we have ∧ji=1P˜ Vi ∈ ρ(z•)
and by FDYRM we get ∧ti=j+1P˜ V ′i ∈ ρ(bxic). Since bxic = z• this takes care of (b)
and (c); furthermore P has extended type ({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Bκ,BENC) and the
induction hypothesis then takes care of (d).
In case of (Dec), i.e. Q is the process of the form
decrypt E as {E1, . . . , Ej ;xj+1, . . . , xk}l•E0 in P
and we need to find ϑ and ϑ0, . . . , ϑj and show
(a) ρ |= E : ϑ ∧ ∧ji=0ρ |= Ei : ϑi
for all P˜ V1, . . . , P˜ Vj that ∧ji=1P˜ Vi ∈ ϑi, and
for all {PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V0 ∈ ϑ with
P˜ V0 ∈ ϑ0 and (PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V1, . . . , P˜ Vj), and:




t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk) that
(b) ∧ti=j+1P˜ V ′i ∈ ρ(bxic)
(c) ¬RM(t, k)⇒ l• ∈ ψ
(d) ρ, κ, ψ |= P : ψ
We choose ϑ as the least set such that ρ |= E : ϑ and prove that ϑ ⊆
ρ(z•); intuitively, if E has free variables z1, . . . , zm then ϑ consists of all val-
ues bE[PV1/z1, . . . , PVm/zm]c where (PVi) ∈ ρ(z•). We perform a similar
development for ϑ0, . . . , ϑj . Next consider {PV1, . . . , PVk}P˜V0 ∈ ϑ and as-
sume that (PV1, . . . , PVlen) =
⊎
(P˜ V1, . . . , P˜ Vj) where ∧ji=1P˜ Vi ∈ ϑi and let




t−j(PVk−len, . . . , PVk), and this takes care of (a).
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Since ϑ0 ⊆ ρ(z•), as above, we have P˜ V0 ∈ ρ(z•) and by FDYRM we get ∧ti=j+1P˜ V ′i ∈
ρ(bxic). Since bxic = z• this takes care of (b) and (c); furthermore P has ex-
tended type ({z•},Nf ∪ {n•},Bκ,BENC) and the induction hypothesis then
takes care of (d).
The remaining cases are similar.
Example 9.6 Consider the protocol from Example 9.1,
A → : {A,N}K
→ B : {K ′}K
The protocol can be modelled as the following,
(ν N)〈A, {A,N}K〉.0
| (A;xenc)l1 .decrypt xenc as {;xk}l2K in 0
where the identity of the sender (or the expected sender), A, is included in the
output (or input) message.
Semantically, the two parallel processes can make a communication, where the
message 〈A, {A,N}K〉 is sent onto the network, which results in binding the
value ({A,N}K) to xenc and the further decryption of xenc then binds (A,N)
to the variable xk. Finally the process evolves into 0 | 0.
The process gives rise to binding the value (bAc, bNc) to the variable xk. The
analysis components ρ, κ and ψ have the following entries:
〈bAc, {bAc, bNc}bKc〉 ∈ κ ψ = {bl2c}
({bAc, bNc}bKc) ∈ ρ(bxencc) (bAc, bNc) ∈ ρ(bxkc)
Now ψ = {bl2c} shows the complex type flaw attack is successfully detected.
9.6 Complex Type Flaw Analysis at the Meta
Level
To show in detail how the complex type flaws analysis works, we use the
Amended Needham-Schroeder protocol Protocol, which is subject to a complex
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type flaw attack, as an example. The analysis results show that the attack can
be successfully captured. The narration of the Amended Needham-Schroeder is
the following (please see Chapter 2.4.1 for a detailed explanation),
1. A→ B : A
2. B → A : {A,NB}KB
3. A→ S : A,B,NA, {A,NB}KB
4. S → A : {NA, B,K, {K,NB , A}KB}KA
5. A→ B : {K,NB , A}KB
6. B → A : {N}K
7. A→ B : {N − 1}K
Below is an encoding of the protocol in a scenario where all the principals Ai
and Bj share the same key K. The indexing parallel is used to describe parallel
sessions where principal Ai communicates to principal Bj . Note that indices are
also attached to labels.
let X ⊆ S1 in let Y ⊆ S2 in (ν K)
|i∈X |j∈Y !〈Ai, Bj , Ai〉.(Bj , Ai;x1ij)l1ij .
(ν Naij)〈Ai, S,Ai, Bj , Naij , x1ij〉.
(S,Ai;x2ij)l2ij .decrypt x2ij as {Naij , Bj ;xkij , x3ij}l3ijK in
〈Ai, Bj , x3ij〉.
(Bj , Ai;x4ij)l4ij .decrypt x4ij as {;xnij}l5ijxkij in
〈Ai, Bj , {xnij − 1}xkij 〉.0
| |i∈X |j∈Y !(Ai, Bj ; y1ij)l6ij .
(ν Nbij) 〈Bj , Ai, {y1ij , Nbij}K〉.
(Ai, Bj ; y2ij)l7ij .decrypt y2ij as {Nbij , Ai; ykij}l8ijK in
(ν Nij)〈Bj , Ai, {Nij}ykij 〉.
(Ai, Bj ; y3ij)l9ij .decrypt y3ij as {Nij ; }l10ijykij in 0
| |i∈X |j∈Y !(Ai, S, Ai, Bi; znaij , z1ij)l11ij .decrypt z1ij as {Ai; znbij}l12ijK in
(ν K ′)〈S,Ai, {znaij , Bj ,K ′ij , {znbij , Ai,K ′}K}K〉.0
Taking S1 = {1} and S2 = {1, 2} the analysis holds whenever
{l611, l612} ⊆ ψ
Thus, the analysis reports possible complex type flaw attacks such that in the
input (Ai, Bj ; y1ij)l6ij , a multi-to-one binding may occur.
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To see that there really is a violation one must find an execution that leads to
the above binding violation. This can be attempted for any two sessions taking
their indexes from N1 and N2. Consider the following message exchange:
A B Attacker
1.1 〈A1, B1, A1〉 (A1, B1; y111)
1.2 (B1, A1;x111) 〈B1, A1, {y111, Nb11}K〉
1.3 〈A1, S, A1, B1, Na11, x111〉 (A1, S,A1, B1;
ZNa11 , Zx111)
2.1 (A1, B1; y111) 〈A1, B1, ZNa11 , B1, ZK〉
2.2 〈B1, A1, {y111, Nb11}K〉 (B1, A1;Zy11)
1.4 (S,A1;x211). 〈S,A1, Zy11〉
decrypt x211 as
{Na11, B1;xk11, x311}K
1.5 〈A1, B1, x311〉 (A1, B1;Zx311)
1.6 (B1, A1;x411) 〈B1, A1, ZN 〉
decrypt x411 as
{;xn11}xk11
1.7 〈A1, B1, {xn11 − 1}xk11〉 (A1, B1;Zxm11)
In the step 2.1, the following pattern matching can successfully take place in
the input construct,
(A1, B1; y112) | 〈A1, B1, ZNa11 , B1, ZK〉
and let the variable y111 become bound to the value (Na11, B1, ZK), where ZK
is a value generated by the attacker. This is a multi-to-one binding, which is
recorded by l611 ∈ ψ, and represents a complex type flaw attack. In step 2.2,
the principal B1 sends the value tuple 〈B1, A1, {Na11, B1, ZK , Nb11}K〉 onto the
network, which is intercepted and replayed by the attacker in step 1.4 to the
principal A1. After the successful decryption,
decrypt {Na11, B1, ZK , Nb11}K as {Na11, B1;xk11, x311}K
A1 then believes the value, Zk, which becomes bound to the variable xk11, is
the new session key generated by the server S. In the next 2 steps, A1 uses Zk
as the new session key to finish the challenge and response procedure with the
attacker and completes the protocol. Some of the relevant entries of the analysis
components ρ and κ are shown below,
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ρ : (A1) ∈ ρ(y111)
({A1, Nb11}K) ∈ ρ(x111)
(Na11, B1, n•) ∈ ρ(y111)
(n•) ∈ ρ(xk11)
(Nb11) ∈ ρ(x311)
κ : 〈A1, B1, Na11, B1, n•, 〉 ∈ κ
〈B1, A1, {Na11, B1, n•, Nb11}K〉 ∈ κ
Similarly, the attack may happen to the session between the principals A1 and
B2, which accounts for the error l612 ∈ ψ.
The protocol can be modified such that each principal with different keys for
different roles, i.e. all the principals Ai share a master key Kai with the server
and all the principals Bj share Kbj with the server. For a version of the process
that has been modified in this way, the analysis holds for ψ = ∅ and thereby it
guarantees absence of complex type flaw attacks.
We have shown how the analysis can capture complex type flaw attacks by
checking the possibilities of multi-to-one binding. However the analysis results
are not precise enough, i.e. every multi-to-one binding is regarded as a violation,
even when it may not represent an actual attack.
The extended notation of variable binding can be combined with origin and des-
tination annotations to capture violation of authentication property caused by
complex type flaw attacks. Rather than focusing on multi-to-one variable bind-
ing, one may add origin and destination annotations to the process in question
and let the control flow analysis captures possible violation to the authentication
annotations.
Example 9.7 Consider the encoding of the amended Needham-Schroeder pro-
tocol with origin and destination annotations,
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let X ⊆ S1 in let Y ⊆ S2 in (ν K)
|i∈X |j∈Y !〈Ai, Bj , Ai〉.(Bj , Ai;x1ij)l1ij .
(ν Naij)〈Ai, S,Ai, Bj , Naij , x1ij〉.
(S,Ai;x2ij)l2ij .
decrypt x2ij as {Naij , Bj ;xkij , x3ij}l3ijK [at a1 orig {s2}] in
〈Ai, Bj , x3ij〉.
(Bj , Ai;x4ij)l4ij .decrypt x4ij as {;xnij}l5ijxkij [at a2 orig {b3}] in
〈Ai, Bj , {xnij − 1}xkij 〉.0
| |i∈X |j∈Y !(Ai, Bj ; y1ij)l6ij .
(ν Nbij) 〈Bj , Ai, {y1ij , Nbij}K [at b1 dest {s1}]〉.
(Ai, Bj ; y2ij)l7ij .
decrypt y2ij as {Nbij , Ai; ykij}l8ijK [at b2 orig s3] in
(ν Nij)〈Bj , Ai, {Nij}ykij [at b3 dest {a2}]〉.
(Ai, Bj ; y3ij)l9ij .decrypt y3ij as {Nij ; }l10ijykij [at b4 orig {a3}] in 0
| |i∈X |j∈Y !(Ai, S, Ai, Bi; znaij , z1ij)l11ij .
decrypt z1ij as {Ai; znbij}l12ijK [at s1 orig {b1}] in
(ν K ′)
〈S,Ai, {znaij , Bj ,K ′ij ,
{znbij , Ai,K ′}K [at s3 dest {b2}]}K [at s2 dest {a1}]〉.0
The analysis results have a non-empty error component, i.e.
(b1, a1) ∈ ψ
which amounts to the same complex type flaw attack as described before.
9.7 Summary
A complex type flaw attack happens when a concatenation of fields in a message
is interpreted as a single field. However, most existing protocol analysers do not
take this kind of attack into consideration. Little research has been done on
this topic, among which is the work by Meadows [64] where a procedure is
proposed to determine whether or not type confusions are possible for a given
protocol. The approach involves a search for all potential misinterpretations of
two given protocol messages that are of equal bit-string length. The procedure
also evaluates the likelihood of the misinterpretations by means of probability.
As a complementary work, Long [59, 58] developed an approach to prove whether
or not a known complex type flaw attack may really happen on a given protocol.
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The approach exploits the data structure of the Z [84] specification language by
constructing all the protocol messages from a common atomic primitive, and
therefore it gains control over which message fields may or may not be confused.
In this chapter, we extended the notation of variable binding in the process cal-
culus LYSA from one-to-one to multi-to-one binding, thus making easier mod-
elling the scenario where a list of fields is confused with a single field. The
semantics of extended LYSA makes use of a reference monitor to capture the
possible multi-to-one binding at run time. On the static property, the control
flow analysis is extended to take multi-to-one binding into account. A protocol
is ensured as free of complex type flaws when the control flow analysis confirms
the zero possibility of multi-to-one binding.
Chapter 10
Conclusion
We studied a number of properties of security protocols, in the process alge-
bra framework of the LYSA calculus, on the common basis of the operational
semantics using dynamic and static techniques.
In the first four chapters, we presented some background information including
an introduction to the process calculus LYSA, a succinct and powerful language
for modelling security protocols running in various scenarios, and a control flow
analysis for the LYSA calculus, which statically predicts safe and computable
approximations of the behaviours that the object processes may be assumed to
perform during the executions.
In the next five chapters, we considered various security properties and attacks.
Each of them is formally expressed in terms of annotations. We then extended
the control flow analysis in a way that the annotations are checked for compli-
ance. The control flow analysis guarantees that if a process passes the test, it
will never violate the security requirements at run time.
In this thesis, on top of process calculus modelling, five different control flow
analyses have been presented. However, the analyses share a great amount of
similarities, as they are all themselves extensions of a fairly standard one, which
over-approximates the run-time protocol behaviours. The main dissimilarity
among the analyses is the way that each kind of annotations is handled in order
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to verify security properties. This observation gives rise to a few options for
further research.
10.1 Combination of Analyses
This thesis has presented a contribution in the area of automated analysis of
various security properties, e.g. confidentiality, freshness, simple type flaw and
complex type flaw, of communication protocols running in a malicious environ-
ment. On one hand, obviously, extending the repertoire with more interesting
properties, e.g. integrity, availability and non-repudiation, that can be analysed
is an ongoing line of future research. However, on the other hand, instead of
putting a great amount of effort into building such a large property repertoire,
where some elements of it might be of less interest to certain users, one may
look into finding a way to integrate the existing analyses in order to yield more
comprehensive results with, hopefully, less resource consumption.
The feasibility of this line of future work is based on the fact that all the first
four analyses presented in this thesis share the same framework and the main
differences are in the way of handling various annotations. As a first attempt
along this line, we shall apply the combination of freshness analysis and simple
type flaw analysis to the Andrew Secure RPC protocol.
1. A→ B : A, {NA}K
2. B → A : {NA+ 1, NB}K
3. A→ B : {NB + 1}K
4. B → A : {K ′, NB′}K
As shown in chapter 8.6, simple type flaw analysis detects that the protocol
is subject to a type flaw attack, where the principal A accepts the message
{NA + 1, NB}K , from step 2, in step 4 and takes the value NA + 1 as the new
key K ′.
Nevertheless, the simple type flaw attack is not the only attack that the Andrew
Secure RPC protocol is subject to. Applying the freshness analysis to the pro-
tocol gives a hint that, the attacker may replay a message, say, {K ′old, NB′old}K ,
of another session in step 4, and fool the principal A to accept an old session
key K ′old as a new one.
In this sense, the combination the freshness analysis and simple type flaw anal-
ysis finds two kinds of attacks that each single one is not capable of, and mean-
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while, only requires to be run once. The combination of the two analyses could
be obtained by generalising the syntax and turning on both reference monitors
in the semantics.
10.1.1 Toward a More General Framework
In the previous section, we have explored the possibility of combining the fresh-
ness analysis and the simple type flaw analysis, and shown that the combination
gives rise to a more comprehensive result than the ones yielded by each indi-
vidual analysis. Along this line, one might find it interesting to create a more
general framework, that not only characterises the existing analyses, but also
allows one to freely specify annotations for dealing with other security proper-
ties that may be of interest without the need to modify the analysis or design a
new analysis.
10.2 User-Friendly Interface
The analyses presented in this thesis are aiming at assisting protocol designers
in the development of high quality, preferably flaw-free, protocols. In practice,
however, users have to encode protocols in LYSA and therefore at least basic
knowledge about process calculi is required. Consequently, the analyses are often
hard to use for non-experts, which limits their direct and practical impact. This
is actually a weak point for not only LYSA but a lot of other formal analysis tools.
One of the ways to address this problem is to provide developers of security
protocols with a high-level interface for those formal analysis tools, such as the
work done in Casper [61], CAPSL [28], CVS [34], and AVISS [7]. As far as LYSA
is concerned, in [21], an interface for the LYSA tool is defined in the style of the
Unified Modelling Language (UML). The system works in the following way:
1) allow the security protocols to be modelling in a consistent way in UML, 2)
take the UML model as input and convert it to a corresponding LYSA process
annotated with the security properties specified in the UML model, 3) analyse
the LYSA process and output the analysis result.
However, the UML interface requires professional knowledge in the field of
UML and thus is inconvenient for non-expert users. Furthermore, as pro-
tocols are more often published in the protocol narrations manner, it might
be plausible to allow users to describe protocols in a more compact way, e.g.
“A→ B : message”.
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In fact, a project aiming at integrating the SENSORIA tool case into a service
oriented architecture (SOA) has been carried out. As the LYSA tool is a member
of the tool case, one of the goals of the project is to develop a high-level interface
for the LYSA tool and encapsulate it as one of the services (units) that can be
distributed over a network and can be combined together and reused to create
other applications.
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